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 INTRODUCTION 
When mediation was first introduced to the courts, the process was hailed 
as “alternative.”1 Mediation gave disputants the opportunity to discuss and 
resolve their dispute themselves, without lawyers or judges imposing legal 
norms or a legal process. The role of the third party was to facilitate the 
disputants’ negotiations, not to dictate the outcome. Because the disputants 
were able to focus on their underlying interests in mediation, the process 
could result in creative, customized solutions.2 
The picture of mediation is changing, however, as the process settles into 
its role as a tool for the resolution of personal injury, contract, and other 
nonfamily cases on the courts’ civil dockets. Recent research suggests that 
this dispute resolution procedure increasingly resembles a traditional bilateral 
negotiation session between attorneys (albeit with a third party in 
attendance)3 or a “glorified”4 judicial settlement conference.5 Attorneys 
 
 
 1. More recently, commentators have urged that the word “appropriate” should replace 
“alternative” in describing mediation and other nontrial dispute resolution processes. See, e.g., Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of 
Settlement (In Some Cases) , 83 GEO. L.J.  2663, 2689 (1995) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Whose 
Dispute Is It Anyway?]. Perhaps this semantic change reflects a larger search for legitimacy. See 
Robert Dingwall, Divorce Mediation as a Social Movement, in RECHTSSOCIOLOGIE,  SOCIALE 
PROBLEMEN EN JUSTITIEEL BELEID [SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND LEGAL POLICY ] 
371, 372 (F. Van Leon & V. Van Acken eds., 1999) (observing that many mediators spent many years 
eagerly “seek[ing] a niche in the shadow of the dominant profession [e.g., the legal profession], asking 
only to be recognized as offering a useful and legitimate supplement to its services”). 
 2. See infra  Part I. 
 3. See infra  Part I. 
 4. John Bickerman, Great Potential: The New Federal Law Provides Vehicle, If Local Courts 
Want to Move on ADR, DISP . RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 3, 5. 
 5. See Deborah R. Hensler, A Research Agenda: What We Need to Know About Court-
Connected ADR, DISP.  RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 15, 17 [hereinafter Hensler, A Research Agenda] 
(observing that anecdotal data and empirical studies “suggest that mediation of civil lawsuits in 
practice is evaluative rather than facilitative, and yields distributive outcomes. In other words, court 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/3
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dominate the mediation sessions, while their clients play no or minimal 
roles.6 Mediators are selected for their ability to value cases and to assess 
each side’s strengths and weaknesses.7 Mediators also increasingly bypass or 
marginalize the joint session in order to move quickly to caucuses.8 
Moreover, a surprisingly small percentage of the settlements produced by 
these mediation sessions are creative or even nonmonetary.9  
Mediation’s shift strongly suggests that the bargaining paradigm that 
dominates and delivers settlements in most civil cases is capturing the 
mediation process. This Article will begin by demonstrating that significant 
theory and research in negotiation and decision making support the move 
toward attorney dominance, evaluative intervention, the marginalization or 
abandonment of joint sessions and traditional monetary settlements.10 If 
mediation is viewed simply as a means to enhance the deal-making that 
occurs in the negotiated settlement of most civil cases, the process’ evolution 
appears to represent a successful adaptation to the realities of our civil system 
of “litigotiation.”11 
Many commentators and mediators, however, argue that mediation is a 
process that goes beyond assisting current approaches to bargaining and 
decision making. 12 These commentators urge that the disputants want and 
 
 
mediation is a lot like a settlement conference.”); Deborah R. Hensler, ADR Research at the 
Crossroads, 2000 J. DISP . RESOL. 71, 76 n.23 (2000) (observing that “[i]n a . . . review of empirical 
literature examining court -ordered mediation practices, [she] found few examples of facilitative 
mediation of civil damage suits” and was “unable to identify any significant differences in case 
outcomes between . . . courts that adopted more facilitative mediation approaches and courts that 
adopted more evaluative approaches”).  
 6. See infra  Part I.A. 
 7. See infra  Part I.B. 
 8. See infra  Part I.C. 
 9. See infra  Part I.D. 
 10. See infra  Part I. 
 11. Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268-69 (1984) (“On the contemporary American legal scene the negotiation of 
disputes is not an alternative to litigation. . . . There are not two distinct processes, negotiation and 
litigation; there is a single process of disputing . . . that we might call litigotiation . . . . [N]egotiation 
and litigation are not separate processes, but are inseparably entwined. Negotiation, then, is not the 
law’s soft penumbra, but the hard heart of the process.”) (footnote omitted). See also  Robert A. Baruch 
Bush, “What Do We Need A Mediator For?”: Mediation’s “Value-Added” for Negotiators, 12 OHIO 
ST. J. ON  DISP. RESOL. 1, 5 (1996) (observing that the standard method of case disposition is through 
settlement as result of negotiation); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial 
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN.  L. REV. 1339, 1390 (1994) (observing that 
settlements are not “a stray byproduct of the judicial process, but .  . . part of the essential core”).  
 12. See Baruch Bush, supra note 11, at 32 (“[E]mpowerment and recognition logically belong at 
the center of the practice of mediation as assisted negotiation. When they are placed there, then the 
process will be as useful and attractive to its potential users as the theory suggests it should be.”); 
Bickerman, supra note 4, at 3, 5 (“[I]f magistrates treat mediation as glorified settlement conferences, 
then the value of the process may be lost.”); Linda R. Singer, Future Looks Bright, But Challenges 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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deserve something more. There is disagreement, however, regarding the 
identity of the additional benefit that mediation can offer to disputants. Some 
commentators urge that this additional benefit is an affirmation of democratic 
values13 and citizens’ rights to self-determination,14 made possible through 
disputants’ control over both the mediation process and the final outcome. 
Others point to mediation’s capacity to provide “empowerment and 
recognition”15 to disputants and even to engender self-transformation or 
“moral growth.”16 Still others assert that the added benefit of mediation is its 
potential for identifying disputants’ unique underlying interests and creating 
 
 
Include Retaining Our Core Values, DISP.  RESOL. MAG., Spring 2000, at 26, 29 (“While efficiency 
may be the value that accounts for much of the interest of the legal establishment and the general 
public in our processes, the values of access, the potential for creative solutions and the ability of the 
parties to participate in shaping outcomes are what makes us unique.”).  
 13. See JAY P .  FOLBERG &  ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION:  A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LITIGATION 35 (1984) (“Using mediation to facilitate conflict 
resolution and encourage self-determination thus strengthens democratic values and enhances the 
dignity of those in conflict.”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New 
Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 
407, 452 (1997) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution] (“As I have 
argued for the substantive justification of ADR (and settlement) on the basis of democratic, party-
empowering participation, consent and quality of solutions, and outcomes, then so must the ethics (and 
justice) of ADR be judged by these goals and purposes . . . .”); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative v. 
Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the “Grid” Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 1001-02 
(1997) [hereinafter Stulberg, Faciliative v. Evaluative Mediator Orientations] (“Concepts of 
participation and empowerment are not idle pleasantries . . . but are central principles of a democratic 
society and critical features of consensual decisionmaking processes, of which mediation is 
traditionally thought to be a prime example.”). See also Alex Wellington, Takin g Codes of Ethics 
Seriously: Alternative Dispute Resolution and Reconstitutive Liberalism , 12 CAN. J. L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE  297, 299 (1999) (arguing that liberal, pluralistic, democratic theory provides coherent 
context for understanding and defending the value of alternative dispute resolution).  
 14. See Nancy Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected 
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization? , 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 15-18 (2001) 
(describing the vision of self-determination that dominated the rhetoric of early mediation as assuming 
that disputants would do the following: actively and directly participate in the mediation process, 
choose and control the substantive norms to guide their decision making, create the options for 
settlement, and control the final decision regarding whether or not to settle). 
 15. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 2 (1994) 
(urging that mediation should promote empowerment and recognition of disputants). Empowerment is 
the renewal of disputants’ values, strengths, and capacity to handle life’s complexities. Id. Recognition 
is “acknowledgment and empathy for the situation and problems of others.” Id. Baruch Bush, supra 
note 11, at 29-30 (describing empowerment as “supporting—and not supplanting—the parties’ own 
deliberation and decisionmaking processes” and describing recognition as “inviting, encouraging and 
supporting the parties’ presentation . . . and reception . . . of each other’s perspectives and new and 
altered views [to] one another”). 
 16. BARUCH BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 15, at 2-3 (asserting that “dispute resolution scholars 
see that mediation’s transformative dimensions are connected to an emerging, higher vision of self and 
society, one based on moral development and interpersonal relations rather than on satisfaction and 
individual autonomy”). More recently, Professor Bush has described the effect of empowerment and 
recognition in more limited terms, noting that it can result in “enhancement of interpersonal expression 
and communication, and de-demonization . . . .” Baruch Bush, supra note 11, at 30-31.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/3
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solutions that respond to those interests.17  
Of course, “context matters”18 when defining the mission and the quality 
of any particular model of mediation. Therefore, what is the “something 
more” that mediation should be expected to deliver when the process is 
occurring within the specific context of civil litigation? When disputants 
have brought their civil nonfamily conflicts to the courts for resolution, what 
are they entitled to expect? Are they entitled to anything more than getting 
deals and settling their legal disputes? What institutional values should guide 
and be visible in court-connected mediation, particularly when the courts are 
ordering disputants into this third-party process? 
This Article argues that particularly within the context of the courts, 
mediation should be expected to deliver to disputants an experience of 
justice, more commonly referred to as procedural justice. Although some 
commentators have suggested that our courts are moving toward a 
transactional model, in which “[t]he courthouse [is] the site for large 
financial transactions . . . . [involving] the buying and selling of . . . legal 
rights, [rather than] their possible adjudication,”19 it is not the metaphor of 
the marketplace that provides the courts with their social and political 
legitimacy. Research in the field of procedural justice clearly reveals that 
citizens want the courts to resolve their disputes in a manner that feels like 
justice is being done.20 This yearning for the experience of justice is so 
profound that disputants’ perceptions regarding procedural justice affect their 
perceptions of the distributive justice that is delivered by a dispute resolution 
 
 
 17. See Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 13, at 416 (“[A]s 
formalism spawned realism, the rigidity of rules and the ‘limited remedial imagination of courts,’ gave 
(re)birth to the more flexible and hybrid forms of mediation, mini-trials and settlement conferences 
which were intended to provide not only more flexible processes but more party-sensitive and complex 
solutions than the traditional litigated outcome.”). Professor Menkel-Meadow also argues that 
negotiated settlements can be more “democratic” than adjudicated results because settlements 
potentially allow for fuller expression of the parties’ interdependent needs and interests. Menkel-
Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? , supra  note 1, at 2673. In addition, negotiated settlements 
facilitate outcomes that maximize party goals and produce more “just” results than adjudication 
because they can incorporate a variety of remedies. Id. at 2673-74. Moreover, negotiated settlements 
serve an “important critical and democratic function” by offering a means to “criticize, avoid, or 
correct laws that some find unjust, inefficient, or just plain inapplicable.” Id. at 2676. 
 18. Craig A. McEwen, Managing Corporate Disputing: Overcoming Barriers to the Effective 
Use of Mediation for Reducing The Cost and Time of Litigation , 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 16 
(1998). 
 19. William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J.  371, 372 
(2001). Professor Rubenstein argues that a “transactional” model helps in understanding the logic of 
recent developments in complex private litigation. Id. at 418-31. He notes that these developments, 
such as the management of mass tort and securities class actions, are not adequately explained by 
either the “adversarial” model described by Lon Fuller or the “managerial” model described and 
critiqued by Judith Resnik. Id. at 410-18. See also  Galander, supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra  Part II.A. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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process, their compliance with the outcome of the dispute resolution process, 
and their perception of the legitimacy of the institution providing or 
sponsoring the process.21 Ultimately, insuring that mediation comes within a 
procedural justice paradigm serves some of the courts’ most important 
goals—delivering justice, delivering resolution, and fostering respect for the 
important public institution of the judiciary.22  
What must be done to enable an experience of justice to co-exist with the 
deal-making that characterizes court-connected mediation?23 Procedural 
justice research indicates clearly that disputants want and need the 
opportunity to tell their story and control the telling of that story;24 disputants 
want and need to feel that the mediator has considered their story25 and is 
trying to be fair;26 and disputants want and need to feel that they have been 
treated with dignity and respect.27 Procedural justice theories explain that 
these procedural attributes are important for two primary reasons. First, 
disputants value the opportunity to express their views because this provides 
them with the opportunity to influence the final outcome of the dispute 
resolution process.28 This influence is important even in mediation because 
the disputants will not reach an agreement unless they sufficiently influence 
each other, either directly or through the mediator. Second, disputants care 
about their interaction with the mediator because a third party—particularly 
if court-appointed or court-approved—represents legal authority. When 
mediators manage the process so that the disputants feel heard and respected, 
this sends a signal to the disputants that the institution of the courts views 
them as valued and respected members of society. In contrast, when 
mediators do not ensure that the procedure includes the attributes described 
above, they send the message to disputants that society has judged them to be 
 
 
 21. See infra  Part II.A. 
 22. See Wayne D. Brazil & Jennifer Smith, Choice of Structures: Critical Values and Concerns 
Should Guide Format of Court ADR Programs, DISP . RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 8, 8 (“The business 
of the courts is not business, it is justice, and particularly protection of respect-worthy procedural 
guarantees. In other words, a court-connected ADR program must be designed to achieve justice and 
to foster public respect for the judicial system as a whole.”). 
 23. Several years ago, Professor Marc Galanter expressed his comfort “with a ‘mixed’ view that 
justice does not reside entirely in the realm of formal legal processes nor is it entirely absent from the 
world of bargaining.” Galanter, supra  note 11, at 275. But, he added, “[t]he question—both for 
research and practice—is how to locate it and augment it.” Id. In some sense, this Article is meant to 
meet Professor Galanter’s challenge.  
 24. See infra  Part II.B. See also infra text accompanying note 162. 
 25. See infra  Part II.B. See also  infra text accompanying note 162. 
 26. See infra  Part II.B.  
 27. See infra  Part II.B. See also infra text accompanying note 163. 
 28. See infra  Part II.B.  
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undeserving or inferior.29 Not surprisingly, many disputants care about such 
messages regarding their social standing. These messages affect disputants’ 
feelings about whether they have received justice and their feelings regarding 
the legitimacy of the social institution that provided the dispute resolution 
process.30 
This Article applies the research findings and theories from the 
procedural justice literature to the current evolution of court-connected 
mediation. The analysis reveals that some of the changes that streamline 
bargaining—the dominant participation of disputants’ attorneys and the 
reduced role of the disputants, the eventual use of evaluative interventions, 
and the prevalence of monetary (noncreative) outcomes—are not necessarily 
inconsistent with procedural justice considerations.31 Indeed, if used 
appropriately, some of these changes may even have the potential to enhance 
disputants’ perceptions of procedural justice. This Article argues that deal-
making and procedural justice can co-exist and even complement each other. 
The analysis in this Article also shows, however, that other changes designed 
to ease legal negotiation—the de facto exclusion of disputants from 
mediation sessions, the abandonment or marginalization of initial joint 
sessions, and the early and aggressive use of legally evaluative 
interventions—are inconsistent with procedural justice.32 These particular 
adaptations raise serious concerns regarding the ability of court-connected 
mediation to deliver an experience of justice along with a settlement.  
Ultimately, this Article argues that choices need to be made to keep court-
connected mediation from continuing its headlong evolution (or devolution) 
into becoming just another bargaining session. Mediators, courts, and policy-
makers need to acknowledge and ensure that for disputants—the ultimate 
beneficiaries of and necessary supporters of court-connected services—
mediation exists at the intersection of a bargaining paradigm and a 
procedural justice paradigm.33 Just as the owners of a house must care for the 
structure’s foundation in order to ensure that the walls of their handsome 
home do not crumble, the courts must ensure that the very effective 
bargaining overseen by the courts’ representatives is well-grounded in the 
courts’ promise of justice. Mediation’s ability to deliver results that last and 
 
 
 29. See infra  Part II.B.  
 30. See infra  Part II.B.  
 31. See infra  Part IV.E. 
 32. See infra  Part IV.E. 
 33. Professor Joseph Stulberg has previously observed that “[a] suitably framed conception of 
fairness” in mediation requires consideration of the substantive and procedural dimensions of fairness, 
as well as consideration of theories of bargaining. Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation , 13 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP . RESOL. 909, 910-11 (1998). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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reflect well on the institution of the courts will be enhanced by attention to 
procedural justice considerations. Conversely, a single-minded rush toward 
bargaining and settlement will erode mediation’s ability to deliver procedural 
justice. 
This Article begins, in Part I, with a description of the adaptations that 
have occurred in the model of mediation that is aiding the resolution of civil 
nonfamily cases in the courts. This part then uses bargaining and decision 
making theory and research to explain why these changes have occurred. 
Interestingly, the evolution of the court-connected mediation process appears 
quite rational when evaluated in this way. In Part II, the Article introduces 
and examines the procedural justice literature. The Article explores the 
procedural attributes that trigger enhanced perceptions of procedural justice 
and the impact of these perceptions on compliance with less-than-fully-
satisfactory outcomes, perceptions of substantive justice, and respect for the 
judiciary. This part also discusses the theories explaining why perceptions of 
procedural justice have significant effects. Part III considers why procedural 
justice has not been expected of unassisted negotiation in the civil litigation 
context, but should be expected of court-connected mediation. Part IV then 
applies procedural justice theories and research to court-connected mediation 
in order to predict the impact of recent adaptations upon disputants’ 
perceptions regarding the fairness of the mediation process. 
I. THE BARGAINING PARADIGM AS EXPLANATION FOR THE ADAPTATIONS 
IN COURT -CONNECTED MEDIATION 
When the “contemporary mediation movement”34 arose and grew in the 
1970s and 1980s, mediation was used primarily to resolve neighborhood, 
small claims, and family disputes. Many of the defining characteristics of the 
process reflected these roots. First and most strikingly, mediation required 
that the disputants meet face-to-face and become “an active part of the 
communication.”35 Consistent with a participatory conception of self-
determination, the disputants did the talking and negotiating. They were 
responsible for nearly every part of the process: identifying the issues to be 
resolved,36 identifying their concerns,37 generating options for the resolution 
 
 
 34. BARUCH BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 15, at 1 (emphasis omitted). Mediation certainly 
existed before the 1970s and 1980s. For example, the process had been used for many years to resolve 
labor disputes. However, many of the principles and practices that had developed in the labor 
mediation context varied considerably from those that arose in the context of the 1970s and 1980s. 
 35. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 41.  
 36. See CMTY . DISP . RESOL. CTR. (Ithaca, N.Y.), MEDIATION TRAINING MANUAL—SIX STAGES 
OF MEDIATION (1989). 
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of their dispute,38 evaluating the resolution options,39 and choosing whether 
or not to reach resolution. Mediation promised a cooperative environment40 
that would enhance the disputants’ ability to understand each other and reach 
resolution.41 The mediator’s job was to ensure that each disputant had a 
chance to speak, that no one dominated the session, that the disputants heard 
each other’s perceptions, and that positions were translated into interests and 
“positive need statements.”42 The mediator “validate[d] and encourage[d] 
parties throughout the process”43 and used both the mediation structure and a 
variety of techniques to enable the parties to exercise their self-
determination.44 The general presumption was that the mediators were 
 
 
 37. See id. at stage II. 
 38. See id. at stage IV. See also BEER ET AL ., infra note 40, at 38 (providing several techniques to 
permit parties to arrive at a resolution for each main issue and if the parties “are unable to continue 
progressing on their own”); THE NEIGHBORHOOD JUST. CTR. OF ATLANTA, INC., TRAINING MANUAL 
FOR MEDIATORS 17 (1987) (“The two or more sides involved in a dispute are given an opportunity 
through the mediator to fashion between and among themselves a solution satisfactory to all sides.”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 39. See CMTY. DISP. RESOL. CTR., supra note 36. 
 40. See id. Some commentators have described the necessity of the cooperative element of 
mediation as follows: 
Beyond techniques, beyond useful phrases, beyond process, the core of the mediator’s work is 
learning to see a situation as each disputant perceives it. Compassion and respect are the intangible 
attitudes which let disputants safely express feelings and break away from locked-in positions . . . . 
An agreement is signed when each disputant is willing to accept each point of the contract. A 
person pressured into concession is less likely to follow the terms of the agreement. If someone is 
uncomfortable with a suggestion, no matter how rational the solution appears, the group continues 
to look for other possibilities. 
JENNIFER BEER ET AL., PEACEMAKING IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD: MODERATOR’S HANDBOOK 18, 34-
35 (1982). See also THE NEIGHBORHOOD JUST. CTR. OF ATLANTA , supra  note 38, at  14 (“Mediation is 
. . . non-adversarial in nature. It seeks not to declare winners or losers, but to find reconciliation 
between disputing parties.”). 
 41. This cooperative environment contrasts with a competitive approach, which many have 
argued favors men and those with power. See, e.g., Stulberg, Facilitative v. Evaluative Mediator 
Orientations, supra note 13, at  993-94. See also Linda Stamato, Voice, Place, and Process: Research 
on Gender, Negotiation, and Conflict Resolution , MEDIATION Q., Summer 1992, at 378 (reporting 
research on the effect of gender differences and situational power on negotiating behavior).  
 42. See CMTY. DISP . RESOL. CTR., supra note 36. See also BEER ET AL ., supra  note 40, at 12, 23, 
35 (noting that mediators should give disputants a meaningful opportunity to express themselves 
during mediation sessions); THE NEIGHBORHOOD JUST.  CTR. OF ATLANTA , supra  note 38, at 49 
(“Vital that both sides air their grievance in presence of opposing party. Get as many issues out on the 
table as possible in joint session.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 43. See CMTY. DISP. RESOL. CTR., supra  note 36.  
 44. Recommended techniques included the following: active listening, clarification, reflecting 
and acknowledging feelings, probing for parties’ underlying issues and concerns, translating positions 
into interests and positive-need statements, helping parties to state what was important to them and 
what they would like to have happen, enabling the parties to generate a list of possible options, 
checking the “workability” of each alternative with the parties, and encouraging the parties to select 
alternatives which appeared acceptable to them. See id. See also, e.g., BEER ET AL ., supra  note 40, at 
28-30 (describing various facilitation skills used in mediation). 
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facilitators and were not to give their views on any issue.45 In order to ensure 
that disputants heard each other’s perceptions and to enhance their 
communication, many mediation programs preferred keeping the disputants 
together in joint session and counseled against the use of caucuses or separate 
meetings.46 Lawyers were not welcome and sometimes were explicitly 
excluded from these mediation sessions.47 Finally, the disputants’ 
participation in the mediation process was voluntary. Mediation advocates 
argued that disputants should participate in mediation only if they chose to do 
so.48  
There is ample evidence that as mediation has entered the courthouse and 
begun resolving bigger, nonfamily civil cases, the process has diverged from 
this earlier model. Court-connected mediation now often bears “an uncanny 
resemblance to the judicially-hosted settlement conference.”49 In many 
 
 
 45. See CMTY. DISP. RESOL. CTR., supra note 36. See also, e.g. , BEER ET AL ., supra  note 40, at 
34, 37 (noting that mediators should avoid judgmental statements and attempt to summarize issues 
without judgment or bias); THE NEIGHBORHOOD JUST.  CTR. OF ATLANTA, supra note 38, at 22 
(“[Mediators] are there as an impartial third party to facilitate communication and to help people reach 
a mutually satisfactory agreement.”). 
 46. See, e.g., T HE NEIGHBORHOOD JUST.  CTR. OF ATLANTA , supra  note 38, at 49 (“Only after 
both sides have been aired and an attempt to have a joint discussion has been made should caucusing 
occur.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 47. See, e.g., BEER ET AL., supra  note 40, at 12 (noting that, in a community mediation program, 
lawyers and witnesses were not allowed to participate in mediation sessions unless the parties 
approved). See also, e.g., THE NEIGHBORHOOD JUST.  CTR. OF ATLANTA , supra  note 38, at 111 
(“[Attorneys] have a right to attend sessions with [their] client[s] . . . . [T]hey do not have a right to 
control [the] session[s] . . . . [i]f [an] attorney disrupts, speak with him/her separately. If disruptions 
continue, adjourn [the] session and let [the] parties decide if they wish to reset [sic] without [the] 
attorney or go on to court.”). 
 48. See, e.g., BEER ET AL ., supra note 40, at 19 (“Community Dispute Settlement Program’s goal 
of empowerment includes the power of choice—the disputant chooses to participate.”); Trina Grillo, 
The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women , 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1581 (1991) (“When 
mandatory mediation is part of the court system, the notion that parties are actually making their own 
decisions is purely illusory.”); Raymond Shonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems: Work, Structure, 
and Guiding Principles, MEDIATION Q., Sept. 1984, at 22-23 (contrasting effects of “coerced 
participation” in the civil justice system with benefits of voluntary participation in community boards’ 
model of mediation). See also  SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, MANDATED 
PARTICIPATION AND SETTLEMENT COERCION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS IT RELATES TO THE COURTS 
12 (1991) (observing that mandated participation in mediation can lead to “narrowly focused 
procedures and briefer, more formulaic sessions” and that “short, rigid sessions may result in lower 
party involvement, poor resolution, and thus lower voluntary compliance with the resolution”); Lucy 
V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two 
Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 5 (1993) (noting that “the growth in compulsory ADR may 
have destroyed part of its original value as an informal, consensual alternative”). 
 49. Welsh, supra note 14, at 25. See also  Hensler, A Research Agenda, supra note 5, at 15 (“On 
the surface, we see widespread adoption of mediation . . . . But as I travel about the country talking 
with judges, court administrators, ADR practitioners and lawyers, I mostly hear about good old-
fashioned settlement programs and evaluative mediation that looks a lot like the latter.”). 
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courts, participation in mediation sessions is court-ordered or mandatory.50 In 
addition, the process diverges from the earlier model of mediation in four 
important ways. First, attorneys attend and dominate these mediation 
sessions while the disputants play no or a much-reduced role. Second, 
mediators are selected for their ability to value cases and to share their 
assessments with the parties; the mediators in court-connected mediation 
regularly opine regarding the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s case. 
Third, the disputants and their attorneys generally are not kept together in 
joint session; caucus is preferred. Fourth, the mediators do not actively 
encourage the development of creative settlement options that respond to the 
unique needs of the parties.  
Some commentators have explained these developments by speculating 
that the “movement [has] been hijacked by the lawyers”51 who now attend 
mediation sessions as advocates for their clients or as mediators. According 
to this argument, as the courts have ordered attorneys to participate with (or 
without) their clients in mediation, the attorneys consciously or 
unconsciously52 have co-opted53 the process. Through their presence, their 
role vis-a-vis their clients,54 and their power over the selection of the 
 
 
 50. See FLA. STAT. ch. 44.102 (1998 & West Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. § 17.697 (1999 & West 
Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1 (2000); TEX.  BUS. & COM.  CODE ANN. § 17.5051 (2000). 
See generally NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE 
§§ 5.1-5.6 (1989) (discussing issues surrounding court-ordered and statutorily -mandated participation 
in mediation).  
 51. Hensler, A Research Agenda, supra note 5, at 15. 
 52. See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J.  29, 43-45 (1982) 
(describing the lawyers’ “standard philosophical map”). Professor Riskin has similarly suggested that 
lawyers’ and judges’ professional concerns have, perhaps unconsciously, shaped judicial settlement 
conferences. 
A lawyer who embraces a Model I [traditional authoritarian] vision of professional-client relations 
may be unsettled by the participation or mere presence of a client in a settlement conference. The 
lawyer who wants to maintain the mystique of expertise could feel severely threatened by the 
presence of a client. The client might interpret his uncertainty as incompetence, or, worse, notice 
that he is unprepared, that the other lawyer is more clever, or that the judge seems not to respect 
his opinion. Similarly, some judges might feel discomfort about interfering with lawyer-client 
relations or the possibility of being challenged, questioned, or evaluated by a client who, not being 
legally trained, might behave less predictably than the lawyer. In short, the presence of clients may 
breed anxiety and interfere with the lawyers’ and judge’s feelings of competence and control. This 
anxiety may cause an unspoken and, perhaps, unconscious conspiracy between lawyers and 
judges to exclude clients from all or important parts of settlement conferences.  
Leonard L. Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference: The Lessons of G. Heileman 
Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 69 WASH . U. L.Q. 1059, 1105 (1991) [hereinafter Riskin, The 
Represented Client in a Settlement Conference]. 
 53. Alison E. Gerencser, Alternative Dispute Resolution Has Morphed into Mediation: Standards 
of Conduct Must Be Changed, 50 FLA. L. REV. 843, 849 (1998). 
 54. See ROBERT F. COCHRAN ET AL ., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH 
TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING §§ 1-2 to 1-4 (1999) (describing authoritarian, client-
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mediator, lawyers have made mediation look like the processes in which they 
are dominant—i.e., bilateral negotiation sessions and judicial settlement 
conferences.55 Further, as more and more attorneys and retired judges have 
become attracted to mediation as a professional activity, they have co-opted 
the role of mediator to make it fit certain assumptions about “the role of the 
[quasi-]judicial host”56 and to permit them to use the skills and knowledge 
that have served them well in their careers.57  
Others have suggested that the reason that mediation is changing can be 
found not by dwelling upon the preferences and behavior of the attorneys 
who are now involved, but by examining the disputes that are generally the 
subject of court-connected mediation sessions. These commentators suggest 
that “the power of a problem-solving, interest-identifying, differences-
conciliating approach [is] a myth, or appropriate in some circumstances but 
not appropriate for the sort of disputes that make their way to court.”58 In 
particular, lawyers and judges have pointed out that the personal injury and 
contract cases that dominate the nonfamily civil docket59 rarely involve 
litigants who have relationships with each other.60 As a result, these 
 
 
centered, and collaborative legal counseling approaches); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, 
Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 509, 509 (1994) (noting that “[a] distinctive characteristic of our formal mechanisms of conflict 
resolution is that clients carry on their disputes through lawyers”); Riskin, The Represented Client in a 
Settlement Conference, supra note 52, at  1076-77 (contrasting traditional and participatory lawyer-
client relationships). 
 55. See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risk of Riskin’s Grid , 3 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 96 (1998) [hereinafter Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation] (“Lawyers 
like most people feel more comfortable with what they know best. Lawyers customarily speak for their 
clients and present adversarial arguments about the merits of the case. Accordingly, they attempt to 
draw mediation back into their adversarial paradigm.”). 
 56. Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference , supra note 52, at 1081. See 
generally id . at 1081-89 (describing courts’ and attorneys’ expectations of the judicial host role in 
settlement conferences). 
 57. See Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 55, at 94. See also Menkel-Meadow, 
Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution , supra  note 13, at  408 (“To the extent that ADR has become 
institutionalized and more routine, it is now practiced by many different people, pursuing many 
different goals.”). 
 58. Hensler, A Research Agenda, supra note 5, at 15. 
 59. See WAYNE KOBBERVIG, MEDIATION OF CIVIL CASES IN HENNEPIN COUNTY: AN 
EVALUATION 13 (1991) (observing that, of the cases involved in a civil mediation pilot project, more 
than two-thirds were personal injury cases and another twenty-two percent were contract cases); 
Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Attorneys’ Negotiation Strategies in Mediation: Business as Usual? , 
MEDIATION Q., Summer 2000, at 384 [hereinafter Gordon, Attorneys’ Negotiation Strategies] 
(observing that the typical case in North Carolina’s Mediated Settlement Conference Program 
“involve[s] two strangers who are involved in an automobile accident”).  
 60. See Gordon, Attorneys’ Negotiation Strategies, supra note 59, at  384 (observing that 
disputants in North Carolina’s Mediated Settlement Conference Program “frequently have no 
preexisting relationship, and if they do, they usually say they place little or no priority on continuing 
that relationship”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from 
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commentators argue, the disputants (and, for that matter, their attorneys and 
the mediator) have little motivation to discuss shared interests or develop 
creative, nonmonetary solutions.61  
A third, related explanation requires focusing on the primary paradigm 
explaining the place or purpose of mediation within the civil litigation 
system. Much of the literature hailing mediation describes the process as 
essentially “facilitated” or “assisted” negotiation.62 For many involved in the 
contemporary mediation movement, the mediation process represented a 
rejection of the formality and elitism of adjudication by the courts.63 Perhaps 
to the surprise of some mediation advocates, attorneys and judges have easily 
adopted the description of mediation as “assisted negotiation.”64 Indeed, the 
conception of mediation as just another form of negotiation fits very well into 
a system in which settlement plays the central role in the resolution of 
cases.65  
It is important to remember, however, that much of the negotiation 
occurring in civil litigation has a decidedly distributive cast. While attorneys 
increasingly acknowledge that mediation may reduce the adversarial tenor of 
 
 
Ideology, 2000 J. OF DISP.  RESOL. 247, 289 (2000) (noting that “tort claimants and defendants are 
often strangers . . . .”). 
 61. See, e.g. , Gordon, Attorneys’ Negotiation Strategies, supra  note 59, at 384 (noting that a 
“lack of a shared past or anticipated future relationship presents barriers to crafting a creative win-win 
solution and relatively little incentive to do so, therefore making a problem-solving strategy less 
likely”). 
 62. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER MOORE , THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR 
RESOLVING CONFLICT 16 (2d ed. 1996) (“[Mediation is] essentially dialogue or negotiation with the 
involvement of a third party,” without which, “there can be no mediation.”) (emphasis omitted); 
Ronald Lee Gilman, Resolving Commercial Cases Through Alternative Dispute Resolution, 26 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 1121, 1124 (1996) (“Mediation is essentially ‘assisted negotiation’ using a third-party 
neutral.”); Kimberlee K. Kovach, Neonatology Life and Death Decisions: Can Mediation Help?, 28 
CAP. U. L. REV. 251, 289 (2000) (same); James K. L. Lawrence, Mediation Advocacy: Partnering 
with the Mediator, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP . RESOL. 425, 425 (2000) (“Mediation is, after all, assisted 
negotiation.”); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for 
Truly Educated Decision-Making, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 777 (1999) (“Mediation is a process 
of assisted negotiation in which a neutral third party assists individuals in resolving a dispute.”); 
Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference , supra note 52, at 1081 (“Mediation is 
facilitated negotiation . . . .”); Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP . 
RESOL. 1, 10 (1996) (“Mediation is best understood as ‘assisted negotiation.’”). See also Baruch Bush, 
supra note 11, at 3 (recounting an imaginary expert’s description of mediation for clients considering 
use of the process to resolve a dispute over land-use issues); Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the 
Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation , 79 
MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1373 (1995) [hereinafter McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers] (reporting that 
attorneys in Maine describe mediation as “formalizing and improving negotiation”). 
 63. See Welsh, supra note 14, at 16 (noting that mediation allows citizens a means to “wrest 
control over both the . . . process and .  . . outcome from judges and lawyers”). 
 64. See Moore, supra note 62, at 16. 
 65. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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negotiations in the nonfamily, civil context,66 the underlying theory of 
negotiation as distributive remains largely unchanged.67 Thus, mediation is 
conceived as enhanced bargaining—enhanced distributive bargaining—that 
is not different from, just more effective68 than, the typical negotiation 
between lawyers.  
In addition, because negotiation is understood as just a “stray byproduct 
of the judicial process,”69 there is no expectation that a process described as 
“assisted negotiation” should do anything more than deliver settlements. 
Attorneys report that they choose mediation in order to reduce the likelihood 
of trial and improve the likelihood of settlement.70 Attorneys are not 
 
 
 66. See, e.g., BOBBI MCADOO , A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT: THE IMPACT OF 
RULE 114 ON CIVIL LITIGATION PRACTICE IN MINNESOTA 33 (1997) [hereinafter MCADOO, A REPORT 
TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT] (discussing results of a survey in which 62.1% of attorneys 
indicated that, based on their experiences and compared to the normal civil litigation process, 
mediation had the effect of being less adversarial); Gordon, Attorneys’ Negotiation Strategies, supra 
note 59, at 385-86 (reporting a modest difference among attorneys’ responses regarding the 
appropriateness of competitive negotiation strategies in mediation).  
 67. See Gordon, Attorneys’ Negotiation Strategies, supra note 59, at 382 (discussing negotiation 
settlements as bargaining sessions instead of information exchange sessions). 
 68. Although attorneys clearly perceive that mediation increases the likelihood of settlement and 
reduces clients’ expenses, other research does not unequivocally support these perceptions. See, e.g., 
STEVENS H. CLARKE ET AL ., COURT-ORDERED CIVIL CASE MEDIATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN 
EVALUATION OF ITS EFFECTS 55-56 (1996) (reporting that a program of court -ordered mediated 
settlement conferences reduced the median filing-to-disposition time in contested cases by about seven 
weeks, suggesting that the program produced savings for litigants); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND 
INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE , AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION 
UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 48-49 (1996) (finding that federal courts’ use of mediation 
and early neutral evaluation, as mandated by the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, has not resulted in 
quicker settlements or reduced expenses for litigants); KOBBERVIG, supra note 59, at 19 (reporting that 
median disposition times in cases referred to mediation and cases disposed of in the judicial process 
were identical); DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON 
COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION 
PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 16 (1997) (reporting that 
the median age at termination for cases assigned to Missouri Western’s Early Assessment Program 
was reduced by more than two months). In addition, attorneys generally indicate that the use of 
mediation has neither changed the timing nor the volume of discovery in most civil cases. See, e.g., 
MCADOO,  A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, supra  note 66, at 35 (reporting that 
almost two-thirds of lawyers reported no change in timing of discovery while over two-thirds reported 
no change in volume of discovery and pre-trial preparation). 
 69. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 11, at 1390 (arguing that settlements are an essential part of the 
judicial process).  
 70. See, e.g. , MCADOO, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, supra  note 66, at 30-
31. In response to questions about the reasons attorneys choose mediation, 67.9% of attorneys 
surveyed indicated the desire to reduce litigation expenses while 57.4% thought that mediation would 
make settlement more likely. Id. at 33. In addition, 59.8% of attorneys indicated that based on their 
experience and compared to the normal civil litigation process, mediation had the effect of causing 
earlier settlements. Id. See also  Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of 
Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri: Supreme Court ADR Committee Report 67 J. DISP . RESOL. 
(forthcoming Summer 2002) (reporting that lawyers’ selection of mediation is motivated by saving 
litigation expense (85%), speeding settlement (76%) and making settlement more likely (69%)); 
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motivated to choose mediation because their clients like the process71 or 
because they perceive that the mediation process provides their clients with 
any more satisfaction or control than is provided by the normal civil litigation 
process.72 Mediation is just another means to reach a settlement. 
Although this Article focuses on the procedural justice implications of the 
current evolution of court-connected mediation, it is important to begin by 
acknowledging that the most significant changes in the process represent 
adaptations that make mediation a more effective tool for bargaining toward 
settlement. As the remainder of this part will show, substantial negotiation 
research and theory support these structural changes in the mediation 
process. The fact that these adaptations have occurred also reveals the 
capture of the mediation process by the bargaining paradigm.  
A. The Reduced Role for Disputants in Court-Connected Mediation 
Disputants themselves played the central roles in the model of mediation 
that arose during the contemporary mediation movement. In the civil, 
nonfamily court-connected context, however, the disputants’ role (and even 
the need for their presence) has diminished substantially. Quite commonly, 
for example, insured defendants in personal injury or malpractice claims fail 
even to attend mediation sessions.73 The need for defendants’ presence has 
diminished because in the context of many civil, nonfamily cases, defendants 
 
 
Gordon, Attorneys’ Negotiation Strategies, supra note 59, at 387 (observing that attorneys who are not 
also mediators “think the mediator’s primary duty is to act as referee between opposing sides or to 
convey offers and counteroffers”); Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Why Attorneys Support Mandatory 
Mediation , 82 JUDICATURE 224, 227 tbl.2 (1999) [hereinafter Gordon, Why Attorneys Support 
Mandatory Mediation] (noting that approximately ninety-three percent of North Carolina attorneys 
who are not also mediators perceive that “mediation reduces the likelihood that a case will be tried,” 
and approximately sixty-nine percent perceive that “knowledge that mediation is pending encourages 
settlement sooner than would otherwise happen”). 
 71. See, e.g., MCADOO, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, supra note 66, at 31 
(demonstrating that lawyers’ selection of mediation is rarely motivated by the increased potential for 
creative solutions, preservation of parties’ relationships, or evidence that clients like mediation); 
McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra  note 70 (reporting that lawyers’ selection of mediation is infrequently 
motivated by evidence that clients like mediation, the increased potential for creative solutions, or 
preservation of the parties’ relationships). 
 72. See, e.g., MCADOO, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, supra  note 66, at  33 
(reporting that few attorneys perceived that mediation has the effect of providing greater client 
satisfaction (26.1%) or providing greater client control (28.3%)); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra  note 70 
(reporting that a minority of attorneys perceived that mediation has the effect of providing greater 
client satisfaction (30%) or providing client with a greater sense of control (31.2%)). 
 73. See Thomas B. Metzloff et al., Empirical Perspectives on Mediation and Malpractice, 60 
LAW & CONTEMP . P ROBS. 107, 124-25 (1997). See also  Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra 
note 55, at  99 (reporting that the Civil Appeals Management Plan of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit “neither expects nor requires party participation, though mediators may 
invite the parties to attend the conference”). 
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do not control the funds that will be necessary to settle the case.74 In most 
cases, insurance companies control these funds and, therefore, essentially 
wield full settlement authority. Indeed, in some courts’ programs, attendance 
by either the plaintiff(s) or the defendant(s) is the exception rather than the 
norm.75 The disputants’ attorneys attend the mediation sessions and negotiate 
on their clients’ behalf. Courts’ rules for court-connected mediation generally 
require attendance only by the attorneys who will try the case76 and those 
with the authority to settle the case.77 In this model of mediation, if the 
disputants do not possess authority or if they have given full authority to their 
attorneys, the disputants are not needed and are generally absent.78 Further, 
even when the disputants do attend the mediation sessions, their involvement 
is likely to be limited. Disputants may be excluded from caucuses with the 
mediator.79 When the disputants are permitted to attend both the joint session 
and the caucuses, their attorneys are likely to do much if not all of the 
 
 
 74. See JOHN W. COOLEY, THE MEDIATOR’S HANDBOOK: ADVANCED PRACTICE GUIDE FOR 
CIVIL LITIGATION 127 (2000) (defining the “‘real client’” as the person who has a large role in 
deciding how much the insurance company will pay in the case of a personal injury claim). 
 75. This is the case, for example, in the mediation program established by the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court. The order establishing the program provides that “[a]ll mediation sessions must 
be attended by counsel for each party with authority to settle the matter, and, if required, such other 
person with actual authority to negotiate a settlement.” While the order also provides that “[t]he 
mediation judge may at his or her discretion require the parties (or real parties in interest) to attend 
mediation,” it has not been the practice of the mediation judge to require the clients to attend. It is 
usually the case that clients do not attend the mediation session. The clients that do arrive at the 
mediation session with their attorneys generally are not included in most of the negotiation that occurs 
in the session. Telephone Interview with John Gordon, Program Director, Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court Mediation Program (Feb. 28, 2001).  
 76. See, e.g., MINN. R. 114.07(b) (2001) (“The attorneys who will try the case may be required to 
attend ADR proceedings.”). But see JULIE MACFARLENE, CULTURE CHANGE? COMMERCIAL 
LITIGATORS AND THE ONTARIO MANDATORY MEDIATION PROGRAM 2, 33-40 (2001) (noting that Rule 
24.1 Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, requires clients’ attendance at mandatory mediation 
sessions and describing attorneys’ reactions to changes in their clients’ role and involvement). 
 77. See, e.g., id. § 114.07(c) (“Facilitative processes aimed at settlement of the case, such as 
mediation . . . shall be attended by individuals with the authority to settle the case, unless otherwise 
directed by the court.”). 
 78. See Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference, supra note 52, at 1109-12 
(exploring the meaning of “full authority to settle the case”). The extent of an individual’s authority to 
settle a case should be determined by considerin g whether the individual has: “authority to commit the 
client to a particular course of conduct . . . . [s]ufficient knowledge . . . of the client’s needs, interests, 
and operations . . . . [s]ufficient  influence . . . that his recommendations likely would affect the 
principal’s decisions [and] [d]iscretion . . . to negotiate a different kind of arrangement . . . .” Id. at 
1110. 
 79. Gordon, Attorneys’ Negotiation Strategies, supra note 59, at 383 (“In observed mediation 
sessions, it was not uncommon for a mediator to caucus with all the attorneys without their clients 
being present, but the observers never witnessed or even heard about the reverse situation’s occurring: 
a mediator’s meeting with parties without their attorneys present.”). See Hensler, A Research Agenda , 
supra note 5, at 17 (“[M]ediator and lawyer may caucus without the lawyer’s client present.”). 
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talking. 80  
Negotiation theory and research often support this reduced role for the 
disputants. First, both negotiation theory and research confirm that 
negotiation will more likely produce prompt resolution if the process is 
structured to enhance decision making. Thus, negotiations should include 
only those with authority and those who will aid the bargaining and decision 
making.81 If a disputant does not control the funds necessary for such 
settlement and will neither influence nor provide strategic benefit to the 
individual who does control such funds, the disputant’s presence is 
unnecessary. Indeed, the disputant may even be a distraction.  
Even when the disputants do possess settlement authority, bargaining and 
decision-making research indicates that there are many advantages to relying 
primarily upon the disputants’ agents in the mediation process.82 In the court-
connected context, the disputants’ agents generally are professionals who 
 
 
 80. See, e.g., Gordon, Attorneys’ Negotiation Strategies, supra note 59, at 383 (“[A]ttorneys 
rather than disputants are unquestionably the main negotiators in mediated settlement conferences.”); 
Gordon, Why Attorneys Support Mandatory Mediation, supra  note 70, at 227 (reporting that in 
observed mediations, lawyers dominated negotiation, the minority of clients who did “play active 
roles” were “supporting rather than starring players,” and that three-quarters of responding attorneys 
disagreed with the statement, “‘Litigants should be the most active participants in mediation, with 
attorneys standing by to offer legal advice.’”); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 70, at 51 tbl.32 
(reporting that fifty-one percent of lawyers perceive that mediators speak primarily with or to the 
lawyers, but forty-two percent of lawyers perceive that mediators encourage the clients to speak for 
themselves); Metzloff et al., supra note 73, at 123-25 (discussing the limited involvement of plaintiffs 
and defendants during medical malpractice mediation sessions). But see MCADOO, A REPORT TO THE 
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, supra  note 66, at 39 (reporting that nearly eighty-percent of attorneys 
perceive that mediators always or frequently encourage clients to participate in the mediation process); 
McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers, supra note 62, at 1382-84 (describing lawyer appreciation of 
client involvement in divorce mediation). 
 81. See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING 
FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 228, 311 (1986). “The more . . . parties (and issues), the 
higher the costs, the longer the time, and the greater the informational requirements tend to be for 
settlement.” Id. However, an unaccompanied agent who is uncertain of his principal’s bottom line may 
behave inflexibly and risk impasse. Id. The people who participate in negotiations should “have the 
power or authority to make a decision” and “have the capacity, if they are not involved, to reverse or 
damage a negotiated settlement.” Moore, supra note 62, at 144. See also CHARLES B. CRAVER, 
EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 195-96 (3d ed. 1997) (“Only when the 
representatives of both parties possess the authority to articulate meaningful offers can real bargaining 
occur.”); Major Sherry R. Wetsch, Alternative Dispute Resolution—An Introduction for Legal 
Assistance Attorneys, 2000 ARMY LAW. 8, 12 (2000) (recommending that an individual with 
“‘authority to settle’” must participate in the mediation process because “one of the key goals of 
mediation is a signed agreement before the parties leave the mediation . . . .”). 
 82. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL. ,  BEYOND WINNING:  NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN 
DEALS AND DISPUTES 93-96 (2000) [hereinafter MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING] (describing the 
benefits of using attorneys as agents); See also Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement 
Conference, supra note 52, at 1099-103 (describing the benefits and risks of including clients in 
judicial settlement conferences and noting that the salience of both the benefits and risks increases as 
the clients’ participation increases). 
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bring expertise, detachment, and tactical flexibility to the process.83 In 
addition, some research suggests that members of a common professional 
subculture are more likely to communicate sufficiently to permit mutually-
beneficial settlements.84 Research has also demonstrated that lawyers (and 
perhaps claims adjusters) tend to share and apply a rational, economically-
grounded analysis to determine whether to settle and upon what terms.85 This 
analytical orientation facilitates distributive negotiation, rational decision 
making, and a higher rate of settlement.86 In contrast, disputants are more 
likely to be influenced by cognitive and social-psychological phenomena that 
can distract them from rational, expected financial value analysis.87 Finally, 
although there are exceptions, many clients are heavily influenced by their 
attorneys and thus surrender their primacy in decision making. 88  
If mediation is viewed exclusively within a bargaining paradigm, it 
 
 
 83. See Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E. A. Sander, When Should We Use Agents? Direct vs. 
Representative Negotiation , in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE  81, 81-87 (J. William Breslin & 
Jeffrey Rubin eds., 1991) (describing the potential advantages and disadvantages of using agents in 
negotiation). 
 84. See Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of Fairness Considerations and 
Relationships in a Judgmental Perspective of Negotiation , in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 87, 
103-04 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (reporting research from several studies involving MBA 
students). But see Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 54, at 546-49 (suggesting several institutional 
features that influence the likelihood of cooperative strategies among lawyers and arguing that “[w]hen 
opposing attorneys know and trust each other,” both parties may benefit “by reducing transaction 
costs”). 
 85. One study described experiments that suggest that lawyers are less likely to be influenced by 
the framing of a settlement offer, opening offer anchor, or equity-seeking. See Russell Korobkin & 
Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. 
L. REV. 77, 95-112, 122 (1997). Instead, lawyers tend to focus on whether a settlement or a trial is 
likely to yield a better financial result. Id. But see Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological 
Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999) (suggesting that, 
based on a review of research regarding psychological biases in judgment and decision making, 
lawyers’ faith in their own rationality is “misplaced”). 
 86. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 85, at 82-83. See also , MNOOKIN ET AL ., BEYOND WINNING, 
supra  note 82, at  101-07 (describing financial factors that influence the decision to settle); Deborah R. 
Hensler, The Real World of Tort Litigation , in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 155, 162-
63 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Hensler, The Real World of Tort Litigation] (contrasting 
tort plaintiffs’ desire to vindicate rights and the tort plaintiffs’ sense of entitlement regarding the use of 
a legal system with attorneys’ overwhelming focus on money in discussions with clients and in 
negotiations with opponents). 
 87. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 85, at 88-121 (describing experiments that showed that 
litigants were more affected than their lawyers by framing, anchoring, and equity-seeking variables 
when deciding whether or not to settle). 
 88. William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and 
Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1451-54 (1992) [hereinafter 
Felstiner & Sarat, Enactments of Power] (describing conventional views and studies regarding power 
in attorney-client relationships, with variations caused by differences in status, economic power, the 
area of law, or individual client characteristics). 
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becomes quite rational for mediators89 to permit and even encourage the 
disputants’ attorneys and other agents (such as the claims adjusters) to play 
the central roles and to reduce or even eliminate the participation of the 
disputants. Far from celebrating the participation of the disputants, this 
approach to mediation focuses on the need to control and limit the disputants’ 
contribution to that which is absolutely necessary.90  
It is worth remembering, of course, that the goal of mediation within the 
bargaining paradigm is settlement, not the achievement of a sense of just 
treatment for the disputants. 
B.  The Preference for Evaluative Interventions in Court-Connected 
Mediation 
Recent data also strongly indicates that court-connected mediation has 
developed an evaluative cast. Attorneys, who generally choose the mediation 
process and the mediator, value evaluative interventions. Many attorneys 
choose mediation because they perceive that the process will provide a 
needed “reality check” for both opposing counsel and their own clients.91 
Attorneys report that they want mediators to provide opinions on the merits 
of cases92 and even want mediators to give their view of settlement ranges.93 
 
 
 89. This refers to mediators handling civil, nonfamily cases.  
 90. Of course, not all commentators celebrate the lawyers’ rational approach because it is not 
always responsive to clients’ needs and interests. For example, Professor Jean Sternlight has written: 
Mediation allows participating clients to see with their own eyes, speak with their own voices, and 
use their own creative talents. By participating directly in the mediation, the client has the 
opportunity to view the opponent, the opponent’s attorney, and any witnesses directly rather than 
through the filter of her attorney. A good mediator can facilitate these opportunities. For example, 
whereas the attorney may have responded cynically to the opponent’s apology, it may be 
meaningful for the client. Where the attorney may have regarded the opponent’s story as hogwash, 
the client may see it as compelling. That is, the client’s view is not restricted by the lawyer’s cold, 
rational, and perhaps even cynical lens.  
Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and 
Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting , 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 
343-44 (1999). 
 91. See MCADOO ,  A  REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, supra note 66 and 
accompanying text; McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 92. See ROSELLE L. WISSLER, AN EVALUATION OF THE COMMON PLEAS COURT CIVIL PILOT 
MEDIATION PROJECT ix (Feb. 2000) [hereinafter WISSLER, AN EVALUATION OF THE COMMON PLEAS 
COURT] (reporting that “[a]ttorneys had more favorable assessments of the [mediation] process and 
mediator and reported mediation was more helpful in achieving case objectives if the mediator 
evaluated the merits of the case and suggested settlement options”); Metzloff et al., supra note 73, at 
144-45 (reporting that almost seventy percent of attorneys want mediators to provide opinions on the 
merits of medical malpractice cases and that attorneys highly value mediators who possess substantive 
expertise in medical malpractice). 
 93. See WISSLER,  AN EVALUATION OF THE COMMON PLEAS COURT, supra note 92 and 
accompanying text. See also Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the 
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Attorneys choose mediators who, like judges, have the knowledge  and 
experience that will permit them to understand and comment on the parties’ 
legal arguments.94 Indeed, many court-connected mediators now focus upon 
the legal issues and opine regarding the strengths and weaknesses of each 
party’s case and the appropria te settlement ranges.95 
 
 
Lawyer’s Philosophical Map?, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 376, 390 (1997) (reporting that the 
majority of Hennepin County lawyers that were interviewed want mediators to give their view of 
settlement ranges). 
 94. See, e.g., MCADOO, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, supra note 66, at 38 
(reporting that 84.2% of lawyers surveyed perceive that the most important qualification for mediators 
is “substantive experience in the field of law related to case”); James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and 
Hashing It Out: Is This the End of “Good Mediation”?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66-71 (1991) 
(describing new techniques brought into mediation because of the use of legal professionals as 
mediators); Gordon, Why Attorneys Support Mandatory Mediation, supra note 70, at 228 (noting that 
attorneys prefer mediators who are experienced trial lawyers); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra  note 70, at 
50 tbl.34 (reporting that eighty-seven percent of lawyers indicated that a mediator should know how to 
value a case and eighty-three precent indicated that a mediator should be a litigator); McAdoo & 
Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place, supra note 93 (reporting that the majority of Hennepin County 
lawyers interviewed wanted mediators to give their view of settlement ranges); Metzloff et al., supra 
note 73, at 144-45 (reporting that almost seventy percent of attorneys want mediators to provide 
opinions on the merits of medical malpractice cases and that attorneys highly valued mediators who 
possessed substantive expertise in medical malpractice). For the top factors motivating lawyers to 
choose mediation, see supra note 70 and accompanying text. Some additional factors include: 
providing needed reality check for opposing counsel, opposing party, and an attorney’s own client, and 
valuating cases. McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 70, at 41 tbl.25. Lawyers’ selection of mediation is 
rarely motivated by evidence that clients like mediation, the increased potential for creative solutions, 
or preservation of relationships. Id. Attorneys may use these criteria to select mediators due to 
“concern[s] about the basic qualifications and neutrality of arbitrators and mediators,” which were 
expressed in a recent American Bar Association poll. Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a 
State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution , 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 637 (1997) (citing an 
American Bar Association poll of a sampling of ABA members that found that approximately seventy 
percent respondents expressed these concerns). 
 95. See, e.g., MCADOO, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, supra  note 66, at  39 
(reporting that approximately thirty percent of lawyers perceive that mediators frequently or always 
predict court outcomes while approximately sixty-eight percent perceive that mediators frequently or 
always propose realistic settlement ranges); WISSLER,  AN EVALUATION OF THE COMMON PLEAS 
COURT, supra  note 92, at v (“[M]ediators said they assisted the parties in evaluating the case in 91% of 
the cases, suggested possible settlement options in 77%, kept their views of the case silent in 36%, 
evaluated the merits of the case for the parties in 23%, and recommended a particular settlement in 9% 
of the cases.”); Kovach & Love, Mapping Mediation, supra note 55, at  99 (reporting that mediators 
employed by the Civil Appeals Management Plan of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit evaluate strengths and weaknesses of cases); McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 93, at  390 
n.71 (reporting that the majority of Hennepin County lawyers interviewed perceive mediators to 
frequently or always predict court outcomes about one-third of the time and propose realistic 
settlement ranges about two-thirds of the time); Metzloff et al., supra note 73, at 121 (reporting that 
half of the mediators who were observed expressed opinions about parties’ offers and twelve percent 
opined the merits of the case). In general, the mediators engaged in more directive actions in less 
contentious and less complex cases, but they engaged in less directive actions in more contentious and 
more complex cases.”). See also  STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 68, at 228-29 (describing observed 
EAP sessions). But see Gordon, Why Attorneys Support Mandatory Mediation , supra note 70, at 228 
(reporting that observed mediators were reticent in offering opinions or suggesting specific offers or 
demands).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss3/3
p787 Welsh.doc  2/28/2002   5:08 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] MAKING DEALS IN COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION 807 
 
 
 
 
Bargaining theory and research help explain why such evaluative 
interventions can be very effective in generating movement and ultimately 
producing a settlement. As noted earlier, attorneys generally apply a rational, 
expected financial value analysis to determine whether and when to settle 
and tend not to be diverted by other psychological or cognitive factors.96 
Using this approach, attorneys can evaluate their clients’ “Best Alternative to 
a Negotiated Settlement” (BATNA)97 (i.e., the likely value of the case if it 
proceeds to trial) and use this valuation to formulate their offer or demand, or 
to assess the adequacy of the offer or demand being made by the other side. 
In other words, the attorney can calculate whether a deadlock is acceptable.98  
When attorneys take an active role in their clients’ litigation decision-
making processes, they often can persuade their clients to adopt this rational 
approach and abandon other, less pragmatic anchors or considerations such 
as the desire to be treated fairly or to have the validity of a position 
acknowledged.99 The attorneys’ success in aiding their clients to adopt or at 
least accept this different orientation allows the decision-making process to 
become more rational and predictable and makes settlement more likely.100 
The attorneys’ use of the expected financial value analysis approach eases 
the convergence of the clients’ aspiration levels101 and perceptions of 
 
 
 96. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 85, at 122. But see generally Birke & Fox, supra note 85 
(discussing the considerations that influence attorneys’ settlement decisions); Jeffrey M. Senger & 
Christopher Honeyman, Cracking the Hard-Boiled Student: Some Ways to Turn Research Findings 
into Effective Training Exercises, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION PRACTITIONER: A MONOGRAM BRIDGING 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Shinji Morokuma ed., 2001). 
 97. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 
100 (2d ed. 1991). 
 98. HOWARD RAIFFA ,  THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 126 (1982) (“First, know 
yourself . . . . Consider what will happen to you if no deal is struck.”); FISHER ET AL., supra note 97, at 
97-106 (describing the use and development of BATNA). 
 99. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 85, at 82, 120-21. See MNOOKIN ET AL ., BEYOND WINNING, 
supra  note 82, at 102 (noting that “[l]awyers spend much of their time and energy helping their clients 
to make . . . comparisons [between the value of a proposed settlement and the expected value of 
adjudication in court]; it is a primary reason why disputants hire lawyers”); Felstiner & Sarat, 
Enactments of Power, supra note 88, at 1459 (describing a lawyer’s and client’s struggle in the divorce 
context to “[d]efine and identify[] ‘realistic’ goals, and orient[] and reconcil[e] clients to the world of 
the legally possible”). 
 100. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 85, at 82, 119-20 (observing that lawyers’ interventions 
drastically reduced litigants’ strong opposition to settlement). See also E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE 
PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE : TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF TRIALS, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND 
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 59 (1989) [hereinafter LIND ET AL. ,  THE PERCEPTION OF 
JUSTICE] (noting that litigants perceived procedures to be more fair and were more satisfied with their 
outcomes and with the courts when their outcomes exceeded their subjective expectations).  
 101. Clients’ aspirational levels are also described as their bargaining targets. See Bazerman & 
Neale, supra note 84, at 87. If a client’s aspiration level—or target—is “optimistic,” it will greatly 
exceed the client’s walk-away position in the negotiation. If the aspiration level or target is 
“pessimistic,” it will only slightly exceed the client’s walk -away position. See id. 
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substantive fairness.  
Negotiation research findings explain why attorneys prefer mediators who 
will use and apply the norms and language of the legal marketplace. There is 
some suggestion that court-connected mediation now contains “an 
undercurrent of sensitivity to evidential precepts”102 that places limits on 
disputants’ digression into emotional or other matters that are not sufficiently 
relevant to the legal issues103 or to the needs and interests to be met through 
settlement. Mediators can help the attorneys’ clients become more “realistic” 
(i.e., help them understand what will happen if their cases go to trial and what 
represents a fair settlement when compared to other similar cases). If 
mediators are trustworthy and impartial, and willing to share and reinforce 
the lawyers’ rational financial value analysis, it is more likely that the 
disputants will be persuaded to adopt or at least accept this rational approach.  
In addition, mediators’ evaluations serve as a reassurance and a double 
check for the attorneys who have developed their own estimates and 
counseled their clients regarding the odds of prevailing, the odds of particular 
outcomes, and the resulting valuation of their cases. Research has repeatedly 
demonstrated that valuation of cases is an imprecise science.104 In particular, 
attorneys’ valuations can be affected by their idiosyncratic histories with 
similar and memorable cases105 and their representation of and advocacy for 
one of the parties.106 Mediators are just as likely to be limited by their own 
idiosyncratic histories, yet their histories will expand the attorneys’ 
comparative experiences, resulting in somewhat more reliable valuations. 
Further, due to mediators’ perspectives as impartial third parties, they are less 
likely to make biased assessments of the value of a case.107 Ultimately, if a 
 
 
 102. Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded 
Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1327 (1998).  
 103. See MCADOO & HINSHAW, supra note 70, at 49 tbl.33 (reporting that about twenty-three 
percent of lawyers believe mediators encourage the parties to address issues beyond the legal causes of 
action). 
 104. See John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in 
Mediation , 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 137, 153 (2000) (noting that research shows that claims adjusters 
and personal injury lawyers “rely on folk conceptions” to determine liability and damage estimates). 
Of course, inconsistent judgments and recommendations are prevalent in other professions as well. 
See, e.g., STEPHEN L. FIELDING, THE PRACTICE OF UNCERTAINTY  52 (1999) (noting that physicians 
consistently disagree on diagnosis and treatment, notwithstanding technical knowledge, due to heavy 
dependence upon personal judgment, an “intuitive feel,” and other subjective factors). 
 105. This psychological principle is termed the “availability heuristic.” See Birke & Fox, supra 
note 85, at 7-12 (describing the availability heuristic and its application to lawyers). 
 106. This psychological principle is know as the “perspective bias.” Birke & Fox, supra note 85, 
at 14. See generally id  at 14-15, 20 (describing the perspective bias and its application to lawyers). 
 107. See Birke & Fox, supra note 85, at 14 (observing that participants in a study who were asked 
to predict jurors’ likely verdicts were more balanced when they were put in a neutral condition than 
when they were put in a partisan condition); Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Judgmental Biases in 
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mediator agrees with an attorney’s valuation of the case, this is likely to 
bolster the attorney’s confidence in the estimates and reduce the disputant’s 
doubts about the reliability of the attorney’s predictions.108 The addition of 
the mediator’s evaluation makes the process of developing a rational, 
expected financial value analysis a bit more scientific and reliable, which 
further supports its use and its potency in easing settlement.109 
If we can assume that judges, attorneys, and disputants agree that the 
exclusive goal of the mediation process is the delivery of settlements and that 
there is no need for the process to offer an experience of justice, this second 
structural change also appears to represent a successful and laudable 
adaptation to the environment of the courthouse. 
C.  The Abandonment or Marginalization of the Joint Session in Court-
Connected Mediation       
As noted earlier, in the model of mediation developed to resolve 
neighborhood, small claims, and family disputes, the disputants themselves 
were expected to meet in joint session and communicate face-to-face 
regarding their dispute.110 Caucus was used very little, if at all, because it was 
not perceived as consistent with a commitment to party control or party self-
determination.111  
 
 
Conflict Resolution and How to Overcome Them , in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 224-
25 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000) [hereinafter Thompson & Nadler, Judgmental 
Biases] (describing research that has found that people who are immediately put into the position of 
one of the parties in a dispute make more self-serving judgments of fairness and encounter a higher 
rate of impasse than people who first learn the facts and determine a fair settlement from the 
standpoint of a neutral observer). See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction to 
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra  note 84, at 3, 13-15 [hereinafter Mnookin & Ross, 
Introduction (discussing the influence of biases on the views of disputants). 
 108. In a sense, the mediator is providing the client with a second opinion, which is particularly 
useful when the client doubts her attorney’s advice. See Michael Klausner et al., Second Opinions in 
Litigation , 84 VA.  L. REV. 1411, 1416-25 (1998) (identifying the circumstances when a second 
opinion serves a valuable function). It has also been suggested that the mediator’s evaluation can assist 
the lawyer whose over-optimistic assessment of the case impedes settlement. See Hensler, A Research 
Agenda, supra note 5, at 17 (“The lawyer who over-promises faces the unpleasant task of informing 
the client that her options are not as attractive as she thought. Mediation offers an opportunity for the 
lawyer to enlist a third party in this task.”). 
 109. See Jeffrey Rubin, Experimental Research on Third-Party Intervention in Conflict: Toward 
Some Generalizations, 87 PSYCHOL.  BULL. 379, 388 (1980) (describing research that found that in 
high-accountability conditions, a third party’s “‘content’” intervention—a recommendation of a 
specific settlement—aided parties’ negotiations more effectively than a “‘process’” intervention—a 
recommendation regarding exercises to improve communication skills—or a “passive” intervention—a 
recommendation that parties take a break).  
 110. See BEER ET AL ., supra  note 40, at 21. See also  THE NEIGHBORHOOD JUST. CTR. OF 
ATLANTA , supra  note 38, at 49. 
 111. See THE NEIGHBORHOOD JUST. CTR. OF ATLANTA , supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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In the context of personal injury, contract, and other nonfamily civil 
actions, however, an increasing number of mediators are abandoning or 
greatly minimizing the joint session, preferring instead to move quickly to 
caucus and keep the parties separate for the remainder of the mediation.112 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that even those mediators who do allow the 
disputants and their attorneys to present their views in joint session “view 
this process as ‘venting,’ rather than as an opportunity for parties to present 
facts that will shape an outcome.”113 
Mediators indicate that they fear that emotional, hostile, or inflammatory 
remarks will be made during joint session and that these remarks will make 
constructive conversation and settlement much more difficult to achieve.114 
 
 
 112. See, e.g., MCADOO, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, supra  note 66, at  39 
(reporting that approximately seventy-two percent of attorneys perceive that mediators always or 
frequently use caucuses effectively and approximately forty-nine percent of attorneys perceive that 
mediators always or frequently ask each side to present an opening statement); Alfini, supra note 94, 
at 66 (reporting that “trasher[s]” discourage direct party communication and quickly move to 
caucuses); Gordon, Attorneys’ Negotiation Strategies, supra note 59, at 382 (“Observations suggest 
that mediation conferences typically involve extensiv e caucusing, a structure that supports bargaining 
rather than open information exchange or direct communication between the parties.”); Hensler, A 
Research Agenda, supra note 5, at 17 (“After initial presentation of the dispute, evaluative mediators 
appear to move quickly to ‘shuttle diplomacy.’ Parties may not meet together again until an agreement 
has been struck . . . .”); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra  note 70 (reportin g that approximately sixty-two 
percent of lawyers perceive that mediators use caucuses almost exclusively but approximately three 
percent of lawyers perceive that mediators use joint session almost exclusively; also reporting that 
about eighty-five percent of lawyers indicated that mediators ask each side to present an opening 
statement in joint session); McAdoo & Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place, supra note 93, at 391 
(reporting that in “lawyer interviews, several lawyers observed that opening statements could promote 
unproductive adversarial posturing and thus should not be part of the typical mediation”); Metzloff et 
al., supra note 73, at 119 (describing the st ructure of mediation sessions, which typically involve a 
series of private caucuses). See also  Reuben, Public Justice, supra note 94, at 638 & n.313 (raising 
concerns about the absence of the right to present evidence in ADR proceedings and that a disputant 
may be “essentially silenced by a biased or rushed mediator”). 
 113. Hensler, A Research Agenda, supra note 5, at 17. 
 114. Mediators have made these sorts of remarks at continuing legal education programs. See, 
e.g., E-mail from James Coben, Director, Dispute Resolution Institute, to Nancy Welsh, Assistant 
Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University (Mar. 6, 2001, 
09:09:42 EST) (on file with author) (describing panel discussion entitled “The Great Mediator Debate: 
Rhetoric or Reality” at the Annual ADR Institute sponsored by the Minnesota State Bar Association in 
2000 and post -panel discussions with lawyer participants). Commentators have made similar remarks 
in various articles and books. See, e.g., COOLEY, THE MEDIATOR’S HANDBOOK, supra note 74, at 154 
(describing situations in which the mediator should caucus “before even attempting to conduct a joint 
session” and should consider “conduct[ing] the entire mediation using separate caucuses”); William D. 
Coleman, The Mediation Alternative: Participating in a Problem-Solving Process, ALA. LAW., Mar. 
1995, at 100, 102 (1995) (explaining that “[t]he mediator can hold the emotions in check by using 
private caucuses and shuttle diplomacy. The mediator is able to discuss the interests of the parties 
without the emotional baggage that often attends direct negotiations between them.”); Rita Lowery 
Gitchell & Andrew Plattner, Mediation: A Viable Alternative to Litigation for Medical Malpractice 
Cases, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 421, 440 (1999) (observing that in caucus, “the mediator allows 
each person to vent any emotions without disrupting the communicative process between the parties”) 
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In addition, many mediators believe that disputants and their attorneys are 
more likely to be candid and to provide more reliable information in a private 
session with the mediator than they are in the presence of the opposition.115 
Finally, mediators indicate that they prefer the control that the use of caucus 
provides over the transmission and framing of information.116 
Recent research in bargaining supports court-connected mediators’ 
preferences. First, a recent study strongly suggests that communication in 
caucus can be superior to direct communication between the disputants in 
joint session, because the mediator’s “translation” of the information is 
generally stripped of the implicit threats or insults that impede efforts to build 
understanding and reach agreements.117 Further, negotiation studies have 
 
 
(footnote omitted); Charles R. Pyle, Mediation and Judicial Settlement Conferences: Different Rides 
on the Road to Resolution , ARIZ. ATT’Y, Nov. 1996, at 20, 23 (observing that “[a] cardinal rule of 
mediation is that no personal attacks are made on the other party. Such attacks invariably move 
parties’ positions further apart.”); Richard G. Spier, Legal Practice Tips: Mediation Miscues: The 10 
Biggest Mistakes Lawyers Make in Mediation, OR. ST. B. BULL., June 1999, at 35, 35 (observing that 
the trend is to avoid using opening comments “to present aggressive or inflammatory statements of the 
case” and recommending that “it is often best to say nothing or perhaps to state that while one’s client 
feels strongly about the correctness of his or her position, the client is here to bargain in good faith”); 
Nicholas J. Taldone, Winning Mediation Strategies, TRIAL LAW., May-June 1999, at 190, 194 
(cautioning that counsel should not “oversell his or her case in the opening statement [because] 
[n]othing destroys the conciliatory atmosphere of a mediation faster than arrogance, hostility, or 
puffery as to the merits of a case”).  
 115. See Baruch Bush, supra note 11, at 9 (observing that negotiators are unlikely to trust the 
information provided by each other); John G. Melbane, III, An End to Settlement on the Courthouse 
Steps? Mediated Settlement Conferences in North Carolina Superior Courts, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1857, 
1886-87 (1993) (“[S]ome mediators prefer to use caucuses in their settlement efforts . . . . A mediator 
might find that caucuses provide an opportunity for candor or, perhaps, a chance for the party to feel 
more at ease.”). 
 116. John Cooley characterizes mediators as “conductors,” observing that  
[M]ediators are more likely to use deceptive behaviors because they are the conductors . . . of an 
information system specially designed for each dispute, a system with ambiguously defined . . . 
disclosure rules in which mediators are the chief information officers with near-absolute control. 
Mediators’ control extends to what nonconfidential information, critical or otherwise, is 
developed, to what is withheld, to what is disclosed, and to when disclosure occurs. 
John W. Cooley, Mediation Magic: Its Use and Abuse, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 6 (1997) (emphasis 
omitted).  
 117. See Ian Ayres & Barry J. Nalebuff, Common Knowledge as a Barrier to Negotiation, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1631, 1634 (1997) (“Caucus mediation can communicate . . . (first order knowledge) 
without creating common, higher-order knowledge among the parties.”). See also  Dean G. Pruitt et al., 
Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HUM.  BEHAV. 313, 314 (1993) (reporting research 
findings that disputants’ hostile or contentious behavior in mediation can decrease the likelihood for 
reaching an agreement that satisfies the disputants, but that such behavior is unrelated to measures of 
long-term outcome); Rubin, supra note 109, at 382-83 (describing research demonstrating that 
compulsory communication between parties engaged in intense conflict had the effect of exacerbating 
the conflict). See also  William Laurens Walker & John W. Thibaut, An Experimental Examination of 
Pretrial Conference Techniques, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1113, 1132-33 (1971) (reporting that settlement is 
impeded when a judge begins a pretrial conference in a high conflict case by having the parties 
identify the issues in dispute). 
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shown that, when an opponent makes a proposal—which may actually 
represent a compromise, concession, or responsive solution—the recipient of 
the proposal is nonetheless likely to devalue the proposal simply because it 
came from a perceived opponent.118 Finally, other negotiation research 
indicates that if the disputants have a negative relationship—which can be 
created or exacerbated by an outburst or a subtle jab in a joint session—the 
disputants are more willing to take risks just so that they can do better than 
their negotiating opponents. This dynamic occurs even when disputants can 
objectively achieve better settlements if they permit their opponents to 
recover equally.119  
All of these studies120 suggest that it makes great sense for the mediator to 
separate the parties in mediation as quickly as possible and, throughout the 
mediation session, to control the communication of offers and counter-offers 
by shuttling back and forth. In this way, the mediator effectively buffers the 
disputants from each other’s intentional or unintentional barbs and threats.121 
Further, knowing that the dispute has already reached the point at which one 
of the disputants turned to the courts for assistance, the mediator can keep the 
disputants from worsening what is likely to be an already negative 
relationship. Finally, keeping the disputants apart gives mediators the option 
of presenting potential solutions as their own, rather than tainting such 
proposals by associating them with an opponent.122  
 
 
 118. See generally Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution , in 
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 84, at 27, 29-31 (summarizing research results that 
demonstrate that an offer made by an adversary may appear less attractive in the eyes of the recipient). 
See also  Baruch Bush, supra note 11, at 11 (describing various cognitive biases that distort 
information). 
 119. Bazerman & Neale, supra note 84, at 98-99.  
 120. Other studies also support this development. See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman, Negotiator 
Judgment: A Critical Look at the Rationality Assumption , in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE , 
supra  note 83, at 197, 198-200 (finding that people are more likely to gamble on the possibility of a 
loss than on the possibility of a gain and suggesting that one negotiator may be able to influence the 
other negotiator’s perceptions through careful framing of proposals). See also  Jennifer Gerarda Brown, 
The Role of Hope in Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1661, 1682 (1997) (suggesting that third parties 
such as mediators may “present more credible proof that [negotiators’] estimates are unrealistically 
optimistic”); Sternlight, supra note 90, at 332-45, 348 (demonstrating how a mediator can overcome 
various psychological barriers to settlement, but also asserting that many barriers can be overcome by 
direct communication between the disputants and their attorneys in joint session). 
 121. It should be noted, however, that other research suggests that mediators can choose 
interventions (e.g., coaching the parties in communication skills or urging the parties to put themselves 
in each other’s shoes, be fair, and make reasonable and mutually acceptable proposals) that enhance 
direct, constructive negotiation between the parties in joint session. See Rubin, supra note 109, at 382-
83 (describing a series of experiments to test the circumstances that facilitate productive 
communication channels). 
 122. See Mnookin & Ross, Introduction , supra note 107, at 23; Birke & Fox, supra note 85, at 48-
50 (describing the psychological principle of “reactive devaluation” and applying it to negotiation 
between lawyers). For a definition of reactive devaluation, see supra text accompanying note 118. 
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Indeed, the research results summarized above suggest that a mediator 
invites failure by keeping the disputants together. “Failure,” of course, means 
failure to assist the disputants in negotiating a settlement.123 After all, 
settlement is the sole criterion for judging the success or failure of a 
mediation session if the mediation process is defined as “nothing more than a 
formalized settlement procedure”124 structured to remove cases (perhaps 
more quickly and less expensively) from the courts’ civil dockets. 
D.  The Lack of Creativity in the Settlements Produced by Court-
Connected Mediation  
Mediation continues to be hailed as a process that permits the disputants 
to arrive at creative, nonmonetary settlements that meet their unique needs.125 
Empirical data, however, indicates that mediators infrequently act to 
encourage the search for creative, nonmonetary settlements,126 and that 
relatively few attorneys choose mediation for its creative potential.127 Instead, 
mediation generally results in traditional, distributive outcomes.128 This has 
led commentators, such as Professor Barbara McAdoo to lament: “In 
litigation, money is the substitute (i.e., remedy) for every ‘wrong.’ Is 
[money] the only language trial lawyers have?”129 
 
 
 123. See Baruch Bush, supra note 11, at 8 (describing failure as impasse or as unnecessarily 
expensive or sub-optimal). 
 124. Steven Weiss, ADR: A Litigator’s Perspective: Viewing the Pluses and Minuses, BUS. L. 
TODAY, Mar./Apr. 1999, at 30, 32. 
 125. See supra notes 12, 17 and accompanying text.  
 126. See, e.g., MCADOO, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, supra  note 66, at  39 
(reporting that approximately twenty-six percent of attorneys perceive that mediators frequently or 
always “provide input for non-monetary aspects of settlement”); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 70, 
at 51 tbl. 32 (reporting that about eight percent of lawyers perceive that mediators “suggest creative 
outcomes that would not be a likely court outcome”). See also  Metzloff et al., supra note 73, at 151 
(noting that during the course of a study involving court -ordered mediation in the malpractice context, 
parties rarely considered “creative solutions”). 
 127. See MCADOO, A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, supra note 66, at  31 
(reporting that about thirty-one percent of attorneys voluntarily choose mediation to “[i]ncrease 
potential for creative solutions”). 
 128. See Gordon, Attorneys’ Negotiation Strategies, supra note 59, at 384. One survey showed 
that less than twelve percent of “plaintiffs settling at a mediated settlement conference received 
nonmonetary relief.” Id. In contrast, nearly thirty percent of plaintiffs who opted for adjudication 
“received some type of nonmonetary relief.”; Hensler, A Research Agenda, supra note 5, at 15. 
 129. Barbara McAdoo, The Future of ADR: Have They Come for the Right Reason? , 3 J. ALT. 
DISP . RESOL. EMP . 8, 10 (Summer 2001). See also  Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, supra  note 52, at 
44-45 (observing that “on the lawyer’s philosophical map, quantities are bright and large while 
qualities appear dimly or not at all . . . . [The] ‘reduction’ of nonmaterial values . . . to amounts of 
money, can have one of two effects . . . . [T]hese values are excluded . . . as irrelevant [or] . . . they are 
present but transmuted into . . . a justification for money damages.”). 
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Bargaining theory and research help to explain this phenomenon. On one 
hand, effective bargaining requires the communication of goals that are 
“concrete,” “specific, and preferably measurable.”130 Negotiators can more 
easily compare such goals by placing them in a “common dimension,”131 
thus enhancing the rationality of the sequential offers and counter-offers that 
characterize distributive negotiation. 132 As one commentator has observed: 
“[A]ny guide is better than none . . . [and] [t]ranslating every issue into 
dollars is one way to facilitate these comparisons.”133 This helps to explain 
why, “[i]n evaluating the interests at stake, a typical negotiator might focus 
on commodities that can be bought and sold or on concrete terms that can be 
written into a contract or treaty.”134 Further, reliance on monetary, 
noncreative solutions facilitates settlement. “[C]ut-and-dried cases” can be 
resolved with “cut-and-dried solution[s,]” which generally “involve[] the 
simple exchange of money.”135  
Integrative negotiation theory, however, celebrates the search for 
nonmonetary, creative solutions that meet the underlying needs and interests 
of disputants.136 Some commentators have suggested that settlement options 
naturally become nonmonetary and creative in more complex disputes.137 
Indeed, if disputants expand rather than restrict the issues under discussion in 
negotiation,138 it seems nearly inevitable that such expansion will lead to a 
 
 
 130. ROY J. LEWICKI ET AL., NEGOTIATION 42 (3d ed. 1999) (emphasis omitted). 
 131. Id. at 61. 
 132. RAIFFA , supra note 98, at 128 (describing the pattern of concessions in the “negotiation 
dance”); Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 
OHIO ST. L. REV. 41, 48-52 (1985) (describing the competitive negotiation strategy). 
 133. LEWICKI ET AL ., supra note 130, at 62. 
 134. LAX & SEBENIUS, supra  note 81, at 64. 
 135. HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET’S MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 44 (1991). 
 136. See, e.g., FISHER ET AL., supra  note 97, at 49-50 (noting that the most powerful interests are 
basic human needs, which also underlie a monetary figure in negotiation); LAX & SEBENIUS, supra 
note 81, at 68 (“Many negotiators retard creativity by failing to dist inguish the issues under discussion 
from their underlying interests.”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal 
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving , 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 794-813 (1984) (describing the 
underlying principles and structure of problem solving). 
 137. See, e.g., KRITZER, supra note 135, at 44 (“[T]here is a clear, steady shift toward 
nonmonetary offers . . . as the complexity of the cases increases . . . . [T]his is not particularly 
surprising, because in more complex cases there may be greater possibilities for ‘creative’ solutions.”). 
 138. See, e.g., Birke & Fox, supra note 85, at 32-33 (“[F]ully exploiting issues on which the 
principals have a shared interest” improves agreements and makes them more “‘Pareto efficient,’” that 
is, “no party can be made better off without at least one party made worse off.”); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms, 
and Practices, 11 NEGOT. J. 217, 226 (1995) (reviewing ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH &  JOSEPH 
FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:  RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT & 
RECOGNITION (1994); DEBORAH M. KOLB & ASSOCIATES,  WHEN TALK WORKS:  PROFILES OF 
MEDIATORS (1994); THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE : A CASE STUDY OF AMERICAN 
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creative broadening of the resources available for exchange and settlement. 
However, integrative negotiation is likely to be used and creative 
solutions are likely to arise only if the disputants have sufficiently explored 
each other’s preferences and priorities.139 This assumes that the disputants 
recognize each other as unique individuals with unique needs and interests.140 
In other words, integrative negotiation assumes that the disputants realize that 
they do not necessarily share identical (and mutually exclusive) objectives 
and goals in the mediation and are willing to learn about each other’s 
preferences and priorities. Furthermore, for the disputants to sufficiently 
explore each other’s preferences and priorities, the mediator and the 
mediation process must offer the disputants an opportunity to communicate 
regarding these matters. 
All of the changes in the mediation process that make distributive 
bargaining and decision making more effective—the reduced role of the 
disputants; the preference for use of a rational financial value analysis 
approach to decision making; the marginalization of joint session and 
increased reliance on caucus–unfortunately make it less likely that disputants 
will perceive each other as unique, that the disputants will become willing to 
learn about each other, and that they will have an opportunity to 
communicate regarding their preferences and priorities.  
Ultimately, then, negotiation theory and research do not provide a clear-
cut justification for mediation’s failure to produce creative, nonmonetary 
settlements. Instead, some of court-connected mediation’s adaptations—
which, as this Article has demonstrated, are supported by research and theory 
 
 
COMMUNITY JUSTICE  (Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993)) (“It is often more productive to 
expand, rather than narrow issues in order to create more issues for trade . . . . Much legal dispute 
settlement activity is focused on narrowing disputes, which often makes resolution more difficult, 
rather than easier.”). 
 139. LEWICKI ET AL., supra note 130, at 136 (citing K. E. Kemp & W. P. Smith, Information 
Exchange, Toughness, and Integrative Bargaining: The Roles of Explicit Cues and Perspective-
Taking, INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 5, 5-21 (1994)); MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING, supra  note 
82, at  108 (observing that “[a]lthough the litigation game includes the evaluation of the legal 
opportunities and risks, it does not usually incorporate a broad consideration of the parties’ interests, 
resources, and capabilities” and thus “the parties may never discover possible trades that could have 
left both sides better off”). 
 140. This also assumes that attorneys recognize their clients as unique individuals, with unique 
needs and interests. However, various studies suggest that attorneys fail to perceive their clients’ 
nonmonetary interests and goals. See, e.g., Hensler, The Real World of Tort Litigation , in  EVERYDAY 
PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES, supra note 86, at 156-66 (contrasting tort plaintiffs’ desire to 
vindicate their rights and to use the legal system with lawyers’ focus on monetary concerns); Gordon, 
Attorneys’ Negotiation Strategies, supra note 59, at 384 (“[M]ost attorneys (56.1 percent) feel that 
litigants are not necessarily involved in these suits to satisfy some sense of justice; instead, they think 
litigants are concerned about money.”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p787 Welsh.doc  2/28/2002   5:08 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
816 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:787 
 
 
 
 
as effective means to streamline bargaining and decision making—may have 
the undesirable effect of reducing mediation’s effectiveness if the disputants 
cannot reach common ground regarding a particular monetary settlement. 
E.  Summarizing the Application of Bargaining Theory and Research to 
Court-Connected Mediation 
The application of bargaining theory and research to the current evolution 
of court-connected mediation shows that mediation’s new “look” makes 
great sense. For the most part, these innovations have enhanced mediation’s 
effectiveness as a tool for distributive negotiation, decision making, and 
settlement. If court-connected mediation is defined as just assisted 
negotiation, these innovations represent successful and necessary adaptations 
to the environment of the courthouse, at least that part of the courthouse that 
handles nonfamily, relatively large civil disputes.  
However, other research reveals that when disputants bring their disputes 
to the courthouse, they expect something more than bargaining assistance. 
They expect and value procedures that feel fair. Indeed, research suggests 
that the failure to consider issues of procedural justice in court-connected 
mediation has the potential to threaten the legitimacy and the authority of the 
judiciary and to reduce disputants’ compliance with the agreements they 
have reached. In order to understand why this is so, it is necessary to 
understand the concept of procedural justice.141 
 
 
 141. This Article will confine its discussion to “procedural justice” or “procedural fairness” as it 
has been defined through social science research and theory. However, it is worth noting here that 
commentators have used the terms “procedural justice” or “procedural fairness” to describe various 
characteristics of activities in mediation. For example, one commentator has defined a procedurally 
fair mediation process as one that provides “equal opportunity to engage in a meaningful dialogue.” 
Michael Coyle, Defending the Weak and Fighting Unfairness: Can Mediators Respond to The 
Challenge? , 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 625, 637 (1998). Another commentator has indicated that 
procedural fairness principles require consideration of parties’ “self-esteem.” Stulberg, Fairness and 
Mediation , supra note 33, at 912. Furthermore, “fair procedures [in mediation] assume (1) starting 
points in which parties possess the autonomy to explore settlement arrangements, (2) the liberty to 
strike deals which maximize their freedom of operation consistent with a like liberty for all and (3) 
outcomes that do not put one party in a notably worse-off situation than his original starting position.” 
Id. at 936. A third commentator has discussed the importance of “procedural justice” within the 
context of court-connected mediation involving unrepresented parties. See generally Russel Engler, 
And Justice for All–Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, 
and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2007-11 (1999). 
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II. UNDERSTANDING PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
What does “justice” mean? What types of justice142 must or should the 
courts provide? This Article focuses primarily upon one type of justice—
procedural justice. Procedural justice is concerned with the fairness of the 
procedures or processes that are used to arrive at outcomes.143 Distributive 
justice, in contrast, focuses on perceptions of and criteria to determine the 
substantive fairness of the outcomes themselves.144  
As previously noted, researchers have found that procedural justice 
matters profoundly. Disputants’ perceptions of the justice provided by a 
procedure affect their judgments of the distributive justice provided by the 
outcome, their compliance with that outcome, and their faith in the 
legitimacy of the institution that offered the procedure. Disputants use the 
following indicia to assess procedural justice: whether the procedure 
provided them with the opportunity to tell their stories,145 whether the third 
party considered their stories,146 and whether the third party treated them in 
an even-handed and dignified manner.147 The procedures used in socially-
sanctioned dispute resolution processes assume such significance because 
disputants seek personal and pragmatic reassurance. Disputants need to 
believe that they are valued members of society and that the final outcome of 
a dispute resolution process will be based on full information.  
In order to advance beyond this very general understanding of the effects, 
indicia, and underpinnings of procedural justice and in order to discern this 
concept’s application to mediation, it is necessary to examine the research 
findings and the underlying theories in some detail.  
A.  The Effects of Procedural Justice 
Although issues of procedural justice often do not attract as much public 
attention as concerns about distributive justice, research has shown that when 
people experience dispute resolution and decision-making procedures, they 
“pay a great deal of attention to the way things are done [i.e., how decisions 
 
 
 142. See Morton Deutsch, Justice and Conflict, in  THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 
supra  note 107, at 41-42 (discussing distributive justice, procedural justice, a “sense of justice,” 
retributive or reparative justice, and the scope of justice). 
 143. See id. at 41. 
 144. See id. Professor Deutsch also describes other types of justice, including “retributive or 
reparative justice,” which he defines as “concerned with how to respond to the violation of moral 
norms and how to repair the moral community that has been violated.” Id. at 42. 
 145. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 146. See infra  note 162 and accompanying text. 
 147. See infra  note 163 and accompanying text. 
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are made] and the nuances of their treatment by others.”148 As a result, 
perceptions of procedural justice profoundly affect people’s perceptions of 
distributive justice, their compliance with the outcomes of decision-making 
procedures and processes, and their perceptions of the legitimacy of the 
authorities that determine such outcomes. Perhaps surprisingly, perceptions 
of distributive justice generally have a much more modest impact149 than 
perceptions of procedural justice.  
Research has repeatedly confirmed that people’s perceptions of 
procedural justice mediate or influence their perceptions of distributive 
justice. Disputants who believe that they have been treated in a procedurally 
fair manner are more likely to conclude that the resulting outcome is 
substantively fair.150 In effect, a disputant’s perception of procedural justice 
 
 
 148. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
242 (1988); E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural 
Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, ADMIN. SCI. Q., 1993, at 247 [herein after Lind et al., Individual and 
Corporate Dispute Resolution]. In a field study, researchers found that procedural justice judgments 
strongly influenced litigants’ decisions whether or not to accept non-binding arbitration awards, 
regardless of whether litigants were individuals, small business owners, or corporate officers; only 
corporate employees failed to demonstrate a link between their procedural justice judgments and their 
decisions to accept awards. Id. at 247. But see JANE W. ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE :  HOW 
LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 76, 83 (1983) (Unlike 
“unsophisticated individual litigants,” institutional litigants who made extensive use of the arbitration 
program “appear[ed] to care little about qualitative aspects of the hearing process . . . . They judge 
arbitration primarily on the basis of the outcomes it delivers.”). 
 149. LIND & TYLER, supra note 148, at 242. There may be a need to distinguish unsophisticated 
individual disputants from sophisticated institutional litigants. See, e.g., ADLER ET AL ., supra note 148 
and accompanying text. But see Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution , supra  note 
148 and accompanying text. 
 150. See, e.g. , LIND & T YLER, supra note 148, at 66-70, 205. Lind and Tyler describe laboratory 
and field studies that show that greater perceptions of procedural justice generally produce greater 
perceptions of distributive justice, regardless of whether the outcome is positive or negative. Id. 
Occasional studies show that this effect may be reduced when the outcome is positive, but also that 
this effect continues to be strong when the outcome is negative. Id. See also  Craig A. McEwen & 
Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 
LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 11, 37 (1984) [hereinafter McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims 
Court] (reporting a study that found that fairness perceptions depend in part upon whether the dispute 
resolution forum operates under a consent or command model and that “defendants were about twice 
as likely to perceive the settlement as fair after consensual settlements”—reached in face-to-face 
mediation sessions generally without lawyers—“as after adjudication”); Craig A. McEwen & Richard 
J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 258 
(1981) [hereinafter McEwen & Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine] (reporting that the 
perceived fairness of adjudicated outcomes “closely paralleled the degree of one’s victory or loss,” 
while perceived fairness of outcomes reached in face-to-face mediatio n sessions was much more 
weakly correlated with the favorability of the outcome); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the 
Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive and Procedural Justice, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 850, 859 (1994) [hereinafter Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive] (reporting 
that studies in legal and managerial settings found that the “primary relational issue influencing 
judgments of distributive justice was trustworthiness”); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural 
Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830, 834 (1989) 
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anchors general fairness impressions or serves as a fairness heuristic.151 
Further, research has indicated that disputants who have participated in a 
procedure that they evaluated as fair do not change their evaluation even if 
the procedure produces a poor or unfair outcome.152  
The perception of procedural justice also serves as a shortcut means of 
determining153 whether to accept or reject a legal decision or procedure.154 
Disputants who believe that they were treated fairly in a dispute resolution 
procedure are more likely to comply with the outcome of that procedure.155 
This effect will occur even if outcomes do not favor the disputants156 or they 
 
 
[hereinafter Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice] (observing that people are most influenced 
by the relational concern of neutrality “when the issue of concern is outcome fairness”).  
 151. E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, in 
EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND T ROUBLE CASES, supra note 86, at 177, 185 [hereinafter Lind, Procedural 
Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities] (“[P]eople form their original justice judgment 
on the basis of procedures and social process and then later incorporate outcome information into their 
overall impressions of the fairness or unfairness of the encounter. In the terms of art used in modern 
social cognition theory, process information anchors the fairness judgment to such an extent that 
outcome information can only make relatively minor adjustments.”). 
 152. ADLER ET AL., supra  note 148, at 65 (reporting that “perceptions of fairness [of arbitration 
hearings differed] by outcome of the case, [and] although in the expected direction, [these differences] 
were not statistically significant”); LIND & TYLER, supra  note 148, at 235. See also Tyler, 
Psychological Models of the Justice Motive, supra note 150, at 855 (discussing a study finding that 
procedural justice judgments are influenced only by relational concerns, while distributive justice 
judgments are influenced by both resource or outcome concerns and relational concerns). 
 153. This psychological shortcut “replaces a full exploration of the implications and possible 
motives of each directive from an authority.” Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution , 
supra  note 148, at 225. 
 154. See Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra note 151, 
at 185; Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution , supra  note 148, at 224 (citing 
research that found the decision to accept or reject  an arbitrator’s award is “strongly correlated with 
judgments of procedural justice . . . , which had a stronger effect than either subjective or objective 
measures of the arbitration award”). 
 155. See Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra note 151, 
at 192 (describing research regarding court-annexed arbitration that found that “[a]cceptance of the 
arbitration awards as resolution of the case was much more strongly linked to the fairness judgments 
than to the outcome”). Moreover, one study of the resolution of cases in small claims court found 
greater compliance with results reached in consensual processes than in adjudicative processes, 
suggesting that “the personal and immediate commitments generated by consensual processes bind 
people more strongly to compliance than the relatively distant, impersonal obligations imposed by 
authorities.” McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court, supra  note 150, at 44-45. 
Compliance with mediated results (reached in face-to-face meetings without lawyers) was higher than 
compliance with negotiated results. See id. at 21. See also Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice 
Motive, supra  note 150, at 857 (discussing field studies that found that “procedural justice is the 
primary justice judgment influencing affect and the willingness to accept third-party decisions, 
although distributive influences also occur”). Arguably, courts that ensure the provision of 
procedurally just processes can improve their efficiency by reducing the likelihood that litigants will 
return to court. Research, however, has not found a relationship between goals of efficiency or 
productivity and issues of procedural justice. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 148, at 225. 
 156. See Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive, supra  note 150, at 857. See also supra 
note 155 and accompanying text. 
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are actually unhappy with the outcomes.157  
Disputants’ perceptions of the procedural justice provided by a decision-
making authority also affect the respect and loyalty accorded to the 
authority.158 This effect is particularly strong for the courts.159 Thus, litigants’ 
reactions to the institution of the judiciary and their compliance with 
decisions arising out of court-mandated procedures do not depend simply (or 
even primarily) upon whether they feel that they won or lost their cases. 
Rather, litigants’ reactions depend largely upon their “experience of legal 
procedures.”160  
B.  Process Characteristics That Enhance Perceptions of Procedural 
Justice 
Several rather specific process characteristics enhance perceptions of 
procedural justice. First, perceptions of procedural justice are enhanced to the 
extent that disputants perceive that they had the opportunity to present their 
views, concerns, and evidence to a third party and had control over this 
presentation (“opportunity for voice”).161 Second, disputants are more likely 
to perceive procedural justice if they perceive that the third party considered 
their views, concerns, and evidence.162 Third, disputants’ judgments about 
procedural justice are affected by the perception that the third party treated 
them in a dignified, respectful manner and that the procedure itself was 
dignified.163 Although it seems that a disputants’ perceptions regarding a 
 
 
 157. See Pruitt et al., supra note 117, at 324, 327 (reporting research showing that respondents 
who perceived that the mediation process was fair were more likely to comply with the agreement, 
even though they were not necessarily happier with the agreement). 
 158. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 148, at 209 (summarizing studies that have “found that 
procedural justice judgments affect the evaluation of authorities and institutions”); TOM R. TYLER, 
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 94-108 (1990) (finding that procedural fairness judgments influence 
perceptions of the legitimacy of legal authority and that this effect is particularly strong for the courts); 
Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra note 151, at 188 
(summarizing studies showing that perceptions of authorities’ legitimacy and compliance “with 
authoritative directives correlate highly with procedural justice judgments”).  
 159. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra  note 158, at 94-108. 
 160. LIND & TYLER, supra  note 148, at 218. 
 161. See id. at 101-04.  
 162. Id. at 236 (proposing a model to explain “finding[s] that the voice effect does not require that 
voice be effective in producing favorable outcomes but does require that the decisionmaker appear to 
be giving due consideration to the expressed values and arguments”); Tom R. Tyler, Conditions 
Leading to Value-Expressive Effects in Judgments of Procedural Justice: A Test of Four Models, 52 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 333, 339 (1987) [hereinafter Tyler, Conditions Leading to Value-
Expressive Effects] (reporting that results of a study regarding citizens’ interactions with police 
“suggest that the key precondition for the occurrence of voice effects is the belief among citizens that 
their views are being considered by the authorities with whom they deal”). 
 163. See LIND & TYLER, supra  note 148, at 214 (describing studies showing that “politeness of 
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fourth factor—the impartiality of the third party decision maker—also ought 
to affect procedural justice judgments, it appears that disputants are 
influenced more strongly by their observations regarding the third party’s 
even-handedness and attempts at fairness.164  
Through a long series of experiments involving many different settings 
and situations, disputants’ opportunity for voice has been found to “reliably 
affect”165 perceptions of procedural justice. “[W]hen disputants [feel] that 
they [have] been allowed a full opportunity to voice their views, concerns, 
and evidence, the disputing process [is] seen as fairer and the outcome [is] 
more likely to be accepted.”166 Concerns regarding the opportunity for voice 
apply in a variety of settings, including the courtroom, arbitration 
proceedings, contacts with the police, political decision making, and decision 
making in work organizations.167 Even in countries where the judicial 
systems typically use nonadversarial procedures, citizens often prefer 
procedures that allow a full opportunity for voice.168 Perhaps most 
 
 
treatment” affects judgments about procedural justice); Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and 
Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra  note 151, at 181 (summarizing the findings from studies that 
show the influence of dignified and polite treatment).  
 164. See ADLER ET AL., supra  note 148, at 65 (reporting that litigants simply “want[] an 
opportunity to have their case heard and decided by an impartial third party”); Tyler, Psychological 
Models of the Justice Motive, supra note 150, at 853 (reporting that “neutrality” is one of three 
relational concerns that exert independent influence on procedural justice judgments). Although 
“[n]eutrality involves honesty and lack of bias,” people focus “on whether the third party creates a 
‘level playing field’ by evenhanded treatment [and] uses facts, not opinions,” as bases for decision 
making. Id. at 854. Consequently, litigants value trust in the motives of the third-party authority as the 
primary relational influence on procedural justice; “issues of standing and neutrality [are] of lesser 
importance.” Id. See also Tyler, Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects, supra note 162, at 
337 (reporting that in field experiment a significant “voice effect” occurred regardless of whether 
citizens viewed decision makers as impartial or nonbiased; however, judgments of process control 
were affected by citizens’ perceptions that decision makers considered their views and tried to be fair). 
See generally infra  notes 204-08 and accompanying text. 
 165. Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra note 151, at 
180. 
 166. Id.  
 167. LIND & TYLER, supra  note 148, at 211-12. 
 168. See, e.g., Stephen LaTour et al., Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, 86 
YALE L.J. 258, 281 (1976) (finding that subjects in Chapel Hill and Hamburg both preferred 
procedures allowing “full opportunity for evidence presentation,” but diverged with respect to third-
party decision control; Chapel Hill subjects preferred that the third party control the outcome while 
Hamburg subjects did not); E. Allan Lind et al., Reactions to Procedural Models for Adjudicative 
Conflict Resolution: A Cross-National Study, 22 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 318, 335 (1978) [hereinafter 
Lind et al., Reactions to Procedural Models] (reporting that in a laboratory study involving students in 
the United States, England, France, and West Germany, researchers found that the subjects 
consistently preferred the adversary model over the investigator and inquisitorial models, suggesting 
that “even among subjects whose own legal systems are based on inquisitorial models,” procedures 
that provide high process control are preferred and perceived as fairer). See also E. Allan Lind et al., 
Procedural Context and Culture: Variation in the Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 767, 777 (1997) [hereinafter Lind et al., Procedural Context and 
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surprisingly, both field and laboratory studies169 have demonstrated that the 
opportunity for voice heightens disputants’ judgments of procedural justice 
even when they know that their voice will not and cannot influence the final 
outcome.170  
These research results are helpful as we consider the application of 
procedural justice to court-connected mediation, but they raise several 
important questions: What counts as a full opportunity for voice? How much 
freedom and time must disputants be given? What represents sufficient 
control by disputants over the presentation of their views, concerns, and 
evidence? Can an agent’s presentation fulfill the disputants’ opportunity for 
voice? Many of the procedural justice studies deal with these questions, 
directly or indirectly. The results of these studies and their significance for 
the court-connected mediation process will be considered below, particularly 
with respect to the reduced role of the disputants in court-connected 
mediation and mediators’ increased use of legal norms to evaluate 
disputants’ cases. 
The other three process characteristics that influence procedural justice 
judgments center upon the behavior of the third party.171 In particular, 
 
 
Culture] (discussing two laboratory studies involving four cultures, which indicate that procedural 
fairness is defined consistently across cultures and primarily in terms of relational variables).  
 169. The early studies in procedural justice, which “used laboratory methods and undergraduate 
students,” were quickly subjected to criticism of their methodology. LIND & TYLER, supra note 148, at 
203. However, subsequent studies “have not only confirmed the findings of laboratory and scenario 
studies on procedural justice, but in fact have usually shown stronger procedural justice effects.” Id. at 
206. 
 170. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and 
Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 957 
(1990) (finding that people’s fairness judgments are enhanced by the opportunity to voice their 
opinions even when this opportunity does not occur until after a decision has been made; having a 
“voice with  the possibility of influence .  . . leads to even greater perceived fairness”); Tom R. Tyler et 
al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. 
PERSONALITY &  SOC.  PSYCHOL. 72, 80 (1985) [hereinafter Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on 
Satisfaction with Leaders] (based on one field study and two laboratory studies, researchers concluded 
that voice heightens procedural justice judgments and leadership endorsement even when disputants 
perceive that they have little control over the decision). See also  LIND & TYLER, supra note 148, at 
215. Some studies reveal that variations in decision control either have no influence on satisfaction or 
judgment of procedural justice or have a smaller influence than process control effects. Id. Growing 
evidence suggests that control over the process or having a voice “enhances perceived fairness for 
reasons quite apart from any value it might have in affecting outcomes.” Id. It is important to point out, 
however, that disputants’ perceptions of procedural justice are affected by whether or not they perceive 
that the decision maker has considered what they said. See supra  note 162 and accompanying text. In 
addition, studies have found that under certain conditions, voice without decision control heightens 
feelings of procedural injustice and dissatisfaction with leaders, a result described as the “frustration 
effect.” See Tom R. Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders, supra, at 74. 
 171. This focus on the behavior of the third party is also known as “enactment” or “interactional 
justice.” See Donald E. Conlon et al., Nonlinear and Nonmonotonic Effects of Outcome on Procedural 
and Distributive Fairness Judgments, 19 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1085, 1087 (1989). 
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disputants assess the extent to which the third party hears and considers their 
presentations, treats them with dignity and respect, and tries to be fair and 
even-handed. Disputants seek assurance that the decision maker has given 
adequate consideration to their presentations.172 Apparently, while disputants 
care very much about having the opportunity for voice, they also wish to 
know that they have been heard.173 In one study examining citizens’ 
interactions with police and judges, researchers found that the effect of 
providing an opportunity for voice was significantly enhanced if citizens also 
believed that the police and judges considered their views before they made 
decisions.174 Indeed, a third party’s behavior, including the third party’s 
consideration of the disputants’ views, independently affects perceptions of 
procedural justice and “acts as a filter for . . . and an amplifier of”175 the 
disputants’ subjective assessments of their control over both the outcome and 
the process within a particular procedure.  
Disputants’ perceptions of procedural justice also are influenced by how 
the third party interacts with them on an interpersonal level. In particular, 
disputants assess the degree to which the third party treats them in a polite 
and dignified fashion176 and tries to be fair and even-handed.177 Research has 
 
 
 172. Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra  note 151, at 
183. 
 173. See Conlon et al., supra note 171, at 1095 (“suggest[ing] that it is not only important for 
disputants to express their opinions, but [that] they must [also] feel that the third party is giving due 
consideration to the views expressed by the disputants”). 
 174. See Tyler, Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects, supra  note 162, at 338-39. In a 
field study of mediation and arbitration, grievants’ “judgments of procedural justice were greatest 
when third parties were judged to be fair and process control was high.” Debra L. Shapiro & Jeanne 
M. Brett, Comparing Three Processes Underlying Judgments of Procedural Justice: A Field Study of 
Mediation and Arbitration, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1167, 1173 (1993). The study 
measured third party fairness by asking grievants whether the third party understood the grievance, 
whether the third party was fair, whether the third party was impartial, whether the grievants were 
willing to take a future grievance to the same third party, and whether the third party seriously 
considered their feelings and opinions. Id. at 1171. 
 175. Shapiro & Brett, supra note 174, at 1175 (studying the extent to which instrument, 
noninstrumental, and enactment processes influenced claimants’ procedural justice perceptions in the 
mediation and arbitration of coal miners’ grievances).  
 176. See LIND ET AL ., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 100, at 22-23; E. Allan Lind et al., 
In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice 
System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953, 958 (1990) [hereinafter Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder]; 
Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice, supra note 150, at 831. Mediation commentators most 
frequently identify this process element as the key to providing procedural fairness to disputants. See, 
e.g., John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach to Mediation–Part I: Classical Rhetoric and the Art of 
Persuasion in Mediation, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 83, 130 (1993) (noting that mediators must provide 
procedural fairness, which involves treating the disputants with respect and insuring that neither party 
intimidates or abuses the other). 
 177. See Tyler, Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects, supra  note 162, at 337 (reporting 
that significant “voice effect” occurred regardless of whether citizens viewed decision makers as 
impartial or nonbiased; however, citizens’ perceptions that decision makers considered their views and 
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shown that disputants’ procedural justice judgments are strongly influenced 
by the dignity or lack of dignity in decision-making proceedings.178 For 
example, in one study comparing litigants’ reactions to the third-party 
processes of trial, arbitration, and judicial settlement conferences, the 
litigants gave much higher procedural justice rankings to trial and arbitration, 
even though these proceedings required the litigants to surrender decision-
making control.179 Most litigants perceived trial and arbitration as dignified 
and careful.180 In contrast, settlement conferences were more likely to strike 
litigants as undignified181 and contrary to the litigants’ sense of procedural 
fairness.182 Dignified and respectful treatment demonstrates to citizens that 
authorities recognize their own role as that of “public servants and 
[recognize] . . . the role of citizens as clients who have a legitimate right to 
certain services.”183 Interestingly, while authorities’ politeness and respect for 
citizens’ rights have been found to influence all citizens’ perceptions of 
procedural justice, some research suggests that minority group members 
 
 
tried to be fair affected their judgments about process control); Tyler, Psychological Models of the 
Justice Motive , supra  note 150, at 853 and text accompanying note 164. Overall, citizens just want 
their case to be heard and decided by an impartial third party. ADLER ET AL., supra  note 148, at 65. See 
generally  infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text. 
 178. One commentator suggests that the importance of dignified treatment parallels a finding in 
the negotiation literature that “issues of ‘face saving’ often overwhelm bargainers, leading them to 
make choices not in their economic self-interest.” Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Disputant 
Concerns in Mediation, 3 NEGOT. J. 367, 371 (1987) [hereinafter Tyler, The Psychology of Disputant 
Concerns]. 
 179. See LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE , supra note 100, at 44-45 (reporting that tort 
litigants “who had experienced arbitrations or trials thought that arbitration hearings and trials were 
fairer than did those litigants who had had settlement conferences”). 
 180. See id. at 45 (reporting that litigants perceived arbitration and trial procedures as “more 
dignified and . . . employ[ing] a more careful and thorough process” than settlement conferences). See 
also  Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 176, at 967 (observing that litigants viewed 
trials as “more dignified and more careful than bilateral settlements”). 
 181. See LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE , supra note 100, at 62 n.55 (reporting that 
litigants believed settlement conferences were “undignified,” even when they had no personal 
knowledge of what occurred); Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra  note 176, at 968 tbl.2 
(demonstrating that in one court approximately eighty-nine percent of litigants surveyed considered 
trial to be dignified while approximately fifty-six percent considered settlement conferences to be 
dignified; in another court, approximately eighty-four percent judged arbitration to be dignified, 
compared to approximately sixty-seven percent for settlement).  
 182. See Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra note 151, 
at 188 (“Our analyses suggested that litigants feel that settlement conferences are unfair because the 
conferences seem to them to be undignified, and undignified treatment violates the relational concerns 
that underlie the fairness heuristic.”); LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE , supra note 100, at 62, 
76 (“[I]f a procedure appears to treat cases in a less than serious fashion . . . litigants will be quick to 
see the procedure as unfair, and they will be dissatisfied with the court.”); Lind et al., In the Eye of the 
Beholder, supra note 176, at 972 (“Perceptions of the dignity of the procedure showed a consistent and 
strong relationship with procedural justice judgments.”). 
 183. Tom R. Tyler & Robert Folger, Distributional and Procedural Aspects of Satisfaction with 
Citizen-Police Encounters, 1 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 281, 292 (1980). 
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particularly value the existence of these qualities in their interactions with 
authorities.184  
Significantly, several studies have shown that disputants value these 
process characteristics as much as, or even more than, control over the final 
decision (also termed “decision control” 185). Disputants particularly have 
identified the opportunity for voice as just as valuable as decision control.186 
Other studies have demonstrated that disputants actually prefer processes in 
which they surrender decision control (e.g., trial and arbitration) if they 
perceive that these processes provide more opportunity for voice187 and more 
dignified treatment than the available consensual processes.188 This finding is 
consistent with other studies that have found that disputants’ procedural 
 
 
 184. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice, supra  note 150, at 835 n.4 (noting that 
minorities “place[d] significantly greater weight on evidence about their social standing than did White 
group members”). See also  MICHELE HERMAN ET AL., METROCOURT PROJECT FINAL REPORT: A 
STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF ETHNICITY AND GENDER IN MEDIATED AND ADJUDICATED CASES AT THE 
METROPOLITAN COURT MEDIATION CENTER viii-xii (1993) (finding that minority litigants were more 
satisfied with mediation processes and outcomes even though mediated outcomes were not as 
favorable as those received in adjudication). 
 185. “Decision control” is defined as “the extent to which disputants are free to accept or reject 
the result of a third-party intervention.” E. Allan Lind et al., Decision Control and Process Control 
Effects on Procedural Fairness Judgments, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 338, 339 (1983) [hereinafter 
Lind et al., Decision Control and Process Control].  
 186. See P. Christopher Earley & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice and Participation in Task 
Selection: The Role of Control in Mediating Justice Judgments, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1148, 1154 (1987) (reporting the results of a laboratory experiment and a field experiment, which 
found no evidence that perceptions of decision control produce or influence perceptions of procedural 
justice); Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive , supra  note 150, at 859 (finding that “both 
decision and process control mattered” in the legal arena while control did not matter in the managerial 
setting). 
 187. See LaTour et al., Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, supra  note 168, 
at 283 (finding that United States “participants prefer to control the process of evidence presentation 
themselves while a third party controls the result”). 
 188. See Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 176, at 965 (reporting that “litigants 
viewed trial and arbitration as fairer than bilateral settlements” and viewed judicial settlement 
conferences as somewhat less fair than bilateral settlements, though the difference was not statistically 
significant). See also  LaTour et al., Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, supra 
note 168, at 274 (speculating that United States participants least prefer bargaining because “if litigants 
simply present their cases to each other (as in bargaining), they may choose to ignore each other or 
may prevent each other from making a complete presentation of the evidence”). But see TOM R. 
TYLER ET AL., PREFERRING, CHOOSING, AND EVALUATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES: T HE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANTECEDENTS OF FEELINGS AND CHOICES 28 (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No. 
9304, 1993) (reporting that while people’s post -procedure evaluations and preferences are most 
strongly influenced by issues of “treatment,” their actual selection among procedures is based on 
issues of “control”); Baruch Bush, supra note 11, at 18, 23, 26 (arguing that the procedural justice 
studies show that people prefer consensual processes because these provide the opportunity for 
participation in the decision-making process as well as an opportunity for voice); Shapiro & Brett, 
supra  note 174, at 1175 (reporting that grievants “perceived greater procedural justice in mediation 
than in arbitration and . . . perceived great er outcome and process control in mediation than in 
arbitration”). 
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justice judgments are affected much more strongly by variations in process 
control189 than by variations in decision control.190 
Ultimately, the procedural justice literature highlights the need to focus 
not solely on the fairness of outcomes, but also on the fairness of 
procedures.191 Further, the literature suggests that disputants are less 
concerned about receiving formal due process during their experiences with 
the courts than they are about being treated in a manner that is consistent 
with their everyday expectations regarding social relations and norms.192 The 
research studies themselves, however, do not explain why the opportunity for 
voice, consideration, and even-handed, dignified treatment are so important 
to disputants. Social science scholars have developed theories to explain the 
potency of procedural justice. These theories also assist the application of 
procedural justice principles to mediation.  
C.  Theories Explaining Procedural Justice 
Two theories—the “social exchange” theory and the “group value” 
theory—together explain the importance of procedural justice.193 According 
to the social exchange theory, disputants value the opportunity for voice 
 
 
 189. One commentator has defined process control as “the extent and nature of participant’s 
control over the presentation of evidence.” Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive, supra 
note 150, at 853. Other commentators have defined process control as “the extent to which disputants 
are given control over the content of the dispute resolution hearing.” Lind et al., Decision Control and 
Process Control, supra  note 185, at 339. 
 190. Decision control is defined as “the extent and nature of people’s control over the actual 
decisions made.” Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive , supra note 150, at 853. Some 
studies have found that variations in decision control have no or much smaller effects on procedural 
justice judgments than variations in process control. LIND & TYLER, supra  note 148, at 215. 
Furthermore, process control may be “more important to people’s feelings of being fairly treated than 
. . . decision control.” Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice, supra  note 150, at 837. But  see 
Baruch Bush, supra note 11, at 23 (asserting that disputants prefer mediation and negotiation—at least 
in the small claims and divorce contexts—because they “offer greater opportunities for participation 
and communication”). 
 191. LIND & TYLER, supra  note 148, at 217 (“The most important implication of the procedural 
justice literature is that . . . outcome-based conceptions of the person are incomplete—they ignore 
important concerns that people have. In particular, work in procedural justice shows a great concern 
with the processes of social life.”). 
 192. Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra  note 151, at 
187. 
 193. See Lind et al., Reactions to Procedural Models, supra  note 168, at 179. Theorists also have 
raised a “cultural conditioning” theory, which posits that disputants prefer procedures that promote 
their cultures’ most important social bonds and that disputants are socialized to perceive such 
procedures as fair. Id. This suggests that American disputants prefer procedures in which they have an 
opportunity for voice because the American culture values the opportunity for expression and free 
speech. Specifically, some studies have revealed that people in other countries, with very different 
conflict resolution cultures, also prefer procedures that offer the opportunity for voice. Id. at 180. 
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because this provides them with the opportunity to influence the decision 
maker and indirectly influence the final outcome. Disputants “evaluate 
procedures in terms of the immediate financial and social benefits they 
receive from the procedure.”194 Thus, procedure is important because it 
serves the disputants’ goals of achieving favorable outcomes. As previously 
noted, however, research has shown that disputants value voice even when 
they know they cannot influence outcomes.195 This suggests that voice has a 
significance that is independent of its effect upon the outcome. 
A second theory, the “group value” theory, supplements the social 
exchange theory and helps to explain the inherent value of voice.196 The 
group value theory views procedures as something more than a means to 
achieve outcomes. The theory “emphasize[s] the symbolic and psychological 
implications of procedures for feelings of inclusion in society and for the 
belief that the institution using the procedure holds the person in high 
regard.”197 By focusing on the symbolism and psychological implications of 
procedures, the group value theory explains the overwhelming importance of 
voice in affecting perceptions of procedural justice, even when such voice 
will not affect the outcome of a decision-making forum. The theory also 
provides a means for understanding the importance of dignified treatment 
and consideration of the views expressed by the disputants. All of these cues 
send powerful messages to disputants regarding their status in society, which 
then “validates their self-identity, self-esteem, and self-respect.”198  
 
 
 194. Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra  note 151, at 
179. 
 195. Such research also challenged the theory proposed by Thibaut and Walker that the 
opportunity for voice is seen as fair because it permits the disputants to provide the decision maker 
with all information needed to permit the most equitable resolution. Id. at 180-81. 
 196. See Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive, supra note 150, at 858. Tyler 
observes that:  
[D]istributive justice judgments do have a basis in the resources individuals receive in interactions 
with others [i.e. outcomes]. This supports traditional conceptions of the psychology of distributive 
justice. It suggests that social exchange concerns are important to any complete understanding of 
the psychology of justice. The data also suggest that the traditional conception of the psychology 
of distributive justice is too limited. Relational concerns also influence judgments of distributive 
justice. Hence, people’s feelings about the fairness of outcomes also reflect judgments about 
procedural justice.  
Id. More recently, Lind and Tyler have hypothesized that people use their perceptions of procedural 
justice as a heuristic for determining whether they have received distributive justice. See supra note 
151. See also  Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice, supra note 150, at 836 (suggesting that the 
influence of social exchange concerns on procedural justice judgments may be greater in dispute 
settings and when outcomes are unfavorable). 
 197. Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra  note 151, at 
182. 
 198. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive , supra note 150, at 852. 
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Based on the group value theory and the findings of procedural justice 
research, Tom Tyler developed three categories of “relational concerns,”199 
or “indicators,”200 that independently and “directly shape[] procedural justice 
judgments.”201 Subsequent research has begun to indicate that disputants’ 
perceptions regarding these relational concerns also influence the effect of 
providing the disputants with an opportunity for voice in a dispute resolution 
process.202 First, disputants are concerned about their “standing” as full 
members of society (also termed “status recognition”). The disputants’ 
assessments of their standing is dependent upon the way in which group 
authorities treat them.203 Second, disputants assess the treatment they receive 
in order to determine whether the authorities involved in the decision-making 
procedure “are trustworthy and benevolently disposed toward”204 them. “If 
people are able to infer a benevolent disposition, they can trust that in the 
long run the authority with whom they are dealing will work to serve their 
interests.”205 Finally, disputants are concerned about “neutrality” and assess 
the “evenhanded[ness]”206 of the treatment they receive and the extent to 
which decisions will be based on facts, not opinions.207 Based on their 
evaluations of these relational concerns, disputants determine the security of 
their place in society. To the extent that decision-making procedures are 
structured to reassure disputants that they are valued members of society—
and thus included in “the group”—such procedures are more likely to be 
perceived as procedurally just.208 
 
 
 199. Id. at 853 (describing relational concerns and reporting field research results that support the 
influence of these concerns on procedural justice judgments). See Lind et al., Procedural Context and 
Culture, supra  note 168, at 778-79 (finding that in a study of four different cultures, evidence of the 
“voice effect” is mediated by perceptions regarding relational concerns).  
 200. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive , supra note 150, at 858. 
 201. Id.  
 202. Lind et al., Procedural Context and Culture, supra note 168, at 778 (finding “little support 
for the idea that voice has a substantial effect independent of the three relational variables”).  
 203. See Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive, supra note 150, at 851. See also Lind 
et al., Procedural Context and Culture, supra  note 168, at 768 (describing “status recognition” as 
“feelings that the authority has treated the person with the dignity and respect appropriate for a full-
fledged member of the group).  
 204. Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra  note 151, at 
182. See also Lind et al., Procedural Context and Culture, supra note 168, at 768 (reframing “trust” as 
“trust in benevolence” and defining this relational term as “inferences about the authority’s 
motivat ions, especially the authority’s willingness to consider one’s needs and to try to make fair 
decisions”).  
 205. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive , supra note 150, at 854. 
 206. Id. See also Lind et al., Procedural Context and Culture , supra  note 168, at 768 (defining 
“neutrality” as “the belief that decisions are based on a full and open accurate assessment of the 
facts”).  
 207. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive, supra note 150, at 854. 
 208. Research supports the importance of these indicators. See, e.g., Tyler, The Psychology of 
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It should be noted here that the group value theory does not assume that 
the disputants participating in a decision-making procedure are most 
concerned about gaining recognition or acknowledgment from each other. 
The group value theory does not focus on the relationship (or lack of a 
relationship) between the disputants. Rather, this theory and the research 
supporting the theory highlight the relationship between the disputants and 
the third party in decision-making procedures. The group value theory 
“assumes that people are concerned about their long-term social relationship 
with the authorities or institutions acting as third parties and do not view their 
relationship . . . as a one-shot deal.”209 Research has demonstrated that 
“[p]eople care about their relationship with the third party. They react to 
evidence about how that person makes decisions, to information about their 
intentions, and to the interpersonal context of their interaction with each 
other.”210  
The group value theory also does not assume that disputants seek a 
personal or spiritual recognition of each other’s “common humanity.”211 
Rather, this theory assumes that disputants search for something more 
limited—reassurance regarding their identities as valued members of society. 
Is the disputant respected enough by this society’s authorities that they grant 
him the opportunity to be heard and structure their decision-making process 
to ensure that he is treated with dignity? Do the authorities pay attention to 
what he has to say? Ultimately, what does their treatment suggest about the 
disputant’s placement in the social hierarchy?212 
 
 
Procedural Justice, supra  note 150, at 836 (examining citizen experience with police and courts and 
finding that “issues of neutrality, trust, and standing . . . explain more about people’s reactions to their 
experiences than do variations in perceived control or outcome favorability”).  
 209. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice, supra note 150, at 831. 
 210. Id. at 836-37.  
 211. BARUCH BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 15, at 92. Bush and Folger explain that  
[i]n the transformative orientation, the ideal response to a conflict . . . . is to help transform the 
individuals involved . . . . Responding to conflicts productively means utilizing the opportunities 
they present to change and transform the parties as human beings. It means encouraging and 
helping the parties to use the conflict to realize and actualize their inherent capacities both for 
strength of self and for relating to others. It means bringing out the intrinsic goodness that lies 
within the parties as human beings.  
Id. at 82. See also  Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 
61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 930 (1981) (describing the “procedural barrenness of liberal theory,” which does 
not respond to man’s fundamental sociability and his interest in “a relationship in which he both knew 
and was known. For it may be that we cannot, after all, ever know ourselves except as mediated and 
reinforced by association with others.”) (citing ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND 
POLITICS 191-235 (1975)).  
 212. See Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice, supra note 150, at 837 (discussing standing 
within a group).  
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In some sense, it is easier to intuit why disputants care so much about 
procedural justice when they will be subject to a third party’s decision 
regarding their dispute. If disputants perceive that the third party is treating 
them and their dispute in a procedurally just manner, then it becomes 
somewhat easier to trust that the third party’s decision will be based on all 
relevant information and that the third party will attempt to make a 
substantively just decision. Mediation, however, assumes that the disputants 
will maintain control over the resolution of their disputes. There will be no 
outcome unless they agree to it. They are not vulnerable to the whims of a 
third-party decision maker. Under these circumstances, why should 
mediation participants care about procedural justice?213 Further, why should 
the courts care about the existence of procedural justice in the mediation 
process? The next part of this Article will explain why the procedural justice 
paradigm does and should apply to mediation, despite the consensual nature 
of the process. 
III. EXAMINING WHETHER THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE PARADIGM SHOULD 
APPLY TO MEDIATION 
If mediation is viewed as fitting exclusively within the bargaining 
paradigm, there is little reason to propose that disputants participating in 
mediation are entitled to experience procedural justice. Courts certainly do 
not expect procedural justice in the negotiation process. Judicial review of 
the negotiation underlying a settlement agreement generally is limited to 
determining whether the negotiation was marred by fraud,214 
misrepresentation,215 mutual mistake,216 coercion or duress,217 or undue 
influence.218 Under extremely limited circumstances, judicial review will 
include consideration of the “candor, openness and bargaining balance”219 of 
 
 
 213. This question is grounded in the assumption that disputants’ voice matters only because it 
serves as a means to “secure fair outcomes.” Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to 
Legal Authorities, supra note 151, at 181. E. Allan Lind, Tom Tyler, and others were troubled by this 
assertion and “questioned how [it] . . . could be reconciled with laboratory research . . . showing that 
voice effects occur even when disputants have more direct means to assure the fairness of outcomes 
(as is the case in mediation procedures, where the disputants can reject outcomes that they feel are 
unfair).” Id. 
 214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162, 164 (1982). 
 215. See id. at §§ 162-64. 
 216. See id. at § 152.  
 217. See id.  at § 175. See also Machinery Hauling, Inc. v. Steel of W. Va., 384 S.E.2d 139, 141-44 
(W. Va. 1989) (discussing duress defenses in contract enforcement actions). 
 218. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1982). 
 219. United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp ., 899 F.2d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 1990). In cases involving 
claimed violations of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 
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the settlement negotiations or whether the settlement agreement represents 
the exercise of parties’ free and informed will. 220 However, courts rarely 
concern themselves with the extent to which the underlying negotiation 
affirmatively provided the parties with the opportunity to be heard, to have 
their perceptions considered by the other side, or to be treated with dignity 
and respect.221  
Empirical studies of litigants’ experiences in the negotiated resolution of 
their cases further suggest that the courts would not find much procedural 
justice in court-connected negotiation if they chose to look for it. Several 
years ago, a study involving personal injury litigants in three different state 
courts compared the litigants’ perceptions of the procedural justice provided 
by trial, court-connected arbitration, judicial settlement conferences, and 
 
 
1980 (CERCLA), the government frequently negotiates proposed consent decrees with companies and 
individuals identified as potentially responsible parties (PRPs). Before such a consent decree may be 
entered, the court must determine whether the decree is reasonable, fair, and consistent with 
CERCLA’s goals. Id. at 84. In assessing the decree’s fairness, the court must consider the procedural 
fairness of the proposed settlement which requires a review of the “candor, openness, and bargaining 
balance of the settlement process.” Id. at 86. Specifically, courts have focused on whether the 
complaining PRPs were or should have been given the opportunity to participate in the negotiation 
process. United States v. Am. Cyanamid Co., Inc., No. 2:93-0654, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4692, at 
*23, *31 (S.D.W. Va. 1997). See also United States v. Davis, 11 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (D.R.I. 1998) 
(“Generally, the requirement of procedural fairness is satisfied if . . . all parties . . . are afforded an 
opportunity to participate . . . .”); Arizona v. Nucor Corp., 825 F. Supp. 1452, 1458 (D. Ariz. 1992) 
(examining whether the government misled the complaining PRPs regarding the negotiation process). 
The courts have also looked at whether the government bargained in good faith. United States v. Bay 
Area Battery, 895 F. Supp. 1524, 1529 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (examining whether the government made 
reasonable efforts to collect and analyze financial data before agreeing to specific payment terms); 
Nucor, 825 F. Supp. at 1458 (requiring government to operate in good faith). In assessing the 
procedural fairness of the bargaining process, courts specifically have found that the government is not 
required to invite all PRPs to participate in negotiations and that the government is not required to 
“telegraph its settlement offers, divulge its negotiating strategy in advance, or surrender the normal 
prerogatives of strategic flexibility.” Cannons Eng’g, 899 F.2d at 93. Although the courts use the term 
“procedural fairness” in their review of the negotiations that led to the proposed decrees, they do not 
examine the underlying negotiations to determine the opportunity for voice, consideration by the other 
negotiators, and respectful and dignified treatment. But see United States v. Kramer, 19 F. Supp. 2d 
273, 284-85 (D.N.J. 1998) (reviewing a proposed decree developed through a nonbinding 
mediation/arbitration procedure involving a third party, court evaluated the procedure to determine the 
extent of participants’ involvement in developing the procedure, the participants’ opportunity to be 
heard regarding allocation factors and proposed allocations, and the third party’s consideration of the 
participants’ views). 
 220. For example, in a settlement agreement with a seaman, the shipowner bears the burden of 
establishing the validity of the seamen’s release of claims and must show that the release “‘was 
executed freely, without deception or coercion, and that it was made by the seaman with full 
understanding of his rights.’” Castillo v. Spiliada Mar. Corp., 937 F.2d 240, 244 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(quoting Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248 (1942)). The shipowner bears the 
burden because “seamen have enjoyed a special status in our judicial system . . . . because they occupy 
a unique position. A seaman isolated on a ship on the high seas is often vulnerable to the exploitation 
of his employer.” Castillo , 937 F.2d at 243. 
 221. See supra note 219. 
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traditional bilateral negotiations (i.e., negotiations between the litigants’ 
attorneys).222 Although litigants clearly retained control over the final 
outcome223 of bilateral negotiations between their attorneys, litigants ranked 
this process as significantly less procedurally fair than either trial or court-
connected arbitration.224 The procedural fairness ratings for judicial 
settlement conferences were even slightly lower than the ratings for bilateral 
negotiations, although the difference was not statistically significant.225 The 
reasons for these perceptions will be examined in greater detail below, but 
the research results affirm a real-life disconnect between the delivery of 
procedural justice and court-connected negotiation processes. These results 
raise concerns about the procedural justice-related consequences of modeling 
court-connected mediation after either attorneys’ bilateral negotiations or 
judicial settlement conferences. 
The theories underlying the importance of procedural justice help to 
explain why procedural justice is not expected of the negotiations underlying 
settlement. The group value theory suggests that procedural justice is 
important because people are concerned about how they are perceived by the 
authority presiding over a decision-making process. The negotiation process, 
however, does not involve a decision-making authority. Instead, it involves 
just another self-interested negotiator. Arguably, litigants who opt out of the 
state-sponsored processes that involve third-party decision makers (i.e., the 
courts) also effectively waive any expectation of procedural justice. Taking 
the courts’ perspective, once litigants withdraw from participation in the trial 
process, the courts (and society) are under no obligation to ensure that their 
cases are resolved in procedurally just processes. The litigants are on their 
own.226  
The other major theory explaining the importance of procedural justice, 
the social exchange theory, argues that procedural justice is important to 
disputants because it is only through the opportunity for voice that the 
disputants retain some level of indirect control over the outcome. However, 
 
 
 222. Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra  note 176, at 961-63. 
 223. It is worth noting, however, that there was no significant difference between litigants’ 
perceptions of their control (either over outcome or process) in bilateral negotiations compared to their 
control in the trial or arbitration processes. Id. at 967. In addition, the means for litigant control ratings 
were relatively low across all processes. Id. at 993-94.  
 224. Id. at 965. 
 225. Id. at 965-66. 
 226. This perspective is consistent with the conception that settlement is a “product of a 
consensual private departure from the public forum [and that] [t]he results [are] an accidental 
byproduct for which the court [is] not accountable.” Galanter & Cahill, supra note 11, at 1390-91 
(arguing that courts can no longer define themselves or be defined as responsible only for adjudication; 
they must ensure the quality of dispute resolution processes and settlements). 
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in negotiation, there is no need for disputants to exercise indirect control. 
They retain full and direct control over their own decision whether or not to 
settle and upon what terms. Thus, they retain direct control over the outcome.  
Because negotiation does not involve an authority and does not remove 
disputants’ control over outcomes, it is understandable that expectations of 
procedural justice generally are not applied to the bargaining process.227 If 
mediation is viewed as merely assisted negotiation, it is equally easy to 
understand why one might conclude that procedural justice also need not be 
expected of this process.228  
However, mediation is different from negotiation simply because it 
involves the presence of a neutral third party.229 Particularly in court-
connected mediation, this third party is likely to be perceived as a 
representative of the courts and as an authority figure.230 This perception of 
the mediator as an authority, and of mediation as a socially-sanctioned 
decision-making process, is likely to be even stronger when the use of 
mediation is court-mandated or court-encouraged.231 Under these 
 
 
 227. Although procedural justice is not expected of the negotiation process, some researchers have 
begun to identify the dynamics within negotiation that produce enhanced perceptions of procedural 
fairness. See, e.g., Lind et al., Procedural Context and Culture, supra note 168, at 778 (discussing two 
laboratory studies involving four cultures that indicate that when people are engaged in “dyadic 
conflict resolution,” procedural justice judgments are based primarily upon perceptions of status 
recognition and neutrality, but when people are engaged in third-party dispute resolution processes, 
procedural justice judgments are influenced more strongly by perceptions of trust).  
 228. Frankly, if mediation is viewed as a substitute for judicial settlement conferences (another 
process involving a third party authority) it is less easy to justify the inapplicability of procedural 
justice principles. Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, for example, has observed that judges may 
conceive of their overriding goal in settlement conferences as “facilitation of . . . procedural justice,” 
but this goal competes with others, such as “efficient case management,” “facilitation of substantive 
justice,” or “simple brokering of what would occur anyway in bilateral negotiations.” See Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement 
Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 506 (1985).  
 229. In making this point, Craig McEwen and Richard Maiman have further assumed that the 
mediator must be educated in the mediation session:  
Mediation and negotiation differ in that the former involves a third party whereas the latter does 
not. The presence of the third party makes it  likely that the consensual process in mediation will 
differ in some respects from that in negotiation. A mediator, in order to understand the dispute, 
needs to have the disputants review and clarify their perceptions of facts, events, commitments, 
obligat ions, demands and disagreements. In bilateral negotiations such a detailed review is neither 
as necessary, nor as likely. 
McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court, supra  note 150, at 14-15. 
 230. See Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation About the Current Status and the Future 
of ADR: A View from the Courts, 2000 J. DISP.  RESOL. 11, 24 (2000) (noting that litigants, lawyers 
and the general public perceive neutrals in court -sponsored ADR programs as representatives of the 
court). See also McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court, supra note 150, at 15 
(observing that “the presence of a mediator makes a consensual commitment semi-public in 
character”). 
 231. Indeed, Professor Richard Reuben has even suggested that some due process guarantees 
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circumstances, the group value theory suggests that disputants will care very 
much about the mediator’s behavior and will interpret it as a sign of the 
judiciary’s attitude toward them and their disputes.232  
The social exchange theory is also relevant to mediation because there 
will only be an outcome if all of the disputants agree to one.233 Simply, in 
order to reach a mutually acceptable agreement, the disputants generally 
must persuade each other to move from mutually exclusive positions. Such 
persuasion requires that the disputants hear and understand each other’s 
voice. Often, this also requires the mediator to hear and understand the 
disputants’ voices, so that the mediator can then use the information he has 
learned to encourage each of the disputants to make responsive (and perhaps 
even creative) new offers and demands.  
Ultimately, it is not surprising that research has demonstrated that 
procedural justice concerns apply just as much to mediation as to the third-
party processes that produce binding outcomes.234 Indeed, some 
commentators have warned of a “potentially serious problem—the 
diminution of perceived fairness—if the flight from adversariness is carried 
too far”235 and have recommended that “care must be taken to provide the 
disputant with clear procedural mechanisms for the exercise of process 
control in the mediation hearing.”236  
The rhetoric and data used to introduce mediation to the courts and to 
persuade litigants to submit their cases to this dispute resolution process (or 
to acquiesce in court-ordered submission of their cases to the process) also 
support the application of procedural justice considerations to mediation. 
Professor Deborah Hensler recently noted that in urging courts to 
institutionalize mediation, advocates “tended to sell ADR . . . to litigants as 
 
 
apply to court -connected ADR processes once they are mandated, encouraged, or enforced by the 
courts. See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1046-1101 (2000). 
 232. See Shapiro & Brett, supra  note 174, at 1174 (reporting that the noninstrumental importance 
of voice was “relatively” as important in mediation as in arbitration in accounting for judgments of 
procedural justice).  
 233. Recent research supports the relevance of both the group value theory and the social 
exchange theory in mediation. See, e.g. , id. at 1174-75 (reporting that field study results demonstrate 
that “instrumental, non-instrumental, and enactment processes account for judgments of procedural 
justice both in mediation, where disputants have control over the outcome, and in arbitration, where a 
third party has control over the outcome”). 
 234. See, e.g., id. at 1174 (comparing procedural justice judgments in mediation and arbitration of 
miners’ grievances). See also  Lind et al., Decision Control and Process Control, supra note 185, at 
345-48 (reporting results of a laboratory study demonstrating that perceptions of process control are 
not enhanced by the existence of decision control and that process control enhances fairness judgments 
of individuals experiencing a nonbinding dispute resolution procedure). 
 235. Lind et al., Decision Control and Process Control, supra  note 185, at 347. 
 236. Id. 
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something that [would] improve the quality of the dispute resolution process 
and outcomes.”237 As I have suggested elsewhere, proponents of mediation 
argued that one of the most important procedural attributes of the mediation 
process—and one of its most significant improvements upon both trial and 
attorney-controlled negotiation—was the disputants’ active and direct 
participation in the communication and negotiation occurring within the 
mediation session.238 Mediation, unlike trial or traditional bilateral 
negotiations, gave the disputants the opportunity to tell their stories 
themselves—to have voice—and to be heard by each other and by the neutral 
third party.  
Procedural justice considerations also were recognized as relevant to 
mediation in the development of standards of conduct for mediators and in 
the many studies evaluating mediator performance and litigant satisfaction. 
In the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, mediation proponents 
explicitly invoked the significance of procedural fairness as a measure of the 
quality of the mediation process. Standard VI, entitled, “Quality of the 
Process,” provides that “[a] mediator shall work to ensure a quality 
process[,]” which is defined as one that “requires a commitment by the 
mediator to diligence and procedural fairness.”239 In satisfaction studies of 
mediation—used both to promote the introduction of mediation to the courts 
and to evaluate court-connected mediation programs240—researchers 
consistently invoked procedural justice by querying whether litigants were 
“given an adequate opportunity to express [their] view[s],”241 whether the 
 
 
 237. Deborah R. Hensler, ADR 2000: Court-Sponsored ADR Programs, Address at the 
Association of American Law Schools Centennial Annual Meeting (Jan. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Heisler, 
ADR 2000: Court-Sponsored ADR Programs] (emphasis added). 
 238. See Welsh, supra note 14. See, e.g., FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at xiii (“Those 
involved in mediation are not simply recipients of a service; they are actively involved in the process 
as participants.”); Janet M. Rifkin & JoAnne Sawyer, Alternative Dispute Resolution—From A Legal 
Services Perspective, NLADA BRIEFCASE, Fall 1982, at 20, 22 (“Participation in the resolution of 
their own disputes can give clients a sense of control over their own lives in contrast to the feeling of 
being victims of [a] legal process they do not understand.”). 
 239. See AM. ARB. ASS’N ET AL., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, IV (1994). 
Standard IV fails to define procedural fairness or to reference the indicia of procedural justice 
uncovered by research, but it provides that “[t]here should be adequate opportunity for each party in 
the mediation to participate in the discussions.” Id. Thus, mediation is distinguished by the extent to 
which it permits disputants to participate and have a voice.  
 240. See, e.g., McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court, supra  note 150, at 31 
(measuring participants’ perception of fair treatment in mediation of cases involving small claims). 
 241. KOBBERVIG, supra note 59, at 38. See also THE CJRA DEMONSTRATION PROJECT, 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA: A SURVEY OF 
ATTORNEYS 2 (1993) [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT 
OF CALIFORNIA]. The survey asked attorneys to gauge the helpfulness of the ADR process in “[g]iving 
one or more parties an opportunity to ‘tell their story.’” Id. See also Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A 
“Party Satisfaction” Perspective on a Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. OF DISP . 
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mediation process “handle[d] [their] case fairly,”242 whether litigants 
perceived that the mediator was “fair and impartial in dealing with [their] 
case[,]”243 and whether “the other side heard”244 what they had to say. As 
should be evident, from the beginning of mediation’s institutionalization 
within the courts, the process was treated differently than negotiation. 
Although there was no suggestion that negotiation should be procedurally 
fair, both mediation proponents and the courts245 consistently demanded 
procedural fairness of mediation and even indicated that the quality of 
mediation would be measured by the extent to which it delivered procedural 
justice to the disputants.246     
As mediation has transmogrified in the court-connected context, however, 
commentators have begun to observe that courts need to be reminded of their 
earlier definition of and commitment to quality in mediation. Professor 
Hensler recently urged that there is a need to “challenge courts to make good 
on . . . promises [regarding the quality of the mediation process] that are 
made to disputants” and added that this need is “becoming ever more critical 
as courts order people to use these procedures on the claims that these 
procedures are doing something better for them.”247 Magistrate Judge Wayne 
Brazil has echoed this concern and has observed that the quality of mediation 
reflects upon the quality and mission of the courts: 
 
 
RESOL. 885, 891 n.19 (1998) [hereinafter Guthrie & Levin, A “Party Satisfaction” Perspective] 
(listing examples of evaluation data that focus on the opportunity for voice provided by the mediation 
process). 
 242. KOBBERVIG, supra note 59, at 38; ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE NORTHERN 
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, supra  note 241, at 5. See also  Guthrie & Levin, A “Party Satisfaction” 
Perspective, supra  note 241, at 892 n.20 (listing examples of evaluation data that focus on the 
perceived fairness of the mediation process). 
 243. KOBBERVIG, supra note 59, at 39; ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE NORTHERN 
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, supra  note 241, at 3.  
 244. KOBBERVIG, supra note 59, at 38; ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE NORTHERN 
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 241, at 3. This survey asked attorneys to rank the neutral third 
party based on whether she was “[a] good listener” or “[a] poor listener.” Id.  
 245. I am not suggesting here that civil litigators ever demanded that mediation should be judged 
by its procedural fairness. 
 246. Mediation proponents particularly recommended that as courts ordered litigants into 
mediation (and thus reduced litigants’ autonomy), the courts’ responsibility for insuring quality 
increased. See CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT & THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, 
NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS ii (noting that “[t]he goal of 
the Standards is to inspire court-connected mediation programs of high quality). 
 247. Hensler, ADR 2000: Court-Sponsored ADR Programs, supra note 237. See also Edward F. 
Sherman, A Process Model and Agenda for Civil Justice Reforms in the States, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
1553, 1571 (1994) (“The further ‘institutionalization’ of ADR as a settlement device has raised 
additional fears of undermining the voluntary nature of ADR and subordinating its problem-solving 
and relationship -building goals to cost-efficiency and docket -clearing objectives.”). 
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The goal of an ADR program that is sponsored by a public court 
cannot be simply to have the disputing be over. The business of the 
courts is not business—it is justice. And the dimension of justice for 
which courts are primarily responsible is process fairness—which 
includes, among many other things, assuring that all people stand 
equal before the law and are greeted by the judicial system with the 
same presumption of respect. It follows that the primary concern of 
any court that sponsors an ADR program must be with the process 
fairness of the services that are provided in that court’s name. Those 
processes must be fully respect-worthy.248  
This concern about the process quality of mediation is not simply 
altruistic. As revealed by the procedural justice studies previously described, 
courts actually invite questions about their legitimacy to the extent that they 
fail to deliver dispute resolution processes that are perceived as procedurally 
just.249 Viewed in this way, it is in the courts’ institutional self-interest250 to 
ensure that court-connected mediation is structured to maximize the 
experience of procedural fairness. 
If it is accepted that perceptions of procedural justice are relevant and 
even essential to the definition of quality in mediation within the court 
context, the next step is to apply the lessons from the procedural justice 
literature to the new model of mediation used in the courts. Part II of this 
Article examined the four most significant adaptations that have occurred in 
court-connected mediation and applied negotiation theory and research 
 
 
 248. Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of ADR Services by Courts: Critical 
Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP .  RESOL. 715, 727-28 (1999) [hereinafter Brazil, 
Comparing Structure for the Delivery of ADR Services]. See Brazil, Continuing the Conversation, 
supra  note 230, at 24 (The courts’ “most precious asset is the public’s trust” and such trust is grounded 
in the public’s belief “that the aspect of justice for which [the courts] are primarily responsible is 
process fairness, process integrity. It follows that the characteristic of our ADR programs about which 
we must be most sensitive is fairness, especially process fairness.”). 
 249. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 148, at 209 (summarizing studies that have “found that 
procedural justice judgments affect the evaluation of authorities and institutions”).  
 250. Although fearing that his views will be perceived as “institutional selfishness or narcissism,” 
Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil has written eloquently on this point: 
Courts are charged with performing what is probably the most important function of government: 
peacefully resolving disputes and thus giving order and stability to relationships that do not order 
and stabilize themselves. Courts cannot perform this essential function unless the vast majority of 
people in our society will comply peacefully with the courts’ decisions. Over time, in a 
democracy, the people will comply only if they trust and respect the courts as institutions. It 
follows that we must take great care to do nothing that jeopardizes that trust and respect. This is 
the main chance. So when we design court-sponsored ADR programs our greatest concern should 
be to preserve, at least, and to increase, if possible, the people’s respect for, confidence in, and 
gratitude toward our system of justice. 
Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of ADR Services, supra  note 248, at 738. 
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findings to explain and generally affirm these changes. Part IV revisits these 
changes in order to evaluate them according to the research findings and 
theories of procedural justice. 
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE PARADIGM TO THE 
ADAPTATIONS IN COURT -CONNECTED MEDIATION  
A. The Reduced Role for Disputants in Court-Connected Mediation 
As previously described, even though mediation arose to empower 
disputants to resolve their own disputes, these disputants generally are not the 
central actors in court-connected mediation sessions and, in some courts’ 
programs, are rarely in attendance.251 To what extent is this modification of 
the mediation process consistent with the procedural justice paradigm? 
There can be little doubt that de facto exclusion of the disputants from 
mediation sessions is inconsistent with delivering a procedure that people 
will perceive as procedurally just. As noted earlier, when researchers 
evaluated litigants’ reactions to bilateral negotiation, judicial settlement 
conferences, arbitration, and trial, they found that the litigants gave the 
lowest marks for procedural fairness to bilateral negotiation and judicial 
settlement conferences.252 Further, even though the litigants arguably 
retained the most control in both of these consensual processes (there were 
no settlement outcomes unless the litigants agreed to such outcomes) they did 
not perceive themselves as having any more control in these processes than 
in trial or in arbitration.253 One important difference between the consensual 
processes (i.e., bilateral negotiation and judicial settlement conferences) and 
the adjudicative processes (i.e., trial and arbitration) may help to explain 
these findings. Simply, the disputants generally did not participate in the 
bilateral negotiations or judicial settlement conferences. They were excluded 
from these consensual process by their attorneys and the judges.254 In both 
procedures, for the negotiation-enhancing reasons previously described, the 
 
 
 251. See supra Part I.A. See also supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 252. See Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra  note 176, at 965. For a discussion of 
perceptions of procedural fairness in a variety of contexts, see generally supra Part III. 
 253. See Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 176, at 967, 993-94. 
 254. Indeed, only five of the fifty-three settlement conference litigants included in the final 
analytic sample reported in In the Eye of the Beholder indicated that they attended the conference. Id. 
at 963 n.11. See also Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference , supra note 52, at 
1105 (observing that judges’ and lawyers’ shared anxieties about client attendance and participation 
“may cause an unspoken and, perhaps, unconscious conspiracy between lawyers and judges to exclude 
clients from all or important parts of settlement conferences”). 
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attorneys and judges likely viewed the disputants’ participation as 
“unnecessary and possibly counterproductive.”255 
The effect of excluding the disputants is to deny them even the 
opportunity to observe their attorneys’ presentations and arguments. Such a 
denial is likely to reduce the disputants’ perception of the procedural fairness 
of the decision making process256 for two reasons, both related to the theories 
that have been developed to explain the potency of procedural justice 
considerations. The social exchange theory posits that disputants value the 
opportunity to have their voice heard and considered because this represents 
their means to influence the outcome of the decision making process. The 
group value theory explains that disputants desire the opportunity to have 
their voice heard and considered, as well as the opportunity to be treated with 
dignity and respect, because this reassures them of their place in society. 
When disputants are excluded from mediation sessions, they do not have the 
opportunity to hear their attorneys express their voice, to assess the extent to 
which the mediator and the other side consider this voice, or to be treated by 
the court’s representative with dignity and respect. Thus, they cannot be 
reassured that their story was ever communicated, let alone that it influenced 
the outcome.257 Further, in excluding the disputants from the mediation 
session, courts, attorneys, and mediators send a message that is directly 
contrary to the social reassurance sought by disputants. The message goes 
something like this: “You, disputant, cannot count yourself as included 
within the ‘group’ that will discuss and try to resolve your dispute. Despite 
the fact that this is your dispute, you are inadequate to participate in this 
‘group.’ Only the professionals are truly capable here.” The de facto 
exclusion of disputants from mediation sessions is clearly inconsistent with 
the procedural justice paradigm. 
Fortunately, in many court-connected mediation programs, the disputants 
do attend mediation sessions. However, as noted earlier, the disputants’ 
 
 
 255. Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 176, at 963. See also Riskin, The 
Represented Client in a Settlement Conference, supra note 52, at 1098-105 (describing the advantages 
and disadvantages of client attendance at settlement conferences and lawyers’ and judges’ 
preferences). 
 256. See LIND ET AL ., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE , supra note 100, at 79 (observing that “[a]t 
least some of the unfavorable impressions of settlement conferences may be due to impressions 
formed by litigants who could not attend the conferences and who therefore could not see that the 
conferences were dignified, careful, or otherwise desirable even if they were”). 
 257. Indeed, some research suggests that when lawyers give a general overview of the legal 
process and describe particular procedures to their clients, they emphasize the extent to which 
disputants’ stories are not heard or considered by judges and opposing counsel. See Austin Sarat & 
William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer’s Office, 
98 YALE L.J. 1663, 1676-82 (1989) (describing divorce lawyers’ discussions with their clients). 
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participation is likely to be limited because their attorneys dominate the 
discussion and negotiation.258 Is this reduced role for disputants inconsistent 
with procedural justice (i.e., the opportunity to have a voice, to have this 
voice considered, and to be treated with dignity and respect)? The procedural 
justice literature reveals that the response to this question depends very much 
upon the relationship between attorneys and their clients. 
On one hand, even with the disputants in attendance, attorneys’ 
domination of mediation sessions can be understood to mean that the 
disputants never have a real opportunity to tell their own stories. The 
attorneys express the disputants’ voice. Research suggests that attorneys 
often fail to hear their clients’ experiences, perceptions, or objectives.259 It is 
hard to imagine that these attorneys will then be able to recount their clients’ 
stories in a way that fully captures the clients’ experiences and 
perceptions.260 Further, in some mediation sessions, the attorneys effectively 
waive the opportunity to tell their clients’ stories by making brief opening 
statements in joint session (or none at all), based on the assumption that 
everyone in the room already knows what occurred and that the available 
time will be better spent hammering out a negotiated agreement. If the 
disputants perceive that their attorneys are not truly vocalizing their 
interests—either because the attorneys choose not to tell their clients’ stories 
 
 
 258. See supra Part I.A. 
 259. See Hensler, The Real World of Tort Litigation, in  EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND T ROUBLE 
CASES, supra note 86, at 156-63 (contrasting tort plaintiffs’ desire for accountability and vindication of 
their legal rights with lawyers’ monetary focus in assessing claims). See also  Clark D. Cunningham, 
The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1367-85 (1992) (describing lawyers’ translation of a clinical client’s racial 
harassment case into a “stop and frisk” case for purposes of litigation); Gay Gellhorn, Law and 
Language: An Empirically-Based Model for the Opening Moments of Client Interviews, 4 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 321, 350-53 (1998) (describing a clinical law student’s failure to hear a client’s concern 
regarding her mental state); Carl Hosticka, We Don’t Care What Happened, We Only Care About 
What Is Going to Happen , 26 SOC. P ROBS. 599, 601-05 (1979) (describing lawyer-client interviews in 
which lawyers quickly interrupted client’s narrative and began pursuing a legal pigeonhole for case); 
Sternlight, supra note 90, at 320-31 (describing monetary, nonmonetary, and psychological 
divergences between lawyers and clients that result in lawyers blocking settlements or reaching 
settlements that are inconsistent with clients’ self-defined interests).  
 260. See Cunningham, supra  note 259, at 1375 (describing effect of lawyers’ presentation of case 
as a stop and frisk case, rather than racial harassment case); Gellhorn, supra  note 259, at 350-53 
(describing effect of failure to hear information regarding a client’s psychiatric disorder on the theory 
of a case); David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal 
Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND T ROUBLE CASES, supra  note 86, at 68, 86 [hereinafter Wilkins, 
Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case] (“Individual clients . . . often come to lawyers . . . because 
the system forces them to resolve their problems through legal channels. In these circumstances, what 
the client is often really seeking from her lawyer is help with, or at least understanding of and 
compassion about, the real circumstances of her life. By forcing the client to define the problem in 
legal terms, and then to maximize every available legal advantage, lawyers often neglect the issues that 
are most important to their clients.”) (citations omitted). 
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or because the attorneys do not fully understand or convey those stories—the 
disputants will not likely perceive that the mediation process affords them the 
opportunity to be heard.  
On the other hand, many attorneys do effectively represent their clients’ 
stories in mediation, both in joint session and in caucus. These attorneys fully 
understand their clients’ experiences and perceptions and eloquently describe 
them to the mediator and the other side. The clients of these attorneys may sit 
quietly, satisfied and indeed relieved that their attorneys are speaking on their 
behalf. Some mediators and commentators may nonetheless object, 
contending that the behavior of these articulate attorneys and their silent 
clients violates the participatory and client-centered underpinnings of 
mediation.261 Within the context of the courts, the more relevant question is 
whether this behavior violates procedural justice. 
The procedural justice literature strongly suggests that clients will 
perceive that they were given an opportunity for voice if they believe that 
their attorneys effectively communicated their stories. In the early studies 
that first uncovered the effect of voice on perceptions of procedural and 
distributive fairness,262 the disputants’ voice was communicated entirely 
through their attorneys’ presentations to a judge. The perception of whether 
or not there was an opportunity for voice depended upon the relationship 
between the disputants and their attorneys.  
A bit of detail regarding the design of these early studies263 is helpful in 
understanding their findings. Half of the disputants in the studies experienced 
an adversarial trial procedure; the other half experienced a nonadversarial or 
“inquisitorial” trial procedure.264 The procedures were similar in many ways: 
 
 
 261. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at xiii (“Those involved in mediation are not simply 
recipients of a service; they are actively involved in the process as participants.”); Rifkin & Sawyer, 
supra note 238, at 22 (“Participation in the resolution of their own disputes can give clients a sense of 
control over their own lives in contrast to the feeling of being victims of a legal process they do not 
understand.”). 
 262. See Stephen LaTour, Determinants of Participant and Observer Satisfaction with Adversary 
and Inquistorial Modes of Adjudication, 36  J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH . 1531 (1978) 
[hereinafter LaTour Study]; E. Allan Lind et al., Procedure and Outcome Effects on Reactions to 
Adjudicated Resolution of Conflicts of Interest, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 643 (1980) 
[hereinafter Lind Study]; Laurens Walker et al., Reactions of Participants and Observers to Modes of 
Adjudication , J. OF APPLIED SOC. P SYCH . 295 (1974) [hereinafter Walker Study]. 
 263. The early studies were very similar in design. The Walker Study was conceived primarily in 
response to contemporary proposals to expand the use of inquisitorial procedures in the United States. 
Walker Study, supra note 262, at 296-98. (distinguishing adversarial and inquisitorial models and 
describing their significance). The LaTour and Lind Studies were designed to follow up on the 
“preliminary” results of the Walker Study. LaTour Study, supra  note 262, at 1532; Lind Study, supra 
note 262, at 644. 
 264. See LaTour Study, supra  note 262, at 1535 (using four models—nonadversarial with single 
investigator, nonadversarial with two investigators, adversarial with assigned adversary, and 
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the disputants were interviewed by attorneys; the attorneys then made 
unemotional and substantively-identical presentations of evidence and 
arguments265 to the judges presiding over the trials; the disputants attended 
but never spoke at their trials;266 and after hearing the evidence presented, the 
judges issued written verdicts that had been prepared in advance.267 The 
differences between the procedures related primarily to the relationship 
between the disputants and the attorneys. The disputants involved in the 
adversarial trial procedure selected their own attorneys.268 These attorneys 
then represented the disputants and presented their cases at trial “in the most 
favorable light possible.”269 The half of the disputants involved in the 
nonadversarial or inquisitorial trial procedure were also interviewed by 
attorneys, but these attorneys were selected by the court, not the disputants, 
and the attorneys did not represent the disputants. Instead, this group of 
attorneys—called the court’s “investigating attorney[s]” in one study270—
was responsible to the court.271 These attorneys gathered and presented 
evidence to the judge for both sides and did so “in the most impartial fashion 
possible.”272  
 
 
adversarial with a choice of adversary); Lind Study, supra note 262, at 645 (using two models—
adversarial and nonadversarial with one investigator); Walker Study, supra  note 262,  at 299-300 
(using two models–adversarial and inquisitorial with a single investigator). 
 265. The number of attorneys involved in the nonadversarial or inquisitorial hearing varied 
somewhat among the studies. The inquisitorial model used in the Walker Study featured only one 
attorney-investigator who made a presentation before the judge, which applied to both disputants. 
Walker Study, supra  note 262, at 299. Similarly, in the Lind Study, the inquisitorial (or nonadversary) 
model featured one investigator who made a presentation regarding both of the disputants. See Lind 
Study, supra note 262, at 645. The LaTour Study introduced two variations of the inquisitorial model. 
In half of the inquisitorial hearings, one investigator made a presentation regarding both disputants. 
LaTour Study, supra  note 262, at 1535. In the other half, there were two investigators, each of whom 
made a presentation regarding one of the disputants. Id. 
 266. See LaTour Study, supra note 262, at 1535; Lind Study, supra note 262, at 645; Walker 
Study, supra note 262, at 300. 
 267. Handwritten cards containing the verdicts had been prepared in advance and were distributed 
independently of the evidence presented and arguments made at the trial. See Lind Study, supra  note 
262, at 645. 
 268. This is true of the Walker and Lind Studies. See Lind Study, supra note 262, at 645; Walker 
Study, supra  note 262, at 299. The LaTour Study, however, introduced an additional variation to this 
design element. For half of the adversarial hearings, the disputants were able to choose their own 
attorney. LaTour Study, supra  note 262, at 1535. In the other half, the attorney was assigned to them. 
Id. 
 269. Lind Study, supra  note 262, at 645. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Walker Study, supra note 262, at 299-300. 
 272. Lind Study, supra note 262, at 645. See also LaTour Study, supra  note 262, at 1535 (noting 
that a sign on the attorney’s chair indicated alignment with the disputant); Walker Study, supra note 
262, at 300 (same). 
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The disputants who selected their own attorneys and who perceived that 
their attorneys  advocated on their behalf rated their process—the adversarial 
trial procedure—as fairer and were more satisfied with the resulting verdicts 
than those disputants involved in the non-adversarial trial procedure.273 The 
disputants that had been represented by attorneys who advocated for them 
concluded that they had more control over the evidence, the quality of their 
lawyers’ presentations was higher, and their influence on the verdict was 
greater.274 Interestingly, the disputants reacted positively to the adversarial 
procedure regardless of whether they won or lost.275 By some measures, 
those who lost in the adversarial procedure actually gave their procedure 
higher marks than those won in the nonadversarial procedure.276 In the final 
analysis, then, it appears that disputants’ voice can be achieved through 
attorneys. 
In fact, there is some suggestion from procedural justice studies that 
disputants actually prefer dispute resolution processes in which their 
attorneys speak on their behalf277 and are more likely to perceive a quasi-
 
 
 273. See LaTour Study, supra  note 262, at 1540 (finding that “[b]oth separation of presentations 
and attorney alignment . . . were required to increase male defendants’ perceptions of procedural 
fairness and opportunity for evidence presentation, whereas choice [of attorney] was required in 
addition to these two factors to produce a significant difference in overall satisfaction with the 
procedure”); Lind Study, supra  note 262, at 649; Walker Study, supra  note 262, at 303-05 (reporting 
that the subjects expressed greater satisfaction with the adversarial procedure than the inquisitorial 
procedure). 
 274. See Lind Study, supra  note 262, at 648-49. The LaTour Study also reported that the 
separation of attorneys’ presentations created heightened perceptions regarding “the extent to which 
the lawyer was an ally” and “the quality of the attorney’s presentation[.]” LaTour Study, supra note 
262, at 1538-39. In addition, the LaTour Study found that control over the selection of an attorney 
“significantly increase[d] perceptions of involvement in the decision-making process.” Id. The subjects 
in the Walker Study reported that both sides had more opportunity to present evidence in the adversary 
procedure, trusted the adversary lawyer more, and believed the adversary attorney made a better 
presentation of their case. Walker Study, supra note 262, at 303. 
 275. Lind Study, supra  note 262, at 649. 
 276. Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, supra  note 151, at 
179. 
 277. See LaTour et al., Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, supra  note 168, 
at 265-68 (describing research in which disputants in the United States and Germany were asked to 
judge the similarities among twelve model procedures, to state their preferences among the procedures, 
and to evaluate the characteristics of the procedures). See also WISSLER, AN EVALUATION OF THE 
COMMON PLEAS COURT, supra note 92, at viii (finding that parties reported greater understanding of 
and satisfaction with the mediation process and felt less pressured to settle “if their attorneys spent 
more time talking during mediation to present their side’s case”); ROSELLE L. WISSLER,  STATE 
JUSTICE INSTITUTE , T RAPPING THE DATA : AN ASSESSMENT OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS MEDIATION IN 
MAINE AND OHIO COURTS 91 (1999) (finding that for court -connected domestic relations cases, parties 
whose cases had settled in mediation were more likely to assess the mediation process as fair if they 
had attorneys; in cases that did not settle, parties’ assessments of fairness were not affected by whether 
they had attorneys); Peter J. Kuriloff & Steven S. Goldberg, Is Mediation a Fair Way to Resolve 
Special Education Disputes? First Empirical Findings, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 35, 55-56 (1997) 
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legal procedure as unfair if they are not represented by attorneys.278 In a 
study comparing disputants’ preferences among twelve different decision 
making procedures,279 researchers found that subjects considered the 
presence or absence of representatives or investigators to be a meaningful 
characteristic for distinguishing among decision making procedures,280 and 
further, they associated “pleasantness” with this characteristic.281 The 
researchers speculated that representatives or investigators might be 
perceived as “buffer[s] against severe interpersonal conflict because they 
eliminate the need for direct interaction between the disputants.”282 The 
researchers also raised the possibility that the disputants’ preference might be 
based on their perception that representatives or investigators could “give 
more expert and persuasive presentation of the case”283 (perhaps thereby 
enhancing the disputants’ voice),284 but the researchers noted that “this 
attribute was not assessed.”285  
The simple fact that attorneys dominate court-connected mediation 
sessions has raised serious concerns for many mediators and mediation 
advocates. However, attorney dominance does not, by itself, raise doubts 
regarding the procedural fairness of the process. Instead, the procedural 
 
 
(reporting in special education mediation, “[parents] with attorney-advocates found the mediation 
process fairer than those with non-attorney advocates or with no representation” and that school 
officials’ perceptions of fairness related to their perceptions of the effectiveness of their attorney). See 
also LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE , supra note 100, at 66-67 (reporting findings that 
litigants’ participation did not result in heightened perceptions of procedural fairness). 
 278. ADLER ET AL., supra note 148, at  72 (reporting that pro se litigants were more likely than 
represented litigants to perceive that they had been treated unfairly and that arbitrators were biased; 
though these differences were described as “disturbing,” they were not large enough to be statistically 
significant). 
 279. The twelve decision making procedures are as follows: (1) single court investigator with an 
active judge; (2) single court investigator with the judge playing a passive role; (3) double investigator; 
(4) autocratic; (5) arbitration; (6) adversary; (7) mediation; (8) moot with representatives for each 
disputant; (9) mediation with representative for each disputant; (10) moot; (11) bargaining with 
representatives for each disputant; and (12) bargaining. LaTour et al., Procedure: Transnational 
Perspectives and Preferences, supra note 168, at 263-64. 
 280. Id. at 270. 
 281. Id. at 272. 
 282. Id. at 274.  
 283. Id. at 274 n.53. 
 284. The presence or absence of representatives or investigators, however, did not significantly 
affect the disputants’ perception of their control over the presentation of evidence. LaTour et al., 
Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, supra note 168, at 273. Indeed, to the extent 
that the subjects did perceive a correlation between the disputants’ process control and the presence of 
representatives or investigators, the correlation was a negative one. Id. Specifically, the correlations 
between control over the presentation of evidence and the characteristic of presence or absence of 
representatives or investigators were weaker for the disadvantaged party than for the advantaged party. 
LaTour et al., Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, supra  note 168, at 273. 
 285. Id. at 274 n.53. 
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justice research results and theories described here illustrate the importance 
of assessing the relationships between disputants and their attorneys.286 If 
there is a strong, positive relationship between a client and her attorney, it is 
very likely that the client will perceive that the attorney’s presentation and 
the mediator’s consideration of the presentation adequately fulfills the desire 
for “voice,” influence on the outcome, and personal inclusion in the 
mediation process.287 Conversely, if the relationship between the attorney 
and the client is not so positive or the client perceives that something 
personally valued was not included in the attorney’s presentation, perceptions 
of procedural justice may suffer.  
Ultimately, then, what does the procedural justice literature reveal 
regarding the impact of the reduced role of disputants in mediation? First, the 
procedural justice literature makes it quite clear that disputants should be 
invited and encouraged to attend mediation sessions. Second, disputants’ 
perceptions of procedural justice in mediation will depend upon their 
relationships with their attorneys. Because mediators cannot be aware of the 
nature of every lawyer-client relationship, mediators should routinely invite 
(but not require) the disputants to speak and to be heard during mediation 
sessions. Such invitations will demonstrate the explicit inclusion of the 
disputants in the process (and the group) and will provide the disputants with 
a direct opportunity to provide the information that they believe should 
influence the outcome. Those who are satisfied with the voice provided by 
their attorneys (and this may include a sizable proportion of the disputants 
involved in civil, nonfamily cases) will decline the mediator’s invitations. 
However, those who do not have a strong and positive relationship with their 
 
 
 286. See LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE , supra note 100, at 61 (reporting finding that 
litigants were more likely to perceive procedures as fair “when they trusted their attorneys and viewed 
them as having a good grasp of the case”); WISSLER, AN EVALUATION OF THE COMMON PLEAS 
COURT, supra note 92, at vii (finding that “[p]arties who had more preparation for mediation by their 
attorneys had more favorable assessments of the process”); Sternlight, supra note 90, at 320-31, 339-
45 (examining potential monetary, nonmonetary, and psychological divergences between attorneys 
and clients and how these divergences affect the appropriate role of the attorney in mediation); Tyler, 
The Psychology of Disputant Concerns, supra note 178, at 372 (describing research that found that 
criminal defendants’ perception that they had received fair process was closely linked to “judgment 
about issues such as how often their attorney had consulted with them in deciding how t o resolve their 
case”). 
 287. See Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 176, at 972 (noting that “evaluations of 
the attorney were positively correlated with procedural justice judgments”). Interest ingly, this issue 
regarding the disputant’s relationship with her spokesperson may also arise when the mediator leaves 
the caucus in order to communicate the disputant’s story to the other party. To the extent that the 
relationship between the mediator and the disputant is positive and strong, it is more likely that the 
disputant will feel that the mediator’s conveyance of her message represented her voice. To the extent 
that the disputant does not trust that the mediator has fully heard, understood, and affirmed her story, 
the disputant’s confidence that her voice has been expressed and heard is reduced. 
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attorneys or are not fully satisfied with their attorneys’ expression of their 
voice288 will then be able to participate in a manner consistent with 
procedural justice.289 
B. The Preference for Evaluative Interventions in Court-Connected 
Mediation 
When mediation was first introduced to the courts, it was defined as a 
“facilitative” process in which the mediator engaged in “conduct intended 
simply to allow the parties to communicate with and understand one 
another.”290 Court-connected mediation, however, often involves evaluative 
interventions by the mediator. For example, mediators regularly provide 
disputants with “reality checks” by critically assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the disputants’ cases and even opining regarding appropriate 
settlement ranges.291 Some mediators go further than this and operate from 
an overall evaluative, narrow orientation,292 believing that their primary role 
is to “provide . . . guidance as to the appropriate grounds for settlement”293 
and even to define for the disputants the particular settlement that they should 
reach. As previously demonstrated, negotiation theory, particularly the 
distributive negotiation theory,294 supports the application of legal norms and 
the use of evaluation. At this point, however, it is important to examine the 
likely effect of evaluative interventions upon disputants’ perceptions of 
procedural justice. 
Evaluative mediation, despite its widespread use in the court-connected 
 
 
 288. See MNOOKIN ET AL ., BEYOND WINNING, supra note 82, at 82-90 (describing the tension 
between principals and agents in the legal context and suggesting approaches to manage this tension).  
 289. Recent research regarding mediator interventions in court -connected domestic relations cases 
indicates that in cases that settled, parties are more likely to report that the mediation process was fair 
and the outcome satisfactory if the mediator encouraged them to express how they felt. In cases that 
did not settle, this mediator intervention did not affect parties’ assessment of the mediation’s fairness. 
See WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DATA , supra note 277, at 42. 
 290. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A 
Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 24 (1996) [hereinafter Riskin, Understanding 
Mediators’ Orientations]. 
 291. See supra Part I.B.  
 292. See Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, supra  note 290, at 26-28 (describing the 
evaluative-narrow orientation). 
 293. Id. at 24.  
 294. It should be noted, however, that even integrative negotiation advocates assert the value of 
accurately assessing one’s BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). See generally 
FISHER ET AL., supra note 97, at 97-106 (discussing the benefits of developing a BATNA). In the 
court-connected context, the determination of a BATNA generally includes assessing the disputant’s 
case and how it will be received by a judge or jury.  
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context, has been controversial.295 Many commentators have objected to this 
form of mediation because, among other things, it denies disputants the 
opportunity to control—and broaden—the norms that will be applied to the 
resolution of their dispute.296 Suppose, for example, that a mediator provides 
both disputants with an initial opportunity to tell their stories but asks them to 
confine their remarks to a discussion of the legal merits of their cases.297 
Although the disputants now have the opportunity for voice, their 
presentations may be hindered by the parameters asserted by the mediator.298 
Perhaps they also have personal, psychological, or business concerns they 
wish to address.299 The disputants could interpret the mediator’s directive as 
an encroachment upon their control over their presentation and a limitation 
upon the consideration they can expect to receive from this mediator. Both of 
these interpretations could lead to reduced perceptions of procedural justice.  
However, the procedural justice literature strongly suggests that the mere 
fact that the mediator invokes and later applies legal norms is unlikely to 
have an adverse effect upon a disputant’s perception of procedural justice. 
Most of the procedures that have been examined in procedural justice studies 
assume the use and application of external norms for decision making. 
Indeed, most of the procedures that have been evaluated for procedural 
justice involve a third party whose role is to consider and apply such norms 
in order to make a decision.300 As previously discussed, some research 
studies comparing different processes indicate that disputants actually prefer 
those processes in which the third party makes a decision301 based 
 
 
 295. See Welsh, supra note 14, at 27-32 (describing the facilitative-evaluative debate). 
 296. See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG., Mar. 1996, at 31, 32 (“Again, these practices are 
inconsistent with primary objectives of mediation: promoting self-determination of parties and helping 
the parties examine their real interests and develop mutually acceptable solutions.”).  
 297. See, e.g., Videotape: Mediators at Work: Breach of Warranty (Program on Negotiation 1998) 
(on file with the Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University) (encouraging 
attorneys to “focus on the issues with respect to merits—whether it’s liability, damages or both—that 
you think are the most salient issues that have kept this case from settling”). Even if the mediator does 
not suggest a legal focus to the parties for their opening statements, the mediator may express 
impatience or discomfort with a disputant’s expression of emotions or the recounting of “irrelevant” 
material. 
 298. See Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation , supra  note 33, at 915 (observing that an 
“imposed conversational lens might instantly straitjacket one party and place it at an unfair 
disadvantage”). 
 299. See WISSLER, TRAPPING THE DATA , supra note 277 and accompanying text.  
 300. See supra Part II.B. 
 301. See, e.g. , LaTour et al., Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, supra note 
168, at 275 (finding that United States subjects preferred procedures in which the third party exercised 
decision control—i.e., adversary, double investigator, arbitration, autocratic, single investigator 
(passive judge), and single investigator (active judge)—and least preferred bargaining); Lind et al., In 
the Eye of the Beholder, supra  note 176, at 980-83 (finding that litigants judged trial and arbitration as 
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presumably on relevant, objective norms.302 All of this suggests that 
disputants generally do not expect the authorities presiding over decision 
making procedures to abandon the norms upon which their sponsoring 
institutions are based or to abstain from sharing their norm-based 
judgments.303 Once disputants conclude that they cannot resolve a dispute 
themselves, they accept the application of society’s fairness norms as a 
means to achieve resolution. 304 Thus, disputants perceive that they have voice 
in court proceedings, even though the courts require and even condition 
access upon the invocation of and adherence to legal norms.305 
Nonetheless, the procedural justice literature indicates that when and how 
the mediator invokes the application of legal norms is likely to affect 
disputants’ perceptions that they were heard, that their views were 
considered, and that they were treated with dignity and respect. Suppose that 
a mediator, who has reviewed the court’s case file before the mediation, 
begins the first session by sharing with the parties an assessment of the most 
important strengths and weakness of their cases. The mediator may do this in 
order to avoid wasting the time of the participants, who may otherwise 
mistakenly believe that they need to educate the mediator regarding their 
cases. The mediator also may do this to focus the discussion more quickly 
 
 
more procedurally fair than either bilateral negotiation or judicial settlement conferences). But see 
Guthrie & Levin, A “Party Satisfaction” Perspective, supra note 241, at 890 n.10, 891 n.19 
(describing research in domestic relations, small claims, and victim-offender mediation programs 
showing greater satisfaction with mediation than adjudication). 
 302. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text. 
 303. WISSLER, AN EVALUATION OF THE COMMON PLEAS COURT, supra  note 92, at viii (observing 
that while parties that did not settle felt more pressured to settle if mediators recommended particular 
settlements, these parties also had more favorable assessments of the mediation process and the 
mediator); Wissler, T RAPPING THE DATA, supra  note 277, at 43 (observing that in domestic relations 
mediation, settling parties were more likely to say that the mediation process was fair if the mediator 
suggested several options for settlement, while nonsettling parties were less likely to say the mediation 
process was fair if the mediator recommended one particular settlement). 
 304. There is some evidence, however, that compliance with the mediated agreement improves if 
disputants are able to discuss their “true underlying problems.” See Pruitt et al., supra note 117, at 324. 
Placing normat ive restrictions upon disputants’ voice also appears inconsistent with the view that 
court-connected mediators should structure their interventions to respond to the individual disputants’ 
preferred conceptions of the mediation process. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Savage, Culture and Mediation: 
A Red Herring, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & LAW 269, 279-84 (1996) (describing three different 
conceptions of mediation process—agreement conception, individual personal growth conception, and 
relationship conception—and suggesting that mediators must accommodate these conceptions in order 
for mediation to be effective). 
 305. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (listing grounds for dismissing claims when certain 
conditions in the pleadings are not met). See also James H. Stark, Preliminary Reflections on the 
Establishment of a Mediation Clinic , 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 457, 487 (1996) (“[E]valuative law-based 
mediations can . . . disempower[] parties from settling on the basis of ‘community norms or values that 
are broader than those the court can consider.’”) (quoting Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of 
Legal Negotiation, supra  note 136, at 825)). 
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upon the pivotal issues. Arguably, the mediator’s summary of the disputants’ 
cases demonstrates that the mediator understood and considered what the 
parties had to say through the vehicle of their submissions to the court and is 
now efficiently moving the process beyond the storytelling stage. Yet, the 
timing of this intervention also has the effect of denying the disputants 
sufficient opportunity to express their voice and to experience the mediator’s 
(and each other’s) consideration prior to the mediator’s announcement of any 
conclusions.306 Indeed, this sort of timing can raise questions regarding 
whether the mediator’s evaluation is sufficiently informed by the disputants’ 
presentations (consistent with the social exchange theory)307 and whether the 
mediator is treating the disputants with sufficient dignity and respect 
(consistent with the group value theory). 
The timing and delivery of evaluative interventions also are likely to have 
a significant impact upon disputants’ perceptions regarding whether they 
were treated with dignity and respect. Mediators demonstrate respect for 
disputants and their control over their own decision making process if they 
refrain from using an evaluative intervention until the disputants request it. 
Mediators also treat disputants with respect and dignity if they offer 
disputants their evaluations as something to consider, explain the basis for 
their evaluations,308 and make it clear that they understand and accept the 
 
 
 306. See WISSLER,  AN EVALUATION OF THE COMMON PLEAS COURT, supra  note 92, at viii 
(observing that the mediation process and the mediator were assessed more favorably by the parties “if 
the parties spent more time talking during mediation to present their side’s case”); WISSLER, 
TRAPPING THE DATA , supra  note 277, at 42-43 (reporting that in domestic relations mediation, parties 
were more likely to say that they felt the mediation process was fair if the mediator summarized their 
position); Tyler, Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects, supra note 162, at 339 (reporting 
results of studies that found that, in interactions with police and judges, “increased opportunities to 
state one’s case before a decision is made heighten feelings that one has been involved in a fair process 
and lead to positive feelings about and support for the police officers and the judges citizens 
encounter” and increased the “voice effect” is significantly greater if citizens believe that 
decisionmakers consider their views prior to making a decision). 
 307. In research comparing tort litigants’ process and outcome perceptions of bilateral 
negotiations with their perceptions of judicial settlement conferences, researchers found that the 
litigants were more likely to feel “uncomfortable about” the judicial settlement conference process. 
Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra  note 176, at 967. In addition, the litigants expressed more 
dissatisfaction with the outcomes of settlement conferences. Id. at 980. The researchers concluded that 
litigants’ greater dissatisfaction occurred because the outcomes of the settlement conferences were 
more likely to fall below the litigants’ subjective expectations. Id. If, then, a mediator delivers an 
evaluation of the value of a plaintiff’s case before hearing the plaintiff’s story and learning how the 
plaintiff (or, more likely, the plaintiff’s attorney) values the case, the mediator risks the possibility that 
his evaluation will diverge immediately (and rather dramatically) from the disputants’ subjective 
expectation.  
 308. It is possible that mediators’ evaluations may be less persuasive if accompanied by the 
underlying reasoning. Research regarding attorneys’ ability to influence their clients’ settlement 
decisions suggests that clients are slightly less likely to follow their attorneys’ advice if their attorneys 
also provide the underlying basis for the advice. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 85, at 121 (reporting 
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disputants’ authority to adopt or reject their evaluations. The disputants’ 
sense that they are being treated with respect and dignity in the mediation 
process is not likely to be threatened by evaluation as elective education. 
The procedural justice literature suggests, however, that the greatest threat 
to the disputants’ experience of justice arises when mediators’ evaluative 
interventions and orientations become so aggressive that they actually 
manifest disrespect for the disputants and constitute attacks upon disputants’ 
dignity. As I have described elsewhere,309 a growing number of mediation 
participants are complaining to ethical boards and courts that some mediators 
engaged in evaluation are behaving abusively,310 berating disputants who 
hesitate to accept the mediators’ evaluation as the basis for settlement311 and 
making threats regarding the consequences of failing to settle.312 These 
 
 
the finding and hypothesizing that “the opinion of the respected lawyer-advisor” standing alone carries 
more persuasive value than the lawyer’s opinion coupled with “a justification that some clients might 
find unconvincing”). However, other research from the field of medicine suggests that this short-term 
loss in influence is balanced by a long-term gain in acceptance of the consequences. For example, 
some studies have demonstrated that patients are less likely to sue their doctors if the doctors are open 
and honest regarding likely medical problems and explain their diagnoses and treatment 
recommendations. Fielding, supra  note 104, at 109. 
 309. Welsh, supra note 14, at 9-12 & nn.26-45, 37 & nn.150-53. 
 310. See, e.g., Mediator Qualifications Board Update, THE RESOL. REP. (Fla. Disp. Resol. Ctr.), 
Dec. 1999, at 14 (complainant in a family case “alleged that [the] mediator . . . was abusive (yelled, 
pointed his finger in the complainant’s face and threw papers during the session), . . . inappropriately 
prolonged the session . . . tried to intimidate [the complainant] and made decisions for the parties”); 
Transcript of Proceedings Before the Honorable David Hittner, Settlement Hearing at 36-38, Allen v. 
Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (No. H-96-CV-30) (reporting that during the last hour and a 
half of a mediation session, the mediator “just beat up on [the plaintiffs] vigorously” until the clients 
signed the settlement agreement even though one of the plaintiffs felt “shamed”). 
 311. See, e.g., Mediator Qualifications Board Update, THE RESOL. REP. (Fla. Disp. Resol. Ctr.), 
Jan. 1996, at 3. A 1995 grievance alleged that  
the mediator told the complainants that they were “too poor” to try their case; addressed one of the 
complainants as “a spoiled brat”; and declared the complainants “poor slobs” who would never be 
recognized in court. The mediator admitted having told the complainants that “in [the mediator’s] 
experience, if people are too poor to properly prepare their case the results are always disastrous.” 
The mediator offered to go across the street to the courthouse to discuss this with the judge so that 
the complainants would understand.  
Id. (alteration in original). The grievance further alleged that the mediator, without the defendant’s 
consent, attempted to impose the plaintiff’s offer of settlement for the defendant’s counterclaim onto 
the defendant. Id. 
 312. See, e.g., Mediation Complaint Form, Nov. 3, 1996 (on file with the Office of the Executive 
Secretary of the Supreme Court of Virginia) (alleging that “the mediator assumed the role as a judge 
meeting privately with the attorneys,” repeatedly spoke in a threatening and manipulative manner, and 
made the decisions and divisions of assets without [the complainant’s] input or financial 
considerations). See also Mediator Qualifications Board Update , THE RESOL. REP. (Fla. Disp. Resol. 
Ctr.), Jan. 1995, at 3 (reporting that a recent complaint alleged that “[d]uring caucus, the mediator 
‘used coercion and threats to garner the agreement’ and told the complainants to be more cooperative 
since ‘they would not be pleased with [the judge in case]’s decision’”) (alteration in original); 
Mediator Qualifications Board Update, THE RESOL.  REP. (Fla. Disp. Resol. Ctr.), Apr. 1998, at 7 
(reporting allegations that the mediator was abusive because in a single session family mediation, the 
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tactics, frequently associated with “muscle mediation,”313 are designed to 
force parties to accept the mediators’ evaluations and settle their cases. Some 
mediators argue that these heavy-handed techniques are for the disputants’ 
own benefit, that only this brand of “tough love” will enable disputants to 
abandon their unrealistic hopes and resign themselves to the gritty and 
sometimes unpleasant truth of their cases.314 These tactics, however, are not 
consistent with procedural justice. Such interventions do not send the 
message that the disputants are valued and respected members of society. 
Rather, because these disputants hesitate or refuse to settle their case 
according to the mediator’s design, they are treated as uncooperative, 
recalcitrant, and perhaps intellectually inferior. Disputants who receive this 
message are highly unlikely to perceive that they were treated with dignity 
and respect.315 
Mediators’ evaluative interventions, which require using and applying 
legal norms to the situation described by disputants, represent potent tools. 
These interventions have the potential to be consistent with (and even to 
enhance) disputants’ perceptions of procedural justice if they are used after 
the disputants have had sufficient opportunity to tell their stories and if it is 
clear that the disputants may choose to reject the mediator’s assessment. In 
contrast, if evaluation is used too early (i.e., before the disputants have had 
the opportunity to present their cases and to observe the mediator’s 
consideration of their presentations), perceptions of procedural justice are 
likely to suffer. If evaluation is used too aggressively, it denies disputants the 
respect and dignity that are so important to perceptions of procedural justice. 
C. The Abandonment or Marginalization of the Joint Session in Court-
Connected Mediation 
Increasingly, court-connected mediation is abandoning or marginalizing 
the joint session in favor of shuttle diplomacy through sequential caucuses.316 
From the perspective of mediation as assisted negotiation, which has been 
described previously, much is gained in this development.317 However, this 
 
 
mediator forced the parties to remain for eleven hours). 
 313. FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 135 (emphasis omitted). 
 314. See Allen, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 947 (observing that a prominent Texas mediator had stated, 
“‘[W]hat some people might consider a little bullying is really just part of how mediation works.’”) 
(quoting Charlotte Aguilar, No Decision in Allen Case, 14 S.W. NEWS 1, 22 (1998)). 
 315. This concern may also arise if a facilitative or tranformative mediator consistently fails to 
keep one party from verbally attacking or belittling the other party. 
 316. See supra Part I.C.  
 317. See supra Part I.C.  
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adaptation, like the early or overly-aggressive use of evaluative interventions, 
poses a threat to the  provision of procedural justice in mediation. 
When the mediator abandons the joint session or the disputants’ attorneys 
present only cursory summaries of their clients’ cases in joint session, they 
are likely to sacrifice procedural justice for more effic ient deal-brokering.318 
It is at the storytelling stage in the joint session that the disputants are best 
able to assess whether the mediator permits all disputants to fully express 
themselves,319 considers what all disputants have to say,320 and generally 
manages the process in an even-handed, fair way.321 The joint session also 
provides the disputants with their best opportunity to assess the respect and 
dignity offered by the mediation process.322 They can observe whether the 
mediator personally interacts with all of the disputants in a respectful and 
dignified manner and controls the session to ensure that all disputants receive 
respectful consideration from each other.323  
Obviously, the initial joint session—with its promise of uninterrupted 
time for each of the disputants to tell their stories—can be lengthy, stiff, and 
even somewhat uncomfortable.324 From the perspective of the efficient 
brokering of a settlement, these characteristics are likely to be viewed as 
disadvantages. Yet, these same qualities reassure the disputants that their 
resolution will be informed and made more accurate by their face-to-face 
exchange of information325 and that they (and their dispute) are important 
 
 
 318. See Hensler, A Research Agenda , supra note 5, at 17 (“After initial presentation of the 
dispute, evaluative mediators appear to move quickly to ‘shuttle diplomacy.’ Parties may not meet 
together again until an agreement has been struck . . . . Whether parties view this process as a welcome 
departure from adjudication, on the one hand, or simple negotiation, on the other, is currently 
unknown.”); Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra  note 176, at 982 (suggesting that “it may be 
settlement, rather than trial, that is seen as difficult to understand and that diminishes feelings of 
participation” and affects perceptions of procedural justice). 
 319. See WISSLER,  AN EVALUATION OF THE COMMON PLEAS COURT, supra  note 92, at viii 
(reporting that litigants assessed the mediation process and the mediator more favorably “if the parties 
spent more time talking during mediation to present their side’s case”). 
 320. See supra Part II.B. 
 321. See id. 
 322. See id. 
 323. The joint session also represents the disputants’ opportunity to hear the other side. This 
opportunity may be most significant for plaintiffs who are searching for the reasons why they suffered 
a misfortune. Research indicates, for example, that plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases want to 
learn the truth about what happened. Fielding, supra  note 104, at 107-09. Studies further indicate that 
learning what happened and holding a provider accountable are important steps in the emotional 
healing process for plaintiffs. Id. at 139. 
 324. See Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference, supra note 52, at 1060-62 
(describing the discomfort of a mediation in which the disputants, as well as their attorneys, 
participated). 
 325. This concern about the accuracy of the decision, of course, invokes the social exchange 
theory described supra Part III. See also MOORE , supra note 62, at  325 (noting that caucuses, in 
contrast to joint session, “provide mediators with the greatest opportunity to manipulate parties into an 
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enough to be worth the devotion of substantial time and dignified attention 
by the mediator, the other disputant, and the attorneys.326 
The positive effects of a dignified, serious process and the substantial 
commitment of time are highlighted in litigants’ varying reactions to court-
connected procedures. In one study, tort litigants perceived that the 
procedures of trial and arbitration (procedures that explicitly provide the 
disputants with an opportunity to tell their stories in joint session) afforded 
them more procedural justice than their attorneys’ bilateral negotiations or 
judicial settlement conferences.327 This difference resulted primarily from the 
litigants’ perception that the trials and arbitration hearings that they 
experienced were more “dignified,”328 more “careful,”329 and ultimately 
more “thorough”330 than bilateral negotiations or judicial settlement 
conferences.331 Indeed, the researchers found that “the perception of 
procedural dignity was the crucial variable leading to higher procedural 
fairness ratings for trials than for bilateral settlements.”332 In other studies, 
litigants’ satisfaction with the mediation process has been related to the 
length of the process333 and, particularly, to the amount of time provided to 
the parties to present their cases.334 It follows that a dispute resolution 
process that gives disputants more time to fully  explain their stories and that 
treats all disputants in a dignified manner is likely to represent “one of the 
most meticulous, most individualized interactions that [a disputant has] ever 
experienced in the course of his or her contacts with government 
agencies.”335 Such a process, which is not structured solely or even primarily 
 
 
agreement because disputants do not have the advantage of face-to-face communication to test the 
accuracy of information exchanged”). 
 326. The need for such reassurance relates directly to the group value theory, described supra  Part 
III. 
 327. LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 100, at 44-45; Lind et al., In the Eye of 
the Beholder, supra  note 176, at 965. 
 328. Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra  note 176, at 967. 
 329. Id. 
 330. LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE , supra note 100, at 45 (comparing perceived 
fairness among trial, arbitration, and judicial settlement conferences). 
 331. Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra  note 176, at 967. 
 332. Id. at 981.  
 333. In a study finding that litigants reacted more favorably to face-to-face mediation than to the 
informal adjudication of their small claims cases, the mean of estimated trial times was 14.4 minutes; 
the average estimate for the length of mediation was 25.7 minutes. See McEwen & Maiman, Small 
Claims Mediation in Maine, supra  note 150, at 255. 
 334. See WISSLER,  AN EVALUATION OF THE COMMON PLEAS COURT, supra  note 92, at viii 
(reporting that greater amount of time spent talk ing during the mediation yielded greater satisfaction 
and understanding among litigants).  
 335. Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 176, at 981. See also McEwen & Maiman, 
Small Claims Mediation in Maine, supra  note 150, at 256 (finding that litigants rated mediation more 
highly than adjudication because mediation gave the disputants more opportunity to tell their stories 
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to achieve efficient resolution, is more likely to be perceived as procedurally 
just.  
The procedural justice literature’s suggestion that disputants are likely to 
value the dignified and joint opportunity to speak that is uniquely available in 
the joint session reveals that this procedural element is not just a meaningless 
relic from the early days of mediation. Instead, and particularly in court-
connected mediation, the carefully-managed joint session represents a 
necessary foundation for the provision of an opportunity for voice and for the 
authority’s demonstration of respect for the dignity and value of the 
individual disputant.336 If there is no initial joint session, the disputants do not 
have the opportunity to tell their stories in an open, dignified setting. Instead, 
they are forced directly into the process of brokering a deal. This is unlikely 
to feel like a careful process in which justice will be done.  
Interestingly, it is the mediators and the attorneys who may find it most 
difficult to comprehend the value of the joint session to disputants’ 
perceptions of procedural justice. This should not be surprising. Lawyers 
regularly fail to appreciate and accommodate their clients’ need to tell their 
stories.337 Based on relatively little information, attorneys (and attorney-
mediators) may quickly conclude that they possess sufficient understanding 
of the clients’ situation to understand where it fits in “the world of the legally 
possible.”338 Thus, it appears inefficient and unnecessary to devote the time 
to a full re-telling of the disputants’ stories in joint session. In addition, 
particularly in court-connected mediation, the attorneys and attorney-
mediators do not require reassurance regarding their social standing.339 This 
is their world. They, unlike many of their clients, can take their status for 
granted.340  
 
 
and therefore they had greater confidence that the third party understood what their dispute was about). 
 336. See supra Part III. 
 337. See Hensler, The Real World of Tort Litigation, supra  note 86, at 163 (describing lawyers’ 
focus on monetary concerns); Hosticka, supra  note 259, at 601-05 (describing lawyer-client interviews 
in which lawyers quickly interrupted client’s narrative and began pursuing legal pigeonhole for case). 
Other professionals also regularly fail to give their patients/clients sufficient time to talk or do not fully 
listen to them. See, e.g., FIELDING, supra  note 104, at 87-90 (reporting that in interviews with patients 
who sued their doctors, most “felt marginalized” as a result of their doctors’ patronizing remarks, lack 
of empathy, evasiveness, and overall failure to listen carefully to statements that might be relevant to 
medical condition). 
 338. See Felstiner & Sarat, Enactments of Power, supra note 88, at 1460. 
 339. See Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of 
Motive in Lawyer/Client Interaction , 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 737, 740 (1988) (observing that while 
clients in their dealings with lawyers interpret events “in terms of their impact on the self,” lawyers are 
more likely to consider “technical rules and a problem-solving orientation . . . [as] more important than 
emotional reactions and justificatio ns of self”). 
 340. See Felstiner & Sarat, Enactments of Power, supra note 88, at 1457 (describing interactions 
between a divorce lawyer and a client as taking place in “the space of law,” which may be 
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In sum, the procedural justice literature strongly suggests that the 
abandonment or marginalization of the joint session in court-connected 
mediation is inconsistent with disputants’ perceptions of procedural justice. 
An unhurried and carefully-managed joint session provides needed dignity 
and time for the telling and consideration of the disputants’ stories. The 
reduction and potential disappearance of the joint session most clearly 
demonstrates a conflict between adaptations designed to enhance deal-
making in mediation and the need to ensure that the process also provides 
disputants with an “experience of justice.” 
D. The Lack of Creativity in the Settlements Produced by Court-
Connected Mediation 
As noted previously, even though mediation originally was lauded for its 
creative potential,341 relatively few court-connected mediation sessions 
actually produce creative, nonmonetary settlement agreements.342 Is this 
adaptation of mediation likely to affect perceptions of procedural justice? 
Based on the research that has been conducted in the field of procedural 
justice, the mere fact that the disputants reach a monetary settlement seems 
unlikely to affect their perception of the fairness of the mediation process. 
Most civil lawsuits, after all, involve claims for and potential payment of 
money damages as compensation for harm. In addition, many of the 
procedures judged as procedurally fair by disputants have resulted in the 
exchange of money.343 
 
 
unwelcoming to the client but quite comfortable for lawyer). Sophisticated institutional litigants also 
may not require reassurance regarding their social standing in this context. See, e.g., ADLER ET AL., 
supra  note 148, at 76 (reporting that, unlike “unsophisticated individual litigants,” institutional 
litigants who made extensive use of the arbitration program “appear[ed] to care little about qualitative 
aspects of the hearing process . . . . judg[ing] arbitration primarily on the basis of the outcomes it 
delivers”); Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case, supra note 260, at 84-86 (contrasting 
corporate clients with individual clients). But see Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute 
Resolution, supra note 148, at 247 (reporting that researchers found that procedural justice judgments 
strongly influenced litigants’ decisions about whether or not to accept nonbindin g arbitration awards, 
regardless of whether litigants were individuals, small business owners, or corporate officers; only 
corporate employees demonstrated no link between their procedural justice judgments and their 
decisions to accept awards). 
 341. See, e.g., McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court, supra  note 150, at 33-34 
(suggesting that “consensual processes affect compliance in part because they lead to settlements with 
features not commonly found in adjudicated outcomes”). 
 342. See supra Part I.D. 
 343. See supra  Part II.B. It is possible, on the other hand, that disputants simply have fallen prey 
to cognitive tendencies to simplify conflict and to assume the existence of a fixed pie. Such biases can 
cause disputants to be unaware that “creative” settlements are realistic possibilities that they should 
expect dispute resolution processes to attain. See Thompson & Nadler, Judgmental Biases, supra  note 
107, at 214-19. My thanks to Christopher Honeyman for suggesting this possible explanation. 
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However, if a mediator or a disputant’s attorney rushes to transform the 
disputant’s story into financial terms, this action may have the unintended 
effect of impeding the disputant’s opportunity for voice and respectful 
consideration. Research has shown that attorneys have a tendency, even in 
their first meetings with their clients, to focus on monetary concerns.344 Also, 
as previously noted, attorneys facilitate settlement by encouraging their 
clients to think in terms of the expected financial value of their cases.345 
Attorneys prefer mediators who can evaluate the disputants’ cases.346 Indeed, 
mediators’ evaluative interventions support the transformation of the clients’ 
stories into financial terms.347 One significant advantage of a reduced joint 
session is that the mediator, attorneys, and disputants can then turn more 
quickly to the brokering of a financial deal.348 
All of these adaptations promote the quick transformation of disputants’ 
stories into financial terms—potentially before they have had the opportunity 
to experience a dignified, even-handed procedure in which they can tell their 
stories and be heard. This prompt transformation is likely to run directly 
counter to disputants’ desire for dispute resolution procedures that provide 
reassurance that the outcome will be based on full information (social 
exchange theory) and that the disputants are individuals whose unique 
perspectives and troubles will be treated with dignity and respect (group 
value theory).349 
If, on the other hand, disputants’ stories are not quickly transformed into 
financial terms and if the disputants are provided with a full opportunity to 
describe their situation, procedural justice will almost certainly be served 
even if the settlement is purely monetary. However, it is worth noting that if 
the disputants’ presentations also include discussion of their underlying 
needs and interests, it is more likely (though certainly not guaranteed) that 
opportunities for creative, non-monetary solutions will arise. Consequently, 
the frequent failure of court-connected mediation to produce creative, 
nonmonetary settlements does not violate procedural justice considerations 
per se. Instead, this development may be the natural consequence of other 
changes in court-connected mediation that are aimed more at settlement than 
at ensuring that disputants receive an “experience of justice.” 
 
 
 344. Hensler, The Real World of Tort Litigation, supra note 86, at 163. See supra Part I.D. 
 345. See supra Part I.B.  
 346. See supra Part I.B.  
 347. See supra Part I.B.  
 348. See supra Part I.C.  
 349. See supra Part III. 
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E.  Summarizing the Application of Procedural Justice Theory and 
Research to Court-Connected Mediation 
The application of procedural justice principles to the current evolution of 
court-connected mediation ultimately yields a mixed result. Clearly, 
procedural justice research and theories show that disputants want and need 
the opportunity to tell their stories, feel that their stories have been 
considered, and believe that they have been treated in an even-handed, 
respectful, and dignified manner. Many of the changes in the mediation 
model—the reduced role of the disputants, the preference for evaluative 
interventions, the lack of creativity in settlements—are not inconsistent per se 
with the indicia of procedural justice. Indeed, some of these changes, if they 
are handled appropriately, have the potential to enhance perceptions of 
procedural justice. For example, attorneys speak for their clients in many of 
the processes that clients perceive as procedurally just. The key here is the 
relationship between the attorney and client and the extent to which the 
attorney truly understands and expresses what his client wants to say. If there 
is a strong and positive connection between attorneys and clients, and if 
clients are permitted to observe attorneys’ presentations, it is likely that 
clients will perceive that they had an opportunity for voice and (through their 
attorneys) were treated with dignity and respect. Similarly, many of the 
processes that have been judged as procedurally fair involve the even-handed 
application and use of objective social norms. Thus, it appears that evaluative 
interventions by mediators can be consistent with procedural justice 
considerations.  
However, these changes in court-connected mediation also present the 
potential for violation of procedural justice considerations. The attorney who 
does not fully understand or chooses not to tell his client’s story in a 
mediation session cannot be viewed as effectively expressing his silenced 
client’s voice. The mediator who offers his financial assessment even before 
the disputant has the opportunity to present her case cannot be viewed as 
giving the disputant the opportunity to tell her story. The mediator who 
garners a settlement by aggressively pressuring the disputant to submit to his 
evaluation of her case cannot be viewed as treating the disputant with respect 
and dignity. 
Finally, a few elements of mediation’s new “look” are patently 
inconsistent with disputants’ procedural justice preferences. Specifically, the 
de facto exclusion of disputants from mediation sessions is not consistent 
with disputants’ desire for procedures in which they can be assured that they 
were given the opportunity to speak and were treated as valued members of 
society. Exclusion from mediation sessions certainly cannot signal social 
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inclusion. Similarly, the increasingly common marginalization or outright 
abandonment of joint sessions is inconsistent with the need for a dignified, 
even-handed opportunity for voice. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to propose specific means 
to ensure that the bargaining and settlement that occur in mediation are 
tempered by procedural justice considerations, several themes and 
suggestions quickly emerge from the foregoing application of the procedural 
justice literature to the current evolution of court-connected mediation. For 
example, although mediation is often lauded as an infinitely flexible process, 
it may now be necessary for legislatures or courts to mandate that court-
connected mediation programs shall always invite the actual disputants to 
attend and participate in the mediation sessions, rather than conditioning the 
disputants’ presence and their level of participation upon the preferences of 
individual mediators. It also may now be necessary for court rules or statutes 
to mandate that court-connected mediation sessions shall always provide the 
disputants themselves with an opportunity to speak, rather than permitting 
mediators to rely automatically and exclusively upon the representations of 
the disputants’ attorneys. Statutes or court rules may need to specify that 
mediation sessions shall always include an initial joint session, which will be 
managed to permit the disputants (or their attorneys) to tell their stories in a 
dignified and open setting. Lastly, courts or legislatures may need to amend 
the rules, codes of ethics, or statutes that apply to court-connected mediation 
to provide that mediators shall not engage in evaluative interventions until 
after the disputants have had sufficient opportunity to tell their stories and 
that such interventions shall be delivered in a manner that demonstrates 
respect for the dignity and self-determination of the disputants.350  
CONCLUSION 
It is important to acknowledge that whenever an institution adopts an 
innovation, the institution nonetheless remains (and perhaps must remain) 
true to its own defining norms. Context does matter. In remaining loyal to its 
own norms, an institution may consciously or unconsciously disregard the 
norms of those that created the innovation and brought it to the attention of 
the institution. 
In the case of mediation, early advocates for the process became believers 
for several reasons. They promoted it as a mechanism for the empowerment 
of citizens who found themselves caught in a dispute. The disputants 
 
 
 350. I have suggested elsewhere possible means to tame over-aggressive evaluation. See Welsh, 
supra note 14, at 86-92. 
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themselves participated directly and actively in the resolution of their own 
disputes, controlled the norms that would guide their decision making, 
generated their own options for resolution, and controlled the final decision 
regarding whether or not to reach a resolution and on what terms.351 
Advocates promoted the mediation process as a means to make the process 
of receiving some sort of “justice” more accessible 352 and more 
democratic.353 They also argued that mediation would permit disputants to 
achieve better solutions, solutions that responded directly to the disputants’ 
needs and their personal definitions of justice.354  
The courts, however, are not institutions that are defined by the principles 
of democracy, empowerment, or creative, de-legalized justice. Instead, in 
civil litigation, the courts are committed to the “just,” “speedy,” and 
“inexpensive determination of every action.”355 To the extent that 
mediation’s new “look” is supported by negotiation and decision-making 
theory and research, it appears that mediation is aiding the courts in 
achieving the last two of these three goals.  
The very first of these goals, however, and its application to mediation 
have been the focus of this Article. What does justice have to do with 
dealmaking in court-connected mediation? Simply, when the courts actively 
sponsor and even require litigants to use the third party process of mediation 
to resolve their disputes, the courts’ commitment to a just determination 
necessarily implicates procedural justice considerations. Indeed, the rules of 
civil procedure—and, more broadly, the current state of the law regarding the 
requirements of due process356—represent the result of countless struggles to 
ensure that deserving litigants are sufficiently heard, that their presentations 
 
 
 351. See supra Part I. 
 352. See Edward A. Dauer, Justice Irrelevant: Speculations on the Causes of ADR, 74 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 83, 95-96 (2000). 
 353. See supra Part I. 
 354. See supra Part I. 
 355. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 356. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11-18 (1991) (applying the Mathews test to 
prejudgment attachment of real estate); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (establishing a 
three-part balancing test to determine when a hearing is necessary, and how complete such a hearing 
must be, before deprivation may occur); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) 
(requiring that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant not offend “traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice”) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). See also 
Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 176, at 958 (observing that the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the due process clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments “in essence relies on 
a political and legal tradition that uses process to express a commitment to limited state power and to 
the protection of individuals’ autonomy and dignity”). But see Jerry Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s 
Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in 
Search of a Theory of Value , 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49-52 (1976) (raising concerns regarding the 
Supreme Court’s failure to reference the dignitary aspects of due process). 
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and arguments are sufficiently considered, and that something that looks like 
justice is being done to resolve their legal actions.357 Thus, within the context 
of the courts, the third party process of mediation should and must be judged 
against the standard of procedural justice. 
Measured against this standard, most of the adaptations that now exist in 
court-connected mediation are not objectionable, at least not per se. This is 
helpful to understand, particularly as debates continue to rage about the 
appropriateness of evaluative mediation in the court context and lawyers’ de 
facto (and sometimes de jure) capture of civil nonfamily court-connected 
mediation. Settlement is a worthy goal. Indeed, disputants’ satisfaction with 
mediation is consistently enhanced when the process enables them to reach 
settlement.358 Generally, the changes in court-connected mediation that 
enhance bargaining and thus improve the disputants’ ability to reach 
settlement are laudable. 
However, a few of the adaptations in court-connected mediation that 
make bargaining more efficient and settlement more likely (e.g., the de facto 
exclusion of disputants and the marginalization or abandonment of the joint 
session), raise very serious problems for perceptions of procedural justice. 
Other adaptations, such as the reduced role of the disputants who attend 
mediation sessions, attorneys’ strong preference for evaluative interventions, 
and even the focus on monetary settlements, have the potential to cause 
problems if mediation continues to evolve in order to fit exclusively within a 
bargaining paradigm. Left unchecked by court rules, state statutes, or ethical 
rules, some of the adaptations that enhance deal-making and settlement “may 
 
 
 357. For example, FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), which requires that the plaintiff provide “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” attempts to balance both the 
plaintiff’s and the defendant’s rights to a proceeding in which they will be heard. Id. On one hand, the 
rule requires the plaintiff to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds for the claim, in 
order to permit the defendant to advocate sufficiently on his own behalf. Id. On the other hand, the rule 
does not unduly restrict plaintiff’s access to the courts and discovery by requiring that the plaintiff 
immediately plead all of the facts needed to establish all elements of her claim. Similarly, although 
FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a) punishes dilatory litigants by providing for entry of default, FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c) 
permits the default to be set aside for “good cause shown.” In establishing the factors to be considered 
in determining whether this standard has been met, courts prefer that litigants be given the opportunity 
to be heard and to have their cases decided on the merits. See, e.g., Shepard Claims Serv., Inc. v. 
William Darrah & Assoc., 796 F.2d 190, 195 (6th Cir. 1986) (reversing the trial court’s denial of 
defendant’s motion to set aside the entry of default and remanding for further proceedings, based on 
the following considerations: whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced, whether the defendant had a 
meritorious defense, and whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to default). 
 358. WISSLER, AN EVALUATION OF THE COMMON PLEAS COURT, supra note 92, at vii (reporting 
that parties who reached a full settlement reported more favorable assessments of the mediation 
process and the mediator); Guthrie & Levin, A “Party Satisfaction” Perspective, supra note 241, at 
895 n.34 (listing studies finding that satisfaction rates are higher for parties whose cases settled in 
mediation). 
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in fact diminish [the] perceived justice”359 that can be furnished by court-
connected mediation. This development could tarnish the legitimacy and 
authority of the courts.  
These troubling adaptations require attention and tempering with the 
lessons arising from the procedural justice literature. The experience of 
justice should not be set aside as some “sweet old fashioned notion”360 that 
has outlived its usefulness to modern, settlement-directed civil litigation. 
Instead, mediation, the “alternative” process now struggling with its own 
success, should be allowed to demonstrate that justice can and should have 
everything to do with the “world of bargaining,”361 particularly when the 
bargains are being struck within the realm of our courts. 
 
 
 359. Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder, supra note 176, at 982. 
 360. TINA TURNER, What’s Love Got To Do With It, on PRIVATE DANCER (Capitol Records 1984) 
(“What’s love got to do, got to do with it?/What’s love but a sweet old-fashioned notion?”). 
 361. Galanter, supra  note 23. 
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